Directive 2019/2034 - Prudential supervision of investment firms - Main contents

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/64

Robust prudential supervision is an integral part of the regulatory conditions under which financial institutions provide services within the Union. Investment firms are, together with credit institutions, subject to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) and to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) as regards their prudential treatment and supervision, while their authorisation and other organisational and conduct requirements are set out in Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (6).

The existing prudential regimes under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU are largely based on successive iterations of the international regulatory standards set for large banking groups by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and only partially address the specific risks inherent to the diverse activities of a large number of investment firms. The specific vulnerabilities and risks inherent to those investment firms should therefore be further addressed by means of effective, appropriate and proportionate prudential arrangements at Union level which help to provide a level playing field across the Union, which guarantee effective prudential supervision while keeping compliance costs in check, and which ensure sufficient capital for the risks of investment firms.

Sound prudential supervision should ensure that investment firms are managed in an orderly way and in the best interests of their clients. It should take into account the potential for investment firms and their clients to engage in excessive risk‐taking and the different degrees of risk assumed and posed by investment firms. Equally, such prudential supervision should aim to avoid imposing a disproportionate administrative burden on investment firms. At the same time, such prudential supervision should make it possible to strike a balance between ensuring the safety and soundness of investment firms and avoiding excessive costs that might undermine the viability of their business activities.

Many of the requirements that stem from the framework of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU are designed to address common risks faced by credit institutions. Accordingly, the existing requirements are largely calibrated to preserve the lending capacity of credit institutions through economic cycles and to protect depositors and taxpayers from possible failure, and are not designed to address all of the different risk profiles of investment firms. Investment firms do not have large portfolios of retail and corporate loans and do not take deposits. The likelihood that their failure can have detrimental impacts on overall financial stability is lower than in the case of credit institutions, but investment firms nevertheless pose a risk which is necessary to address by means of a robust framework. The risks faced and posed by most investment firms are thus substantially different to the risks faced and posed by credit institutions and such differences should be clearly reflected in the prudential framework of the Union.

Differences in the application of the existing prudential framework in different Member States threaten the level playing field for investment firms within the Union, hampering the access of investors to new opportunities and better ways of managing their risks. Those differences stem from the overall complexity of the application of the framework to different investment firms based on the services that they provide, where some national authorities adjust or streamline such application in national law or practice. Given that the existing prudential framework does not address all the risks faced and posed by some types of investment firms, large capital add‐ons have been applied to certain investment firms in some Member States. Uniform provisions addressing those risks should be established in order to ensure harmonised prudential supervision of investment firms across the Union.

A specific prudential regime is therefore required for investment firms which are not systemic by virtue of their size and their interconnectedness with other financial and economic actors. Systemic investment firms should, however, remain subject to the existing prudential framework under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU. Those investment firms are a subset of investment firms to which the framework laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Directive 2013/36/EU currently applies and which do not benefit from dedicated exemptions from any of their principle requirements. The largest and most interconnected investment firms have business models and risk profiles that are similar to those of significant credit institutions. They provide “bank‐like” services and underwrite risks at significant scale. Furthermore, systemic investment firms are large enough to, and have business models and risk profiles which, represent a threat for the stable and orderly functioning of financial markets on a par with large credit institutions. Therefore it is appropriate that those investment firms remain subject to the provisions set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU.

It is possible that investment firms which deal on own account, which underwrite financial instruments or place financial instruments on a firm commitment basis on a significant scale, or which are clearing members in central counterparties, have business models and risk profiles that are similar to those of credit institutions. Given their size and activities, it is possible that such investment firms present comparable risks to financial stability as credit institutions. Competent authorities should have the option of requiring them to remain subject to the same prudential treatment as credit institutions that fall within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and to compliance with prudential supervision under Directive 2013/36/EU.

There may be Member States in which the authorities competent for the prudential supervision of investment firms are different from the authorities that are competent for the supervision of market conduct. It is therefore necessary to create a mechanism of cooperation and exchange of information between those authorities in order to ensure harmonised prudential supervision of investment firms across the Union which functions promptly and efficiently.

An investment firm may trade via a clearing member in another Member State. Where it does so, a mechanism for sharing information between the relevant competent authorities in the different Member States should be put in place. Such a mechanism should allow the sharing of information between the competent authority for the prudential supervision of the investment firm and either the authority supervising the clearing member or the authority supervising the central counterparty on the model and parameters used for the calculation of the margin requirements of the investment firm where such method of calculation is used as the basis for the investment firm’s own funds requirements.

To foster the harmonisation of supervisory standards and practices within the Union, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) (EBA) should, in close cooperation with the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) (ESMA), retain primary competence for the coordination and convergence of supervisory practices in the area of prudential supervision over investment firms within the European System for Financial Supervision (ESFS).

The required level of initial capital of an investment firm should be based on the services and activities which that investment firm is authorised to provide and perform, respectively, according to Directive 2014/65/EU. The possibility for Member States to lower the required level of initial capital in specific situations, as provided for in Directive 2013/36/EU on the one hand, and the situation of uneven implementation of that Directive on the other hand, have led to a situation where the required level of initial capital diverges across the Union. To end that fragmentation, the required level of initial capital should be harmonised for all investment firms in the Union. With a view to reducing barriers to market entry that currently exist for the multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) and organised trading facilities (OTFs), the initial capital of investment firms that operate an MTF or an OTF should be set at the level referred to in this Directive. Where an investment firm authorised to operate an OTF has been permitted to also engage in dealing on own account under the conditions provided for in Article 20 of Directive 2014/65/EU its initial capital should be set at the level referred to in this Directive.

