ANNEX 1

EU CBRN[1] ACTION PLAN

[1] Although reference is made to CBRN materials throughout this action plan, nuclear materials are generally already well-covered by existing regulations - this will be taken into account in the implementation.

1. Prevention

Horizontal (H)		
Chemical (C)	**Biological (B)**	**Radiological-Nuclear (RN)**
<u>Goal 1: DEVELOP EU LISTS OF HIGH-RISK CBRN MATERIALS AND RISK-BASED APPROACHES TO SECURITY</u>		

Action H.1

The Member States and the Commission should establish and regularly update EU lists of:

- high-risk chemical agents;
- high risk biological agents and toxins;
- high-risk radioactive sources;

of special security concern.

These lists should be developed based on a risk assessment analysis and should take account of existing relevant lists. This process should include the following steps:

- identifying and analysing relevant CBRN materials;
- assessing its potential for being used for malicious purposes;
- selecting the most dangerous materials in terms of their potential for being used for malicious purposes;
- assessing its vulnerability in terms of theft/loss (ease of obtaining it);
- establishing possible preventive measures: physical / technical and administrative;
- carrying out a cost / benefit study on these preventive measures.

Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Implementation period: 2010 ***Task Force Recommendations No. 1, 82, 83, 167***		
Action H.2 The Commission should: • establish fora for EU level dialogue between relevant authorities in the field of CBRN risk-management in order to take cross-border threats fully into account in national and EU planning processes. This should allow the attainment of a common understanding among the Member States and the Commission of the risks faced by the entire EU. • facilitate the exchange of best-practices concerning CBRN risk-management by organising regional/EU level meetings and channelling funding toward the development/identification/implementation of suitable methodologies ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 2, 88, 168, 169***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Goal 2: ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF HIGH RISK CBRN MATERIALS AND FACILITIES		
Action H.3 The Member States and the Commission should develop criteria on assessing security arrangements at high-risk CBRN facilities. This should be done in the form of a good practice document. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 41, 99, 173***		
Action C.1 The Member States should ensure that relevant authorities engage in dialogue with the relevant site security managers and advise operators on the necessary levels of security. Member States should encourage the establishment of trusted relationships between security managers and law enforcement counterparts. ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 39***	**Action B.1** The Commission should assist the Member Sates in the proper implementation of applicable procedures at "the laboratory bench level" and in developing mechanisms for assessing and monitoring its correct implementation. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS*** ***Implementation period: Ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 89***	**Action RN.1** The Member States should ensure that law-enforcement authorities keep the operators of facilities in which high-risk radioactive sources are present informed on a need-to-know basis about potential threats. If no system exists, each Member State should consider establishing a communication mechanism in order to quickly transfer security related information to security managers in facilities in which high-risk radioactive sources are handled. ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 172***
Action C.2 The Member States should ensure that security plans/security management systems are in place in high-	**Action B.2**	**Action RN.2** The Member States and the Commission should analyse potential gaps and, if needed, propose solutions with

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
risk chemical facilities. The security plans should provide for graduated levels of security based on the existing threat level. Member State authorities should be involved in assessing whether these security plans satisfy the necessary level of protection requirements. ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 34***	The Member States should establish: • a secure registry of facilities possessing any of the substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins within each Member State while allowing access to law enforcement; • a process to verify and if necessary to enhance security arrangements of facilities, including diagnostic laboratories handling and possessing any of the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins; • a mechanism within facilities storing biological agents and toxins on the EU biosecurity list to regularly review the need of such biological agents and toxins while keeping a good record of stored materials. ***Involved actors: MS/ Commission/relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: from 2010-2014*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 98, 100, 104***	regard to security requirements for facilities in which certain high-risk sources are manufactured and/or disposed of (and which are located outside of nuclear facilities). ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 171***
Action C.3 The Member States should: • ensure that the responsibilities of the operator and the State in terms of security of facilities should be clearly defined; • ensure that local law enforcement authorities possess information on high-risk chemical facilities in their area.	**Action B.3** The Commission and the Member States should support: • a process whereby facilities (clinical, diagnostic, university, etc) would avoid keeping clinical samples containing any of substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins unnecessarily; • the identification and development of good practices on handling clinical samples containing any of the substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents	**Action RN.3** The Member States and the Commission should conduct an analysis of the feasibility of linking security vetting/background check requirements to existing licensing systems used to authorise the handling of high-risk radioactive sources. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Involved actors: MS ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 35, 38***	and toxins; • progress in creating collaborative networks of facilities working on substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins while taking into account existing networks. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2014*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 102-103***	***Task Force Recommendation No. 173***
Action C.4 The Member States and the Commission should ensure that the chemical industry develops and implements the security side of the Responsible Care programme. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 32***	**Action B.4** The Commission and the Member States should ensure that: • a comprehensive overview of the relevant standards at hand and their relevance to biosecurity and biosafety is achieved; • facilities possessing substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins consider as appropriate the implementation of the CEN Workshop Agreement (CWA 15793), WHO Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance or their national equivalent standards; • appropriate standards are met as part of a national authorisation or accreditation process or as a condition for issuing licences for work with substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins. Regular control over the adherence to and implementation of such standards should also be	