Although investment firms should no longer fall within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or Directive 2013/36/EU, certain concepts used in the context of those legislative acts should retain their well‐established meaning. To enable and facilitate the consistent reading of such concepts in Union legal acts when used, references in such acts to the initial capital of investment firms, to the supervisory powers of competent authorities for investment firms, to the internal capital adequacy assessment process of investment firms, to the supervisory review and evaluation process of competent authorities for investment firms, and to governance and remuneration provisions applicable to investment firms should be construed as referring to the corresponding provisions in this Directive.

The proper functioning of the internal market requires that the responsibility for prudential supervision of an investment firm, in particular in relation to its solvency and its financial soundness, lies with the competent authority of its home Member State. In order also to achieve effective supervision of investment firms in other Member States, where they provide services or have a branch, close cooperation and exchange of information with the competent authorities of those Member States should be ensured.

For information and supervisory purposes, and in particular to ensure the stability of the financial system, competent authorities of host Member States should be able, on a case‐by‐case basis, to carry out on‐the‐spot checks and inspect the activities of branches of investment firms on their territory, and to require information about the activities of those branches. Supervisory measures for those branches should, however, remain the responsibility of the home Member State.

To protect commercially sensitive information, competent authorities should be bound by rules of professional secrecy when conducting their supervisory tasks and when exchanging confidential information.

To strengthen the prudential supervision of investment firms and the protection of clients of investment firms, auditors should carry out their verification impartially and report promptly to the competent authorities those facts which can have a serious effect on the financial situation of an investment firm or on its administrative and accounting organisation.

For the purposes of this Directive, personal data should be processed in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9), and with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10). In particular, where this Directive allows for exchanges of personal data with third countries, the relevant provisions of Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 should apply.

To safeguard compliance with the obligations laid down in this Directive and Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11), Member States should provide for administrative sanctions and other administrative measures which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In order to ensure that administrative sanctions have a dissuasive effect they should be published except in certain well‐defined circumstances. To enable clients and investors to make an informed decision about their investment options, those clients and investors should have access to information on administrative sanctions and other administrative measures imposed on investment firms.

To detect breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive and breaches of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Member States should have the necessary investigatory powers and should establish effective and rapid mechanisms to report potential or actual breaches.

Investment firms which are not considered to be small and non‐interconnected should have available internal capital which is adequate in quantity, quality and distribution to cover the specific risks to which they are or may be exposed. Competent authorities should ensure that investment firms have adequate strategies and processes in place to assess and maintain the adequacy of their internal capital. Competent authorities should also be able to request small and non‐interconnected investment firms to apply similar requirements where appropriate.

Supervisory review and evaluation powers should continue to remain an important regulatory tool that allows competent authorities to assess qualitative elements, including internal governance and controls, risk management processes and procedures and, where needed, to set additional requirements, including in particular in relation to own funds and liquidity requirements, in particular for investment firms which are not considered to be small and non‐interconnected, and where the competent authority deems it to be justified and appropriate also for small and non‐interconnected investment firms.

The principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is laid down in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). That principle should be applied in a consistent manner by investment firms. To align remuneration with the risk profile of investment firms and to guarantee a level playing field, investment firms should be subject to clear principles with regard to corporate governance arrangements and remuneration rules, which are gender neutral and which take into account the differences between credit institutions and investment firms. Small and non‐interconnected investment firms should, however, be exempt from those rules because the provisions on remuneration and corporate governance laid down in Directive 2014/65/EU are sufficiently comprehensive for those types of investment firms.

Similarly, the Commission report of 28 July 2016 on the assessment of the remuneration rules under Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 demonstrated that the requirements on deferral and pay‐out in instruments laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU are not appropriate for small and non‐complex investment firms or for staff with low levels of variable remuneration. Clear, consistent and harmonised criteria for identifying investment firms and individuals that are exempt from those requirements are necessary to ensure supervisory convergence and a level playing field. Given the important role that high earners play in directing the business and long‐term performance of investment firms, effective oversight of the remuneration practices and trends relating to high earners should be ensured. Therefore, competent authorities should be able to monitor the remuneration of high earners.

It is also appropriate to offer some flexibility to investment firms in the way investment firms use non‐cash instruments to pay variable remuneration, provided that such instruments are effective in achieving the objective of aligning the interests of staff with the interests of various stakeholders, such as shareholders and creditors, and contribute to the alignment of variable remuneration with the risk profile of the investment firm.

The revenues of investment firms in the form of fees, commissions and other revenues in relation to the provision of different investment services are highly volatile. Limiting the variable component of remuneration to a portion of the fixed component of remuneration would affect the investment firm’s ability to reduce remuneration at times of reduced revenues and could lead to an increase of the investment firm’s fixed cost base, leading in turn to risks to the investment firm’s ability to withstand times of economic downturn or reduced revenues. To avoid those risks, a single maximum ratio between the variable and the fixed components of remuneration should not be imposed on non‐systemic investment firms. Instead, those investment firms should set appropriate ratios themselves. However, this Directive should not preclude Member States from implementing measures in national law designed to subject investment firms to stricter requirements with regard to the maximum ratio between the variable and the fixed components of the remuneration. Moreover, this Directive should not prevent Member States from imposing such a maximum ratio on all or on specific types of investment firms.

This Directive should not prevent Member States from adopting a stricter approach with regard to the remuneration when investment firms receive extraordinary public financial support.

Different governance structures are used across Member States. In most cases a unitary or a dual‐board structure is used. The definitions laid down in this Directive are intended to embrace all existing structures without expressing a preference for any particular structure. They are purely functional for the purpose of setting out rules aimed at a particular outcome irrespective of the national company law applicable to an institution in each Member State. The definitions should therefore not interfere with the general allocation of competences in accordance with national company law.

Management bodies should be understood to have executive and supervisory functions. The competence and structure of management bodies differ across Member States. In Member States where management bodies have a one‐tier structure, a single board usually performs management and supervisory tasks. In Member States with a two‐tier system, the supervisory function is performed by a separate supervisory board which has no executive functions and the executive function is performed by a separate management board which is responsible and accountable for the day‐to‐day management of the undertaking. Accordingly, separate tasks are assigned to the different entities within the management body.

In response to the growing public demand for tax transparency, and to promote investment firms’ corporate responsibility, it is appropriate to require that, unless they qualify as small and non‐interconnected, investment firms disclose, on an annual basis, certain information, including information on profits made, taxes paid and any public subsidies received.

To address risks at investment firm only group level, the prudential consolidation method required by Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 should in the case of investment firm only groups be accompanied by a group capital test for simpler group structures. The determination of the group supervisor, however, should in both cases be based on the same principles that apply in the case of supervision on a consolidated basis under Directive 2013/36/EU. To ensure proper cooperation, core elements of coordination measures, and in particular information requirements in emergency situations or cooperation and coordination arrangements should be similar to the core elements of coordination applicable in the context of the single rulebook for credit institutions.

The Commission should be able to submit recommendations to the Council for the negotiation of agreements between the Union and third countries for the practical exercise of supervision of compliance with the group capital test for investment firms, the parent undertakings of which are established in third countries, and for investment firms operating in third countries the parent undertakings of which are established in the Union. Moreover, Member States and EBA should also be able to set‐up cooperation arrangements with third countries to perform their supervisory tasks.

In order to ensure legal certainty and avoid overlaps between the current prudential framework applicable to both credit institutions and investment firms and this Directive, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU should be amended in order to remove investment firms from their scope. However, investment firms which are part of a banking group should remain subject to those provisions in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU which are relevant to the banking group, such as the rules on prudential consolidation set out in Articles 11 to 24 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the provisions on the intermediate EU parent undertaking referred to in Article 21b of Directive 2013/36/EU.

It is necessary to specify the steps that undertakings need to take to verify whether they fall under the definition of a credit institution as set out in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and therefore need to obtain authorisation as a credit institution. Because certain investment firms already carry out the activities listed in points (3) and (6) of Section A of Annex I to Directive 2014/65/EU, it is also necessary to ensure clarity regarding the continuity of any authorisation granted for those activities. In particular, it is essential that competent authorities ensure that the transition from the current framework to the new one offers sufficient regulatory certainty for investment firms.

To ensure effective supervision, it is important that undertakings that meet the conditions set out in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 apply for an authorisation as a credit institution. Competent authorities should therefore have the possibility to apply sanctions to undertakings that do not apply for that authorisation.

The amendment to the definition of ‘credit institution’ in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 by Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 may cover, from the entry into force of the latter, investment firms that are already operating on the basis of an authorisation issued in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU. Those undertakings should be allowed to continue operating under their authorisation as investment firms until the authorisation of a credit institution is granted. Those investment firms should submit an application for authorisation as a credit institution at the latest when the average of their monthly total assets is equal to or exceeds any of the thresholds set out in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 over a period of 12 consecutive months. Where investment firms meet any of the thresholds set out in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as from the date of entry into force of this Directive, the average of their monthly total assets should be calculated taking into account the 12 consecutive months preceding that date. Those investment firms should apply for authorisation as a credit institution within one year and one day after the entry into force of this Directive.

The amendment to the definition of ‘credit institution’ in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 by Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 may also affect undertakings which have already applied for authorisation as investment firms under Directive 2014/65/EU and for which the application is still pending. Such applications should be transferred to the competent authorities under Directive 2013/36/EU and be treated in accordance with the authorisation provisions set out in that Directive if the envisaged total assets of the undertaking are equal to or exceed any of the thresholds set out in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

Undertakings referred to in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 should also be subject to all the requirements for access to the activity of credit institutions laid down in Title III of Directive 2013/36/EU, including the provisions on the withdrawal of authorisation in accordance with Article 18 of that Directive. Article 18 of that Directive should, however, be amended to ensure that competent authorities are able to withdraw the authorisation granted to a credit institution where that credit institution uses its authorisation exclusively to engage in the activities referred to in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and has, for a period of five consecutive years, average total assets below the thresholds set out in that point.