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
	ensured. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholder*** ***Implementation period: Ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 117-120***	
Action C.5 The Member States and the Commission should develop a high level approach to chemical facility security which identifies key objectives and steps to be taken in order to increase security, based on national risk assessment approaches. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 37***		
Action C.6 The Member States and the Commission should encourage industry to replace, where possible, the use of high-risk chemicals with suitable lower-risk alternates. The potential use of the REACH framework or of separate, more specific legislation should be examined in this regard as well, in close coordination with the authorities competent for chemicals of the Member States. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Task Force Recommendation No. 3		
Action C.7 The Commission should bring together the relevant security authorities from the Member States in order to identify good practices concerning the security of high-risk chemical facilities. Based on this work, the Commission should develop a good practice document addressing such issues as: • the responsibility of an authority to assess the security measures in place for various types of materials; • creating varying levels of security measures adapted to the risk posed by particular chemical agents, amounts of certain materials or combinations of materials. These security measures should address inter alia: background checks for personnel, physical security measures and information security. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 33***		
Action C.8 The Commission should launch studies on: • the applicability of existing safety provisions to enhancing security.		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
• training requirements for inspection and enforcement entities, so that they can provide the highest possible levels of relevant security expertise. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 36, 40***		
Action C.9 The Commission should accelerate its work to support enhancing the protection of SCADA systems against cyber-attacks. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 42***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Goal 3: ENHANCE CONTROL OVER HIGH RISK CBRN MATERIALS		
Action C.10 Member States and the Commission should make sure that where this does not take place already today, the chemical industry ensures that in line with international obligations, high-risk chemicals and equipment are only delivered to legitimate users. A sufficient customer qualification scheme should be established in this regard, which is proportionate to the risk and cost effective. The risks associated with trade of chemicals over the Internet should be investigated further. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2010-2012*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 4***		**Action RN.4** The Member States should ensure that national source registries contain comprehensive information on all high-risk sources and their holders. ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 170***
Action C.11 Member States and the Commission should assess the benefits of establishing and if needed should consider creating a licensing scheme for certain high-risk chemicals (in particular for certain CWA precursors) similar to that existing for certain scheduled substances in the framework of the Drug Precursors Regulation. For chemicals covered by the CWC and the Australia Group, the CWC licensing scheme should be considered as meeting some or all of the set-out objectives. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies***		**Action RN.5** The Member States should launch recovery programmes for disused high-risk sources. The launch of a source recovery programme could be coupled with the creation of a source exchange system among the Member States, so that recovered sources can be made available to those states that need them (rather than manufacturing new sources). ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Implementation period: from 2011 ***Task Force Recommendation No. 5***		***Task Force Recommendation No. 178***
Action C.12 The Commission should perform a feasibility assessment on the possibility of using the delivery documentation mechanism to better understand and monitor the supply chain (possibly link it to tracking and tracing). ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 9***		**Action RN.6** The Member States and the Commission should assess the potential and practicalities of establishing tracking systems for high-risk sources (e.g. user-accessible web-based systems; electronic tagging of sources). ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 174***
Action C.13 The Commission should launch a study concerning the availability of certain high-risk chemicals to the general public and potential security gaps in the supply chain. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 10***		**Action RN.7** The Member States and the Commission should identify and exchange good practices for commercial, health care and research facilities possessing radioactive sources to ensure regular appraisal of the staff and its monitoring. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 187***
		Action RN.8 The Commission should launch studies on the origin and consequences of the loss of control over radioactive sources, on the current status of used and disused sources

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
		in the EU and on transport patterns for legal uses of radioactive sources. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 176***
		Action RN.9 The Commission should facilitate the exchange of experience on successful strategies concerning the detection and recovery of orphan sources (article 9 of the HASS Directive). ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 177***
		Action RN.10 Europol should lead an analysis of losses, thefts and other relevant criminal activities related to high-risk sources in the EU. This analysis should take due account of the nature of these particular incidents and the nature of the actual sources, including orphan sources. It could be carried out in cooperation with the IAEA, Interpol and other relevant authorities. It should be made available to the relevant national authorities and reviewed regularly. ***Involved actors: Europol/MS/Commission***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
		Implementation period: from 2010 ***Task Force Recommendation No. 199***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Goal 4: CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HIGH SECURITY CULTURE OF STAFF		
Action H.4 The Member States and the Commission should identify, develop and spread good practices in security training and education of persons working with/having access to or handling high-risk CBRN materials. Consideration should also be given to developing EU guidelines for minimum security training requirements for persons working with, having access to, or handling such materials, based on the national experience across the EU 27. This could be done by way of a peer review process through which experts from the Member States would visit each other with a view to learning from their experience and exchanging best practices in specific fields. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 26, 189***		
Action H.5 The Member States should develop and implement specific training programmes for private security staff (in particular those involved in guarding specific high risk CBRN materials). ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies/ private security companies*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 29, 190***		
Action C.14 The Member States and the Commission should ensure that the chemical industry develops and adopts codes of conduct concerning awareness of security-related issues. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies***	**Action B.5** The Commission and the Member Sates shall encourage professional and other relevant associations working on bio-issues to develop and adopt codes of conduct for their Members. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies***	

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Implementation period: from 2010 ***Task Force Recommendation No. 30***	***Implementation period: ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 95***	
Action C.15 The Member States should implement specific security training for staff in industry and research, where high risk chemicals are present. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 27***	**Action B.6** The Member States and the Commission should define requirements for biosafety officers (roles, competences and training). ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 121***	**Action RN.11** The Member States and the Commission should engage with research stakeholders to raise awareness of security issues and facilitate the exchange of good practices on dealing with security threats. Particular attention should be given to background check requirements for visiting researchers/students. This work should lead to an increased security culture within the research sector. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 207***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Goal 5: IMPROVE THE IDENTIFICATION AND REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS AND BEHAVIOUR		
Action H.6 Member States and the Commission should: • identify and exchange good practices on the reporting of suspicious transactions in relation to high risk CBRN materials used by private and public entities within the EU (e.g. industry, medical sector, research); • establish modalities for reporting loss or suspicious transactions while enhancing awareness of relevant stakeholders about suspicious transactions and encourage stakeholders to report such transactions to law-enforcement authorities. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 7, 96-97, 195***		
Action H.7 Member States and the Commission should develop guidelines for the industry, the medical sector and the research community containing criteria identifying the forms of behaviour, in relation to transactions, which may give rise to suspicion. Member State authorities should provide guidance to stakeholders on what suspicious transactions are. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 6, 196***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Goal 6: ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF TRANSPORT		