Pursuant to Article 39 of Directive 2014/65/EU, third‐country firms providing financial services in the Union are subject to national regimes which may require the establishment of a branch in a Member State. To facilitate the regular monitoring and assessment of activities carried out by third‐country firms through branches in the Union, competent authorities should be informed about the scale and scope of the services and activities carried out through branches in their territory.

Specific cross‐references in Directives 2009/65/EC (12), 2011/61/EU (13) and 2014/59/EU (14) of the European Parliament and of the Council to the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, which no longer apply to investment firms from the date of application of this Directive and of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, should be construed as references to the corresponding provisions in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033.

EBA, in cooperation with ESMA, has issued a report based on thorough background analysis, data collection and consultation for a bespoke prudential regime for all non‐systemic investment firms, which serves as the basis for the revised prudential framework for investment firms.

To ensure the harmonised application of this Directive, EBA should develop draft regulatory technical standards to further specify the criteria to subject certain investment firms to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, to specify the information which the competent authorities of home Member States and of host Member States should exchange in the context of supervision, to set out how investment firms should assess the size of their activities for the purposes of internal governance requirements and, in particular, to assess whether they constitute small and non‐interconnected investment firms. Regulatory technical standards should also specify the categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of firms for the purposes of remuneration provisions, and specify the Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments which qualify as variable remuneration. Finally, regulatory technical standards should specify the elements for the assessment of specific liquidity risks, the application of additional own funds requirements by competent authorities, and the functioning of the colleges of supervisors. The Commission should supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards developed by EBA by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. The Commission and EBA should ensure that those regulatory technical standards can be applied by all investment firms concerned in a manner that is proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of those investment firms and their activities.

The Commission should also be empowered to adopt implementing technical standards developed by EBA regarding information sharing between competent authorities and publication requirements of competent authorities and implementing technical standards developed by ESMA by means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291 TFEU and in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

In order to ensure the uniform application of this Directive and to take account of developments in financial markets, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by clarifying the definitions in this Directive, the internal capital and risk assessments of investment firms, and the supervisory review and evaluation powers of competent authorities. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law‐Making (15). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

Since the objective of this Directive, namely to set up an effective and proportionate prudential framework to ensure that investment firms authorised to operate within the Union operate on a sound financial basis and are managed in an orderly way, including in the best interests of their clients, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents (16), Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the components of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments. With regard to this Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified,

the initial capital of investment firms;

supervisory powers and tools for the prudential supervision of investment firms by competent authorities;

the prudential supervision of investment firms by competent authorities in a manner that is consistent with the rules set out in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

publication requirements for competent authorities in the field of prudential regulation and supervision of investment firms.

‘ancillary services undertaking’ means an undertaking, the principal activity of which consists of owning or managing property, managing data‐processing services, or a similar activity which is ancillary to the principal activity of one or more investment firms;

‘authorisation’ means authorisation of an investment firm in accordance with Article 5 of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘branch’ means a branch as defined in point (30) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘close links’ means close links as defined in point (35) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘competent authority’ means a public authority or body of a Member State that is officially recognised and empowered by national law to supervise investment firms in accordance with this Directive, as part of the supervisory system in operation in that Member State;

‘commodity and emission allowance dealer’ means a commodity and emission allowance dealer as defined in point (150) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;

‘control’ means the relationship between a parent undertaking and a subsidiary, as described in Article 22 of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (17), or in the accounting standards to which an investment firm is subject under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (18), or a similar relationship between any natural or legal person and an undertaking;

‘compliance with the group capital test’ means compliance by a parent undertaking in an investment firm group with the requirements of Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

‘credit institution’ means a credit institution as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;

‘derivatives’ means derivatives as defined in point (29) of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (19);

‘financial institution’ means a financial institution as defined in point (14) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

‘gender neutral remuneration policy’ means gender neutral remuneration policy as defined in point (65) of Article 3(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU, as amended by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council (20);

‘group’ means a group as defined in point (11) of Article 2 of Directive 2013/34/EU;

‘consolidated situation’ means a consolidated situation as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

‘group supervisor’ means a competent authority responsible for the supervision of compliance with the group capital test of Union parent investment firms and investment firms controlled by Union parent investment holding companies or Union parent mixed financial holding companies;

‘home Member State’ means a home Member State as defined in point (55)(a) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘host Member State’ means a host Member State as defined in point (56) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘initial capital’ means the capital which is required for the purposes of authorisation as an investment firm, the amount and type of which are specified in Articles 9 and 11;

‘investment firm’ means an investment firm as defined in point (1) Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘investment firm group’ means an investment firm group as defined in point (25) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

‘investment holding company’ means an investment holding company as defined in point (23) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

‘investment services and activities’ means investment services and activities as defined in point (2) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘management body’ means a management body as defined in point (36) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘management body in its supervisory function’ means the management body acting in its role of overseeing and monitoring management decision‐making;

‘mixed financial holding company’ means a mixed financial holding company as defined in point (15) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (21);

‘mixed‐activity holding company’ means a parent undertaking other than a financial holding company, an investment holding company, a credit institution, an investment firm, or a mixed financial holding company within the meaning of Directive 2002/87/EC, the subsidiaries of which include at least one investment firm;

‘senior management’ means senior management as defined in point (37) of Article 4(1) Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘parent undertaking’ means a parent undertaking as defined in point (32) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘subsidiary’ means a subsidiary as defined in point (33) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

‘systemic risk’ means systemic risk as defined in point (10) of Article 3(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU;

‘Union parent investment firm’ means a Union parent investment firm as defined in point (56) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

‘Union parent investment holding company’ means a Union parent investment holding company as defined in point (57) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

‘Union parent mixed financial holding company’ means a Union parent mixed financial holding company as defined in point (58) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033.

ensure the uniform application of this Directive;

take account, in the application of this Directive, of developments on financial markets.

the investment firm carries out those activities on such a scale that the failure or the distress of the investment firm could lead to systemic risk;

the investment firm is a clearing member as defined in point (3) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

the competent authority considers it to be justified in light of the size, nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the investment firm concerned, taking into account the principle of proportionality and having regard to one or more of the following factors:

competent authorities, as parties to the ESFS, cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular when ensuring the exchange of appropriate, reliable and exhaustive information between them and other parties to the ESFS;

competent authorities participate in the activities of EBA, and, as appropriate, in the colleges of supervisors referred to in Article 48 of this Directive and in Article 116 of Directive 2013/36/EU;

competent authorities make every effort to ensure compliance with the guidelines and recommendations issued by EBA pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and to respond to the warnings and recommendations issued by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (22);

competent authorities cooperate closely with the ESRB;

tasks and powers conferred on the competent authorities do not inhibit the performance of the duties of those competent authorities as members of EBA or of the ESRB, or under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) 2019/2033.

references to initial capital of investment firms in Article 28 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall be construed as references to Article 9(1) of this Directive;

references to initial capital of investment firms in Articles 29 and 31 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall be construed as references to Article 9(2), (3) or (4) of this Directive, depending on the types of investment services and activities of the investment firm;

references to initial capital in Article 30 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall be construed as references to Article 9(1) of this Directive.

information about the management and ownership structure of the investment firm;

information about compliance with own funds requirements by the investment firm;

information about compliance with the concentration risk requirements and liquidity requirements of the investment firm;

information about the administrative and accounting procedures and internal control mechanisms of the investment firm;

any other relevant factors that may influence the risk posed by the investment firm.

to monitor the prudential rules set out in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

to impose sanctions;

in administrative appeals against decisions of the competent authorities;

in court proceedings initiated under Article 23.

the supervision of financial institutions and financial markets, including the supervision of financial entities licensed to operate as central counterparties, where central counterparties have been recognised under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (23);

the liquidation and bankruptcy of investment firms and similar procedures;

oversight of the bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of investment firms and similar procedures;

the carrying out of statutory audits of financial institutions or institutions which administer compensation schemes;

oversight of persons charged with carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of financial institutions;

oversight of persons active on emission allowance markets for the purpose of ensuring a consolidated overview of financial and spot markets;

oversight of persons active on agricultural commodity derivatives markets for the purpose of ensuring a consolidated overview of financial and spot markets.

constitutes a material breach of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions laid down pursuant to this Directive;

may affect the continuous functioning of the investment firm; or

may lead to a refusal to certify the accounts or can lead to the expression of reservations.

fails to have in place internal governance arrangements as set out in Article 26;

fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information on compliance with the obligation to meet own funds requirements set out in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 to the competent authorities, in breach of point (b) of Article 54(1) of that Regulation;

fails to report to the competent authorities, in breach of point (e) of Article 54(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, information about concentration risk or provides incomplete or inaccurate information;

incurs a concentration risk in excess of the limits set out in Article 37 of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, without prejudice to Articles 38 and 39 of that Regulation;

repeatedly or persistently fails to hold liquid assets in breach of Article 43 of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, without prejudice to Article 44 of that Regulation;

fails to disclose information, or provides incomplete or inaccurate information, in breach of the provisions set out in Part Six of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

makes payments to holders of instruments included in the own funds of the investment firm where Article 28, 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 prohibit such payments to holders of instruments included in own funds;

is found liable for a serious breach of national provisions adopted pursuant to Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council (25);

allows one or more persons that do not comply with Article 91 of Directive 2013/36/EU to become or remain a member of the management body.

a public statement which identifies the natural or legal person, investment firm, investment holding company or mixed financial holding company responsible and the nature of the breach;

an order requiring the natural or legal person responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from repeating that conduct;

a temporary ban for members of the investment firm’s management body or any other natural persons who are held responsible on exercising functions in investment firms;

in case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to 10 % of the total annual net turnover, including the gross income consisting of interest receivable and similar income, income from shares and other variable or fixed‐yield securities, and commissions or fees of the undertaking in the preceding business year;

in the case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided due to the breach where those profits or losses can be determined;

in the case of a natural person, administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to EUR 5 000 000, or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on 25 December 2019.

the gravity and the duration of the breach;

the degree of responsibility of the natural or legal persons responsible for the breach;

the financial strength of the natural or legal persons responsible for the breach, including the total turnover of legal persons or the annual income of natural persons;

the importance of profits gained or losses avoided by the legal persons responsible for the breach;

any losses incurred by third parties as a result of the breach;

the level of cooperation with the relevant competent authorities;

previous breaches by the natural or legal persons responsible for the breach;

any potential systemic consequences of the breach.