Action H.8

The Commission should organise workshops on transport security with regard to CBRN materials. These workshops should bring together experts from the transport sector, the security services and law enforcement authorities. The workshops should address the following issues:

- assess whether existing transport security rules fully cover all CBRN materials;
- identify and exchange good practices in the Member States concerning the transport of CBRN materials (e.g. limited quantities in one transport; or tracking systems);
- identify and exchange current good practices in terms of tracking CBRN materials;
- requirements for the development of tracking and tracing systems for the transport of CBRN materials;
- identify and exchange good practices concerning the implementation of current ADR (and RID and ADN) and IMDG Code (class 7-radioactive materials) requirements such as the development of security plans.
- identify security requirements for logistics enterprises;
- consider establishing a notification system for the international transport of high risk CBRN materials;
- consider the feasibility and costs/benefits of introducing a requirement that only licensed transporters would be used for the transport of high risk CBRN materials. These licensed transporters would be obliged to follow agreed minimum security requirements;
- assess the possible negative impact of strict requirements for transport on transporters of high risk substances and examine potential remedies.

This work should feed into existing processes such as the UNECE Ad-Hoc Working Group.

Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies

Implementation period: 2011-2015

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Task Force Recommendations No. 43, 115, 180		
Action H.9 The Member States and the Commission should ensure that links between law enforcement authorities and transporters of CBRN materials are enhanced. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 44, 110***		
Action H.10 The Member States should ensure that the training of transport staff concerning existing legislative requirements on the security of CBRN materials is improved where appropriate. Regular exercises on transport security should be organised. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 116, 179***		
	Action B.7 The Commission and the Member States should initiate the creation of an EU capability and mechanism to rapidly and safely transport biological samples, in accordance with international regulations, within the EU and into the EU. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2014***	**Action RN.12** The Member States and the Commission should assess the feasibility and potential costs/benefits of creating an electronic system for the control of cross-border transfers of high-risk radioactive sources. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
	Task Force Recommendation No. 142	***Task Force Recommendation No. 181***
		Action RN.13 The Commission should launch a study analysing whether (and how) all radioactive sources, and especially those identified as high-risk, are covered by existing legal regimes concerning transport. Depending on the outcome of the analysis mentioned above, the need for new transport rules in relation to high-risk sources should be assessed. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 182***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Goal 7: IMPROVE INFORMATION EXCHANGE		
Action H.11 The Member States should analyse whether potential problem areas exist in the horizontal and vertical flow of information among the entities dealing with high-risk CBRN materials both within and across the individual Member States. Each Member State should assess whether relevant need-to-know information about changing threat levels reaches license holders. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 13, 193***		
Action H.12 The Member States should ensure that each party within the supply chain informs without delay the relevant national authority in the event of any theft or loss of any high-risk CBRN materials. The relevant national authorities should inform without delay the relevant law enforcement authority responsible for gathering and responding to this information where this has not already been done by the party concerned within the supply chain. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2012*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 17, 197***		
Action H.13 The Member States should ensure a high level of information exchange between relevant actors by having a clearly established notification mechanism which would allow anyone to inform the relevant authorities about a loss/theft of high-risk CBRN materials or about a suspicious transaction. As a minimum requirement, facility security managers should have the necessary contact information for relevant local law enforcement authorities. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Implementation period: 2011-2012 ***Task Force Recommendations No. 18, 198***		
Action C.16 The Member States and the Commission should ensure that public authorities provide, as appropriate, adequate security information to the entire supply chain of high-risk chemical agents, first responders (police, fire-departments, medical services, other special units as needed) and educational establishments to focus attention on issues of concern. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2012*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 14***		**Action RN.14** The Member States and the Commission should support the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database with a view to ensuring real time accessibility for law enforcement authorities, ensuring the highest possible quality of the recorded data. Enhanced EU cooperation in this area should lead to making sure that all relevant losses and recoveries of radioactive sources are reported. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 205***
Action C.17 The Member States and the Commission should consider establishing an alert mechanism in order to quickly transfer security related information to security managers in facilities in which high-risk chemicals are present. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2011-2012*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 15***		**Action RN.15** The Commission should assess whether existing systems, in particular the IAEA's ITDB, provides sufficient information for the law enforcement community. Europol should be closely involved in this analysis. If the analysis leads to the identification of gaps, further feasibility work could be conducted on the need to setup a complementary EU Database of Illicit Trafficking Incidents. ***Involved actors: Commission/EU bodies and agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2011***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
		Task Force Recommendation No. 204