the power to require information from the following natural or legal persons:

the power to conduct all necessary investigations of any person referred to in point (a) that is established or located in the Member State concerned, including the right:

the power to conduct all necessary inspections at the business premises of the legal persons referred to in point (a) and any other undertakings included in the supervision of compliance with the group capital test, where the competent authority is the group supervisor, subject to the prior notification of other competent authorities concerned.

the sanction or measure has been imposed on a natural person and publication of that person’s personal data is found to be disproportionate;

the publication would jeopardise an ongoing criminal investigation or the stability of financial markets;

the publication would cause disproportionate damage to the investment firms or natural persons involved.

specific procedures for the reception, treatment and following up of such reports, including the establishment of secure communication channels;

appropriate protection against retaliation, discrimination or other types of unfair treatment by the investment firm for employees of investment firms who report breaches committed within the investment firm;

protection of personal data concerning both the person who reports the breach and the natural person who is allegedly responsible for that breach, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679;

clear rules that ensure that confidentiality is guaranteed in all cases in relation to the person who reports the breaches committed within the investment firm, unless disclosure is required by national law in the context of further investigations or subsequent administrative or judicial proceedings.

a clear organisational structure with well‐defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility;

effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks that investment firms are or might be exposed to, or the risks that they pose or might pose to others;

adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administration and accounting procedures;

remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

the name, nature of activities and location of any subsidiaries and branches;

turnover;

the number of employees on a full time equivalent basis;

profit or loss before tax;

tax on profit or loss;

the public subsidies received.

material sources and effects of risk to clients and any material impact on own funds;

material sources and effects of risk to market and any material impact on own funds;

material sources and effects of risk to the investment firm, in particular those which can deplete the level of own funds available;

liquidity risk over an appropriate set of time horizons, including intra‐day, so as to ensure that the investment firm maintains adequate levels of liquid resources, including in respect of addressing material sources of risks under points (a), (b) and (c).

the remuneration policy is clearly documented and proportionate to the size, internal organisation and nature, as well as to the scope and complexity of the activities of the investment firm;

the remuneration policy is a gender‐neutral remuneration policy;

the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management;

the remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy and objectives of the investment firm, and also takes into account long term effects of the investment decisions taken;

the remuneration policy contains measures to avoid conflicts of interest, encourages responsible business conduct and promotes risk awareness and prudent risk taking;

the investment firm’s management body in its supervisory function adopts and periodically reviews the remuneration policy and has overall responsibility for overseeing its implementation;

the implementation of the remuneration policy is subject to a central and independent internal review by control functions at least annually;

staff engaged in control functions are independent from the business units they oversee, have appropriate authority, and are remunerated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, regardless of the performance of the business areas they control;

the remuneration of senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in Article 33 or, where such a committee has not been established, by the management body in its supervisory function;

the remuneration policy, taking into account national rules on wage setting, makes a clear distinction between the criteria applied to determine the following:

the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration so as to enable the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility of paying no variable remuneration component.

that investment firm does not pay any variable remuneration to members of the management body;

where variable remuneration paid to staff other than members of the management body would be inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base of an investment firm and its timely exit from extraordinary public financial support, variable remuneration shall be limited to a portion of net revenue.

where variable remuneration is performance related, the total amount of variable remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual, of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the investment firm;

when assessing the performance of the individual, both financial and non‐financial criteria are taken into account;

the assessment of the performance referred to in point (a) is based on a multi‐year period, taking into account the business cycle of the investment firm and its business risks;

the variable remuneration does not affect the investment firm's ability to ensure a sound capital base;

there is no guaranteed variable remuneration other than for new staff only for the first year of employment of new staff and where the investment firm has a strong capital base;

payments relating to the early termination of an employment contract reflect performance achieved over time by the individual and shall not reward failure or misconduct;

remuneration packages relating to compensation or buy out from contracts in previous employment are aligned with the long‐term interests of the investment firm;

the measurement of performance used as a basis to calculate pools of variable remuneration takes into account all types of current and future risks and the cost of the capital and liquidity required in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

the allocation of the variable remuneration components within the investment firm takes into account all types of current and future risks;

at least 50 % of the variable remuneration consists of any of the following instruments:

by way of derogation from point (j), where an investment firm does not issue any of the instruments referred to in that point, competent authorities may approve the use of alternative arrangements fulfilling the same objectives;

at least 40 % of the variable remuneration is deferred over a three‐ to five‐year period as appropriate, depending on the business cycle of the investment firm, the nature of its business, its risks and the activities of the individual in question, except in the case of variable remuneration of a particularly high amount where the proportion of the variable remuneration deferred is at least 60 %;

up to 100 % of the variable remuneration is contracted where the financial performance of the investment firm is subdued or negative, including through malus or clawback arrangements subject to criteria set by investment firms which in particular cover situations where the individual in question:

discretionary pension benefits are in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long‐term interests of the investment firm.

individuals referred to in Article 30(1) do not use personal hedging strategies or remuneration and liability‐related insurances to undermine the principles referred to in paragraph 1;

variable remuneration is not paid through financial vehicles or methods that facilitate non‐compliance with this Directive or with Regulation (EU) 2019/2033.

an investment firm, where the value of its on and off‐balance sheet assets is on average equal to or less than EUR 100 million over the four‐year period immediately preceding the given financial year;

an individual whose annual variable remuneration does not exceed EUR 50 000 and does not represent more than one fourth of that individual’s total annual remuneration.