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
Goal 8: STRENGTHEN THE IMPORT/EXPORT REGIME		
		Action RN.16 The Commission should assess the need to address the issue of import/export rules in relation to potential high-risk sources not covered by the HASS Directive. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS*** ***Implementation period: 2012*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 183***
		Action RN.17 The Commission should assess to what extent the Code of Conduct and the IAEA Guidance cover the export and import of all high-risk radioactive sources and how these documents are implemented in the EU Member States. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS*** ***Implementation period: 2012*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 184***
		Action RN.18 The Commission should examine the need and feasibility of drawing up common EU criteria for authorising imports and exports from and to third countries, following an assessment of how the EU Member States implement the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
		Sources. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2012*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 185***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological-Nuclear (RN)
		Goal 9: STRENGTHEN COOPERATION ON THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
		Action RN.19 The Member States and the Commission should progress the ratification of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials by the EU Member States/Community. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 215***
		Action RN.20 The Member States and the Commission should facilitate discussion among regulators, security specialists and performance assessment experts from the EU Member States, as well as the IAEA, in order to discuss progress on the implementation of the amended Convention and identify and exchange good practices concerning physical protection measures. Existing forums should continue to be used as appropriate. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 216***

2. Detection

Horizontal (H)		
Chemical	**Biological**	**Radiological/Nuclear**
Goal 1: ESTABLISH A SCENARIO-BASED/MODELLING APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING WORK PRIORITIES IN THE DETECTION FIELD		
Action H.14 The Member States and the Commission should develop scenarios at EU level (including events with cross-border effects) building on national experience while using the "black box" mechanism. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 45, 127, 217***		
Action H.15 The Member States should strengthen and support: • the exchange of methodologies for developing scenarios; • networking of detectors at national level (centralising the analysis of detection data); • the exchange of information and data regarding broader trends of what has been detected; • the exchange and coordination of information on exercises among the Member States and other stakeholders when relevant. ***Involved actors: MS/ Commission/ relevant agencies***		

Chemical	Biological	Radiological/Nuclear
Implementation period: from 2011 ***Task Force Recommendations No. 46, 133, 218, 222, 223***		
Action H.16 The Member States and the Commission should develop a mechanism for information exchange among Member States on scenario development related to detection. The Commission should prepare an overview of Member State activities in this area. The Commission will support, as far as required, the exchange of information by those Member States wishing to do so. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 132, 219, 221***		
Action H.17 The Member States and the Commission should carry out a gap analysis by creating a matrix for each developed scenario of what is needed to identify CBRN materials and the detection technology already available. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 47, 220***		
	Action B.8 The Member States and the Commission should develop detection models for different biological pathogens and	

Chemical	Biological	Radiological/Nuclear
	toxins, considering distribution, possible vectors, infectious dose and stability. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2012-2014*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 129***	

Chemical	Biological	Radiological/Nuclear
Goal 2: DEVELOP MINIMUM DETECTION STANDARDS		
Action H.18 The Member States and the Commission should develop minimum detection standards (including within the context of border monitoring) based on relevant scenarios and threat assessments while building on existing work (e.g.: CEN). When developing such standardisation activities, adequate engagement of the private sector should be ensured and legal requirements for evidence considered. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2012-2014*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 224***		
	Action B.9 Member States and the Commission should develop reference material of biological agents for both clinical and environmental samples (according to internationally accepted standards) in order to achieve quality assurance in detection. ***Involved actors: MS/ Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2012 - 2014*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 134***	
	Action B.10 Member States and the Commission should set requirements for the detection, identification and monitoring of pathogens and toxins within a civilian security context at the EU level	

Chemical	Biological	Radiological/Nuclear
	Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders ***Implementation period: 2015*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 148***	

<table>
<tr><th>Chemical</th><th>Biological</th><th>Radiological/Nuclear</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3"><u>Goal 3: ESTABLISH TRIALLING, TESTING AND CERTIFICATION SCHEMES FOR CBRN DETECTION IN THE EU</u></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Action H.19

The Member States and the Commission should:

• map out and document the technical requirements necessary for the detection of CBRN materials, according to the field of application of the devices;

• establish an EU wide certification scheme to evaluate whether detection systems and tools meet set requirements relying on existing capabilities and facilities;

• establish an EU wide testing scheme for detection tools and systems to assess the performance and quality of solutions relying on existing capabilities and facilities;

• establish an EU wide trialling scheme to evaluate the quality of both detection tools and systems in practical field operations relying on existing capabilities and facilities;

• exchange good practices, approaches to, and methodologies for quality assurance related to CBRN detection in the Member States.

Involved actors: MS/Commission

Implementation period: from 2011

Task Force Recommendations No. 49, 50, 51, 52, 135, 136-138, 225, 226</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Action B.11

The Member States and the Commission should establish:

• sets of relevant simulants of biological agents for field tests, practical exercises and field technology trialling at national level and EU level, where appropriate;

• criteria for method validation across detection of human, animal and crop threats.

Involved actors: MS/Commission</td><td></td></tr>
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Chemical	Biological	Radiological/Nuclear
	Implementation period: 2012 - 2014 ***Task Force Recommendations No. 139, 141***	

Chemical	Biological	Radiological/Nuclear
Goal 4: IDENTIFY GOOD PRACTICES RELATED TO THE DETECTION OF CBRN MATERIALS, AWARENESS RAISING AND TRAINING		
Action H.20 The Member States and the Commission should assess the feasibility of EU handbooks on the detection of CBRN materials for practitioners (e.g. operators of detection devices) in view of the creation of joint investigation teams as well as an action card for first responders, building on existing work done at the EU and international level, and within the Member States. This handbook should be translated into all official EU languages. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/ relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: 2012-2014*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 54, 149, 229***		
Action H.21 The Member States and the Commission should enhance and support cooperation between forensic laboratories, reference and specialised laboratories on CBRN materials. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: Ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 144***		
Action H.22 The Member States and the Commission should: • establish a mechanism of exchanging best practises in the field of training and exercises, including awareness raising of front line officers; • support EU and national projects aimed at calibrating detection devices in specific environments. Cooperation and information exchange among the Member States on such projects should be enhanced; • support the exchange of good practices on how to respond when CBRN materials are detected;		

Chemical	Biological	Radiological/Nuclear
• exchange good practices on detection methods and processes. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/ relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: 2012-2014*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 55, 56, 57, 128, 130, 131, 227, 228, 230***		
Action H.23 The Commission should: • launch a study on what is currently in place in terms of CBRN border monitoring in the EU; • elaborate guidelines on optimal localisation of detection equipment ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2012***		
Action H.24 Member States and the Commission should initiate the development of mobile detection, identification and sampling capabilities at the EU level. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2014*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 147***		
	Action B.12 Member States and the Commission should enhance and support:	**Action RN.21** The Member States and the Commission should develop an adequate and sustainable training programme at EU level for front line officers. The EU-SECTRA can play an

Chemical	Biological	Radiological/Nuclear
	• cooperation among laboratories assigned to deal with unknown pathogens and toxins at national level; • establish and support networking among existing laboratories which are competent and have capacity across the EU specialising in high risk biological agents and toxins. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: Ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 143, 145-146***	important part in this process. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/ relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: 2012-2014*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 231***

Chemical	Biological	Radiological/Nuclear
Goal 5: IMPROVE THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND STRENGTHEN THE MONITORING OF RADIATION FOR SECURITY PURPOSES		
Action C.18 The Member States and the Commission should communicate the technical requirements of detection devices to the private sector. They should acquire knowledge of available capabilities and future research plans of the private sector. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 53***	**Action B.13** The Members States and the Commission should support: • EU and national projects performing measurements of biological background at specific areas, and enhance cooperation and information exchange among Member States on such projects; • exchange good practices among Member States on cases and processes when a dangerous biological substance is detected. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 150 - 151***	**Action RN.22** The Member States and the Commission should promote and support EU and national projects performing monitoring of radiation for security purposes. Cooperation and information exchange among the Member States on such projects should be enhanced. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 233***

3. Preparedness and response

Horizontal (H)		
Chemical (C)	**Biological (B)**	**Radiological/Nuclear (RN)**
<u>Goal 1: IMPROVE EMERGENCY PLANNING</u>[2]		
Action H.25 Each Member State should integrate CBRN emergencies into its response plans (where applicable into both national and local plans). The requirements of possible criminal investigations and forensics should be fully taken into account in these plans. ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 59, 235***		
Action H.26 Each Member State should assess whether all operators handling high-risk CBRN materials possess emergency response plans. The feasibility of extending, where needed, emergency plan requirements to such operators should be assessed. Gaps in existing regulations should be identified. ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 61, 238***		

[2] Work within the Framework of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism will be streamlined through the launch of an EU CBRN Resilience Programme.

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Action H.27 The Member States and the Commission should develop and conduct regular (at least once a year) exercises and training at all levels (national, European and international), involving and testing cooperation of all relevant organisations, particularly of health, first responders, security and judicial authorities; involvement of private sector in such exercises should be foreseen. Possible criminal investigations and forensics should be part of these regular exercises. The Commission should ensure coordination of relevant exercises at EU level. Within the Framework of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, simulation exercises should regularly address CBRN Scenarios. Existing Training for CBRN responders should be further developed to enhance interoperability. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 60, 154, 236***		
Action H.28 The Commission should launch a study concerning the organisation of Member State structures concerning CBRN incidents. The results of the study should be shared across the EU. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 237***		
Action H.29 Each Member State should assess whether emergency plans exist for high risk public locations and high-risk public events. ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 239***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
	Action B.14 The Member States and the Commission should constitute an EU level working group to consider: • better cooperation among relevant agencies in crisis and consequence management, response and recovery management; it should develop a bio-specific checklist of requirements for consequence management, response and recovery; • good practices on responding to security incidents involving the facilities possessing any of the substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins. ***Involved actors: MS/ Commission/relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: 2011- 2014*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 99, 101, 157***	

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 2: STRENGTHEN COUNTERMEASURE CAPACITY		
Action H.30 Further analysis is required to ensure that sufficient capabilities are available through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in case of need. The Commission should therefore: • update the 2005 assessment of the capabilities that may be available in the event of major terrorist attacks on the basis of specific CBRN scenarios. A flexible approach should be developed, avoiding extensive data gathering and focusing on those types of assistance for which insufficient information was available in 2005; • explore the need for defining additional types of modules in the CBRN area and the feasibility of pre-positioning certain key modules in the event of large public events should be explored as a further way of enhancing European resilience against CBRN emergencies; • work with the Member States to establish templates and procedures for the implementation of Article 5 (6) of the Recast of the Civil Protection Mechanism relating to vaccines, serums and other related medical assistance. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS*** ***Implementation period: 2010/2011***		
Action H.31 Each Member State should: • assess the required amounts and types of medical countermeasures in case of a incident involving high-risk CBRN materials; • assess the availability of hospital beds and hospitals able to carry out the decontamination of victims, the availability of medical and paramedical personnel, transport possibilities and of required countermeasures in the form of technical CBRN equipment; • assess the possibility of sharing medical counter-measures across borders in case of an incident; • update the 2005 assessment of the assistance that may be available through the Civil Protection Mechanism in the event of CBRN incidents.		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Involved actors: MS supported by the Commission ***Implementation period: 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 62, 63, 240, 241***		
Action H. 32 The Commission should collect and disseminate good practices among the Member States concerning the ways in which medical staff can receive guidance on dealing with large scale emergencies and a rapid increase of the number of patients. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS*** ***Implementation period: 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 64, 242***		
	Action B.15 The Health Security Committee should consider: • the possibilities to a) establish therapeutics and vaccine stockpiles towards the known threat of biological agents and toxins, and determine the necessary auxiliary medical supplies to stockpile (gloves, masks, syringes, etc.); b) establish a standby capacity to produce therapeutics, including vaccines, and c) establish sustained funding for a technology platform to secure countermeasures towards biological agents and toxins that are unknown today (public-private experts working group); • the possibilities to scale up the diagnostic capacity in	