the investment firm is not, in the Member State in which it is established, one of the three largest investment firms in terms of total value of assets;

the investment firm is not subject to obligations or is subject to simplified obligations in relation to recovery and resolution planning in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 2014/59/EU;

the size of the investment firm’s on and off‐balance sheet trading‐book business is equal to or less than EUR 150 million;

the size of the investment firm’s on and off‐balance sheet derivative business is equal to or less than EUR 100 million;

the threshold does not exceed EUR 300 million; and

it is appropriate to increase the threshold, taking into account the nature and scope of the investment firm’s activities, its internal organisation, and, where applicable, the characteristics of the group to which it belongs.

a definition of ESG risks, including physical risks and transition risks related to the transition to a more sustainable economy, and, with regard to transition risks, including risks related to the depreciation of assets due to regulatory change, qualitative and quantitative criteria and metrics relevant for assessing such risks, as well as a methodology for assessing the possibility of such risks arising in the short, medium, or long term and the possibility of such risks having a material financial impact on an investment firm;

an assessment of the possibility of significant concentrations of specific assets increasing ESG risks, including physical risks and transition risks for an investment firm;

a description of the processes by means of which an investment firm can identify, assess, and manage ESG risks, including physical risks and transition risks;

the criteria, parameters and metrics by means of which supervisors and investment firms can assess the impact of short‐, medium‐ and long‐term ESG risks for the purposes of the supervisory review and evaluation process.

the risks referred to in Article 29;

the geographical location of an investment firm’s exposures;

the business model of the investment firm;

the assessment of systemic risk, taking into account the identification and measurement of systemic risk under Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 or recommendations of the ESRB;

the risks posed to the security of investment firms’ network and information systems to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of their processes, data and assets;

the exposure of investment firms to the interest rate risk arising from non‐trading book activities;

governance arrangements of investment firms and the ability of members of the management body to perform their duties.

an investment firm does not meet the requirements of this Directive or of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

competent authorities have evidence that an investment firm is likely to breach the national provisions transposing this Directive or the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 within the next 12 months.

to require investment firms to have own funds in excess of the requirements set out in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, under the conditions laid down in Article 40 of this Directive, or to adjust the own funds and liquid assets required in case of material changes in the business of those investment firms;

to require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies implemented in accordance with Articles 24 and 26;

to require investment firms to present, within one year, a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to this Directive and to Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, to set a deadline for the implementation of that plan and require improvements to that plan regarding scope and deadline;

to require investment firms to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements;

to restrict or limit the business, operations or network of investment firms or to request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks to the financial soundness of an investment firm;

to require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems of investment firms, including outsourced activities;

to require investment firms to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of net revenues where that remuneration is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base;

to require investment firms to use net profits to strengthen own funds;

to restrict or prohibit distributions or interest payments by an investment firm to shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1 instruments where that restriction or prohibition does not constitute an event of default of the investment firm;

to impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements to those set out in this Directive and Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, including reporting on capital and liquidity positions;

to impose specific liquidity requirements in accordance with Article 42;

to require additional disclosures;

to require investment firms to reduce the risks posed to the security of investment firms’ network and information systems to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of their processes, data and assets;

one of the cases referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 38 applies;

the competent authority considers it to be necessary to gather the evidence referred to in point (b) of Article 38;

the additional information is required for the purpose of the supervisory review and evaluation process referred to in Article 36.

the investment firm is exposed to risks or elements of risks, or poses risks to others that are material and are not covered or not sufficiently covered by the own funds requirement, and especially K‐factor requirements, set out in Part Three or Four of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

the investment firm does not meet the requirements set out in Articles 24 and 26 and other supervisory measures are unlikely to sufficiently improve the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies within an appropriate timeframe;

the adjustments in relation to the prudent valuation of the trading book are insufficient to enable the investment firm to sell or hedge out its positions within a short period without incurring material losses under normal market conditions;

the review carried out in accordance with Article 37 shows that non‐compliance with the requirements for the application of the permitted internal models will likely lead to inadequate levels of capital;

the investment firm repeatedly fails to establish or maintain an adequate level of additional own funds as set out in Article 41.

at least three quarters of the additional own funds requirement is met with Tier 1 capital;

at least three quarters of the Tier 1 capital is composed of Common Equity Tier 1 capital;

those own funds are not used to meet any of the own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033.

the implementation burden on investment firms and competent authorities;

the possibility that the higher level of own funds requirements that apply where investment firms do not use internal models justifies the imposition of lower own funds requirements when assessing risks and elements of risks in accordance with paragraph 2.

the investment firm is exposed to liquidity risk or elements of liquidity risk that are material and are not covered or not sufficiently covered by the liquidity requirement set out in Part Five of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

the investment firm does not meet the requirements set out in Articles 24 and 26 of this Directive and other administrative measures are unlikely to sufficiently improve the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies within an appropriate timeframe.