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
	crises situations. Involvement of the private sector in the working group should be considered; • ensuring a sufficient amount of medical products to combat an eventual threat; • building an EU wide coordinated approach to access medical countermeasures allowing adequate protection of the EU population, based on risk assessment. ***Involved actors: MS/ Commission/relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: 2011- 2014*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 158, 159, 161, 162***	
	Action B.16 The Commission and the Member States should consider the creation of mechanisms for rapid licensing procedures of drugs and vaccines in crisis situations and possible exemptions from licensing procedures, taking existing work into consideration. This assessment should include possible dual-use export control implications. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS/relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: 2012*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 160***	

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 3: IMPROVE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOWS IN CASE OF CBRN EMERGENCIES		
Action H.33 The Member States should exchange information on emergency plans regarding CBRN incidents, involving all relevant agencies. The target group would be health and police officials, as well as civilian population. It should be developed by health and law enforcement officials together with communication experts. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS/EU bodies and agencies*** ***Implementation period: Ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 154 - 155***		
Action H.34 The Member States and the Commission should setup a CBRN special units' network with a view to enhancing the exchange of information and good practices, organising joint training exercises and keeping up-to-date within the law-enforcement community dealing with CBRN threats. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS/Europol*** ***Implementation period: from 2010***		
		Action RN.23 Each Member State should ensure that public authorities provide relevant security information on a need to know basis to the entire supply chain of radioactive sources and nuclear materials, first responders (police, fire-departments, medical services) and educational establishments in order to enhance preparedness levels. ***Involved actors: MS***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
		Implementation period: from 2010 ***Task Force Recommendation No. 245***
		Action RN.24 The Member States and the Commission should consider integrating and building upon existing platforms for international exchange of information during nuclear emergency situations, as well as assessing their applicability to all radiological and nuclear incidents of concern (scenario-based). An effort should be made to assess the possibilities of streamlining alert messages going through different rapid alert systems. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 246***
		Action RN.25 The Member States and the Commission should establish a process in order to develop generic scenarios illustrating the law enforcement response to a potential event involving radioactive/nuclear materials at the national and the international level. This process should in particular identify the relevant stakeholders who need to be informed about a particular situation and the applicable thresholds for triggering information exchange procedures. The process should at least involve representatives of the

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
		Member States, the Commission and Europol. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/Europol*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 247***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 4: DEVELOP IMPROVED MODELLING TOOLS AND STRENGTHEN DECONTAMINATION CAPACITY		
Action H.35 The Commission should fund an assessment of existing modelling tools for the purpose of seeing whether there is need to invest in further research. The validation of existing modelling tools could be undertaken by the Commission's Joint Research Centre (possibly through the European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection). This work should include the organisation of meetings of modelling experts and emergency response personnel from EU Member States in order to assess practical requirements for modelling tools. Based on this analysis funding could be provided for further research into the development of robust modelling tools applicable to events involving dangerous substances. The Commission should fund an assessment of the role of modelling tools for either pre-event scenario studies or as decision-support systems. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 71, 250***		
Action H. 36 The Commission should facilitate the preparation of an Emergency Response Guidebook for first responders applicable to the context of CBRN emergencies in the European Union. The guidebook would be provided to the Member States free of charge and could be translated into all official EU languages. As part of the process of preparing an Emergency Response Guidebook, a stocktaking of existing documents/guidebooks should be conducted. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 72, 252***		
Action H.37 Each Member should conduct a regular assessment of the available means for effective decontamination and their capacity to deal with mass casualties with reference to CBRN materials. Information about current decontamination solutions should be shared with all Member States. ***Involved actors: MS***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Implementation period: ongoing ***Task Force Recommendations No. 73, 253***		
		Action RN.26 The Commission should further investigate the possibility of using the RODOS and ARGOS Decision Support Systems to address CBRN releases (e.g. radiological dispersal devices, events such as the polonium incident in 2006, etc.), as well as the development of transport and dispersion models for large buildings (e.g.: airports, railway stations) and underground systems. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 251***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 5: IMPROVE THE CAPACITY TO CONDUCT CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS		
Action H. 38 Each Member State should ensure that first responders receive training on forensic awareness in a CBRN crime-scene. ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period: ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 75, 257***		
Action H.39 The Commission should analyse potential problems in the transport of CBRN contaminated materials across borders within the context of criminal investigations and emergency situations in general. ***Involved actors: Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 77, 259***		
Action H.40 Eurojust should develop recommendations on ensuring that collected forensic evidence in a CBRN crime-scene is of a high enough quality to be admissible in court proceedings in the EU Member States. Eurojust, Europol, the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, JRC-Institute for Trans Uranium elements and other relevant organisations should contribute to establishing laboratory practices such that results can be used during legal prosecution (e.g.: accredited measurement procedures; chain of custody). The exchange of experience and good practice concerning the transport, handling, and forensic analysis of contaminated materials in the context of criminal investigations should be pursued. ***Involved actors: Eurojust*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2011***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Task Force Recommendations No. 76, 258		
		Action RN.27 The Commission should support the networking of forensic laboratories and laboratories equipped for measurement/analysis of radioactive materials ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 260***

4. Actions applicable to CBRN prevention, detection and response

Horizontal (H)		
Chemical (C)	**Biological (B)**	**Radiological/Nuclear (RN)**
<u>Goal 1: ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION</u>		
Action H.41 The Member States and the Commission should continue to strengthen the international exchange of good practices concerning staff-awareness and training with external partners. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies*** ***Implementation period: ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 31, 192***		
Action H.42 The Member States and the Commission should, where appropriate, exchange information on their participation in various international forums and should strive toward coordinating their positions in order to ensure that common EU objectives are achieved. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies*** ***Implementation period: ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 206***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 2: IMPROVE COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC		
Action H.43 The Member States and the Commission should regularly organise meetings of Member States' communication specialists dealing with security issues (in particular CBRN events) with a view to encouraging the spread of good practices concerning communication strategies. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 24, 67, 202, 244***		
Action H.44 The Member States and the Commission should review existing international guidelines and incorporate appropriate existing procedures or, when needed, should establish new guidelines for the development of security communication strategies involving CBRN incidents, which could be integrated with existing emergency planning and communications strategies, and would involve all relevant agencies. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 25, 66, 165, 201***		
Action H.45 Each Member State should look into the practical implementation of the good-practices on public and media relations identified in a joint effort by the Commission, Europol and the Member States. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU bodies and agencies***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Implementation period: from 2010 ***Task Force Recommendations No. 65, 200, 243***		
	Action B.17 The Member States and relevant organisations should develop awareness and crisis communication strategies for the public living close to any facilities possessing any high risk biological agents and toxins. ***Involved actors: MS/relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period:2010 - 2012*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 166***	

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 3: DEVELOP IMPROVED INFORMATION TOOLS FOR CBRN SECURITY		
Action H.46 The Commission should establish a forum in which good-practices on security could be shared. The use of existing systems should be explored in this regard. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 16, 194***		
Action H.47 The Commission should establish a library of resources which could be used by the relevant authorities (in particular the law enforcement community and public health authorities). The library would contain applicable information on the nature of CBRN agents and their handling. This library could include national contributions from the Member States. In light of the potentially sensitive content of such a reference library, the need for classification and thus restricted access will be considered. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 80, 214, 263***		
Action H.48 The Member States and the Commission should establish a law enforcement Early Warning System (EWS) for incidents related to high risk CBRN materials, taking account of existing systems and experiences. Such a mechanism would include information on immediate threats, losses/thefts, and suspicious transactions and would in any case need to be accessible to the law enforcement authorities and relevant emergency responders of the Member States and to Europol. As a first step, the extension of the existing G6 system should be considered. The system should be without prejudice to the exchange of information on public health issues. ***Involved actors: Commission/EU bodies and agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2009***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Task Force Recommendations No. 11, 12, 203		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 4: IMPROVE TRAINING		
Action H.49 The European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EEODN) should address the need for developing minimum standards of CBRN training for EOD specialists. The applicability of the standards developed by the European Defence Agency to the non-military context may be assessed in this regard. Training should be provided to EOD personnel in terms of contacting relevant CBRN specialists and on forensic awareness. ***Involved actors: EEODN*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 68, 248***		
Action H.50 The Member States should ensure that CBRN information, including on EOD matters, is integrated into training programmes for relevant first responders and local authority personnel. The Member States and the Commission should ensure that emergency response personnel receive training concerning available modelling tools. ***Involved actors: EEODN*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 70, 249***		
Action C.19 The Commission should provide support for the organisation of specific HazMat specialist trainings. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010***	**Action B.18** Member States and the Commission should identify and spread: • good practices on well targeted training for and education of individuals working with, having access to or handling substances on the EU list of high-risk biological agents and toxins;	**Action RN.28** The Member States and the Commission should use the capacity of the planned European Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) to provide nuclear and radiological security related training and to support and complement such activities at the national level. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Task Force Recommendation No. 69	• good practices on academic training on biosafety, potential misuse of information and biological agents and toxins, and bio-ethics for undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students; • good laboratory practices. ***Involved actors: Member States/Commission/relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: 2010 -2012*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 91***	***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 191***
Action C.20 The Member States should organise regular exercises concerning the security of chemical facilities in order to test preparedness measures in place and raise awareness among staff. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 28***	**Action B.19** The Member States and the Commission should consider and develop: • guidelines at the EU level for minimum training requirements for persons working with, having access to, substances on the EU list of high-risk biological agents and toxins; • in conjunction with universities and professional associations, minimal requirements for academic training on biosafety, potential misuse of information and biological agents and toxins and bio-ethics for undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students. ***Involved actors: Member States/Commission/relevant stakeholders***	

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
	Implementation period: 2010 -2012 ***Task Force Recommendations No. 92-94***	

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 5: STRENGTHEN PERSONNEL SECURITY		
Action H.51 The Member States and the Commission should analyse the need to establish a system of mutual recognition of security vetting processes for certain categories of personnel. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 188***		
Action H.52 The Member States and the Commission should develop and introduce common graduated criteria for background checks and vetting requirements in relation to personnel having access to materials on the EU list of high-risk CBRN materials along the whole chain of production, storage, distribution and use. These common criteria should be based on a graduated approach. In the course of the recruitment process, the recruiting organisation should ensure that the credentials of the candidates are properly checked and assessed. The Commission should launch a study concerning existing background check procedures and requirements within the CBRN industry. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 20, 22, 23, 105, 107, 186***		
Action H. 53 The Member States and the Commission should identify and exchange good practices on approaches to security of non-EU visiting staff and students; Member States should aim at common procedures across the EU. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010--2012***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Task Force Recommendation No. 109		
Action C.21 The Member States and the Commission should identify and exchange good practices on robust management structures at commercial, industrial and research facilities possessing high-risk chemical agents ensuring regular appraisal of the staff and its monitoring ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/EU agencies*** ***Implementation period: from 2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 21***	**Action B.20** The Member States should ensure that each Member State and/or organisation has a secure registry of personnel having access to or information on substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins (along the whole chain of production, storage, distribution and use). Law enforcement should have access to such a registry.[3] ***Involved actors: MS*** ***Implementation period:2010-2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 106***	
	Action B.21 The Member States and the Commission should identify and exchange good practices on robust management structures at commercial, industrial and research facilities possessing substances on the EU list of high risk biological agents and toxins ensuring regular appraisal of the staff and its monitoring. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010--2012***	

[3] Diagnostic facilities would only be concerned, if they stored isolated biological agents and toxins from clinical samples.

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
	Task Force Recommendation No. 108	

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 6: STRENGTHEN AND PRIORITISE RESEARCH		
Action H.54 The Member States and the Commission should improve the aggregation and spread of research results both at EU level as well as at national level across the EU Member States. For unclassified materials, this should be done by way of organising conferences and setting up a dedicated research web-portal (for all of CBRN security) which would contain a summary of the relevant research projects and contact information where further details can be obtained, as well as opportunities for future research collaboration and work. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 78, 211, 261***		
Action H.55 The Member States and the Commission should engage in further research cooperation with international partners with a view to enhancing synergies and avoiding duplications. The research work performed by the European Defence Agency and the Joint Research Centre as well as the recommendations to be made by the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) should be taken into account in these efforts. The Commission should organise periodic meetings of CBRN experts, including specialists from other partner countries, in order to share and spread good practices on CBRN issues. The results of these meetings should be collected and the disseminated among the Member States. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No.79, 212, 262***		
Action H.56 The Member States and the Commission should improve the use of existing scientific networks to enhance work in the detection area. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Task Force Recommendation No. 234		
Action H.57 The Commission should launch studies on: • the necessity and impacts of assessing scientific research and scientific publications against security aspects; • the potential psychological effect of CBRN emergencies on the population and the likely reactions of local populations in case of incidents, and possible action-oriented responses; • the economic and social consequences of a CBRN terrorism incident and identify practical and action-oriented responses; • rehabilitation of contaminated areas following malevolent dispersal of CBRN materials, which also addresses the question of acceptable levels of residual contamination; • decontamination procedures which do not damage forensic evidence. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 74, 81, 126, 208, 254, 255, 264***		
Action H.58 The Member States and the Commission should encourage funding organisations (be it public or private) to take security aspects of proposed research projects and other publications into account, as well as the suitability of the funds receiver (from both a safety and a security perspective) to work on the research the receiver is proposing. Best practices of funding organisations should be identified and exchanged across Member States. ***Involved actors: MS/Commission/relevant stakeholders***		

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Implementation period: from 2010 ***Task Force Recommendations No. 123, 124, 210***		
Action C.22 The Commission and the Member States should support research into the following areas: • Prevention: 1. Development of low-risk alternatives to high-risk chemicals. • Detection: 1. Ensuring interoperability and network application of detection devices in view of joint team operations; 2. Improving the presentation of detection results in a way that they can easily be understood by end-users, particularly first responders; • Technology research: 1. Further miniaturising detection equipment, which should combine various capabilities in one device. 2. The development of transportable equipment which can be used by emergency responders in the field.	**Action B.22** The Commission and Member States should enhance: • research on capabilities for response and recovery from biological incidents; • the understanding of and research in emergency logistics and distribution operations (e.g., of medicines) at the regional, national and international level. ***Involved actors: Commission/MS/relevant stakeholders*** ***Implementation period: Ongoing*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 163-164***	**Action RN.29** The Commission and the Member States should support research into the following areas: • Detection: 1. Detection and identification of difficult to detect radioactive sources and nuclear materials; 2. Detection and identification of masked and shielded sources 3. Improving spectrometry based detection and address the problems of "innocent" and false alarms 4. Detection and location of radiation source in large crowds; • Response: 1. The further development of nuclear forensics; 2. The development of radiological forensics 3. Guidance on storage of contaminated evidence for an extended period of time; 4. Guidance on the disposal of contaminated

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Involved actors: MS/Commission ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 3, 58***		materials; 5. Particle size distribution and potential chemical composition changes following an explosion. 6. Other gaps identified based on a risk-assessment process • Technology research: 1. Detection technologies and electronic tracking systems for radioactive sources; 2. Integration of different technological solutions [address the current status when numerous devices are required for detection]; 3. Improving detection software; 4. Enhance mobility and portability of detection solutions. 5. The development of transportable equipment which can be used by emergency responders in the field (including neutralisation and detection equipment for bomb squads); 6. Decontamination equipment; ***Involved actors: MS/Commission*** ***Implementation period: from 2010*** ***Task Force Recommendations No. 211, 213***

Chemical (C)	Biological (B)	Radiological/Nuclear (RN)
Goal 7: ENSURE THE CRIMINALISATION OF ACTS INVOLVING HIGH-RISK CBRN MATERIALS		
Action H.59 The Commission should analyse the penal legislation enacted in the Member States concerning CBRN terrorism, in order to assess whether any further work at EU level is necessary. ***Involved actors: Commission*** ***Implementation period: 2010-2011*** ***Task Force Recommendation No. 19***		