require investment firms that do not meet the conditions for qualifying as small and non‐interconnected investment firms set out in Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 and investment firms referred to in Article 46(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 to publish the information referred to in Article 46 of that Regulation more than once a year and to set deadlines for that publication;

require investment firms that do not meet the conditions for qualifying as small and non‐interconnected investment firms set out in Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 and investment firms referred to in Article 46(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 to use specific media and locations, in particular the investment firms’ websites, for publications other than the financial statements;

require parent undertakings to publish annually, either in full or by way of references to equivalent information, a description of their legal structure and governance and organisational structure of the investment firm group in accordance with Article 26(1) of this Directive and with Article 10 of Directive 2014/65/EU.

their review and evaluation process referred to in Article 36;

the methodology used for decisions referred to in Articles 39, 40 and 41;

the level of administrative sanctions laid down by Member States, referred to in Article 18.

the tasks referred to in Article 47;

the coordination of information requests where this is necessary for facilitating supervision on a consolidated basis, in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

the coordination of information requests, in cases where several competent authorities of investment firms that are part of the same group need to request either from the competent authority of a clearing member’s home Member State or from the competent authority of the QCCP information relating to the margin model and parameters used for the calculation of the margin requirement of the relevant investment firms;

the exchange of information between all competent authorities and with EBA in accordance with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and with ESMA in accordance with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010;

reaching an agreement on the voluntary delegation between competent authorities of tasks and responsibilities, where appropriate;

increasing the efficiency of supervision by seeking to avoid the unnecessary duplication of supervisory requirements.

the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of subsidiaries of an investment firm group headed by an Union investment firm, Union parent investment holding company or Union parent mixed financial holding company;

where appropriate, third‐country supervisory authorities, subject to confidentiality requirements that are equivalent in the opinion of all competent authorities to the requirements laid down in Section 2 of Chapter I of this Title.

identification of the investment firm group’s legal and governance structure, including its organisational structure, covering all regulated and non‐regulated entities, non‐regulated subsidiaries and the parent undertakings, and of the competent authorities of the regulated entities in the investment firm group;

procedures for the collection of information from the investment firms in an investment firm group, and the procedures for the verification of that information;

any adverse developments in investment firms or in other entities of an investment firm group, which could seriously affect those investment firms;

any significant sanctions and exceptional measures taken by competent authorities in accordance with national provisions transposing this Directive;

the imposition of a specific own funds requirement under Article 39 of this Directive.

changes in the shareholder, organisational or management structure of investment firms in the investment firm group, which require the approval or authorisation of competent authorities;

significant sanctions imposed on investment firms by competent authorities or any other exceptional measures taken by those authorities; and

specific own funds requirements imposed in accordance with Article 39.

carry out the verification themselves within the framework of their competence;

allow the competent authorities who made that request to carry out the verification;

request an auditor or expert to carry out the verification impartially and to report the results promptly.

require that the mixed‐activity holding company supply them with any information that may be relevant for the supervision of that investment firm;

supervise transactions between the investment firm and the mixed‐activity holding company and the subsidiaries of the latter, and require the investment firm to have in place adequate risk management processes and internal control mechanisms, including sound reporting and accounting procedures to identify, measure, monitor and control those transactions.

investment firms the parent undertaking of which has its head office in a third country;

investment firms located in third countries, the parent undertaking of which has its head office in the Union.

the texts of laws, regulations, administrative rules and general guidance adopted in their Member State pursuant to this Directive;

the manner of exercise of the options and discretions available pursuant to this Directive and to Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

the general criteria and methodologies they use in the supervisory review and evaluation referred to in Article 36 of this Directive;

aggregate statistical data on key aspects of the implementation of this Directive and of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 in their Member State, including the number and nature of supervisory measures taken in accordance with point (a) of Article 39(2) of this Directive and of administrative sanctions imposed in accordance with Article 18 of this Directive.

“sectoral rules” means Union legal acts relating to the prudential supervision of regulated entities, in particular Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 (*1) and (EU) 2019/2033 (*2) of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directives 2009/138/EC, 2013/36/EU (*3), 2014/65/EU (*4) and (EU) 2019/2034 (*5) of the European Parliament and of the Council.

irrespective of the amount of those requirements, the own funds of the management company must at no time be less than the amount prescribed in Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council (*6).

the title is replaced by the following:

‘Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC’;

Article 1 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 1

Subject matter

This Directive lays down rules concerning:

Article 2 is amended as follows:

in Article 3(1), point (4) is deleted;

Article 5 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 5

Coordination within Member States

Member States that have more than one competent authority for the prudential supervision of credit institutions and financial institutions shall take the requisite measures to organise coordination between such authorities.’;

the following article is inserted:

‘Article 8a

Specific requirements for authorisation of credit institutions referred to in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

• 1. 

  Member States shall require the undertakings referred to in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 which have already obtained an authorisation pursuant to Title II of Directive 2014/65/EU to submit an application for authorisation in accordance with Article 8, at the latest on the day when either of the following events takes place:

• 2. 

  The undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article may continue carrying out the activities referred to in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 until they obtain the authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

• 3. 

  By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of this Article, the undertakings referred to in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 that on 24 December 2019 carry out activities as investment firms authorised under Directive 2014/65/EU shall apply for authorisation in accordance with Article 8 of this Directive by 27 December 2020.

• 4. 

  Where the competent authority, after receiving the information in accordance with Article 95a of Directive 2014/65/EU, determines that an undertaking is to be authorised as a credit institution in accordance with Article 8 of this Directive, it shall notify the undertaking and the competent authority as defined in point (26) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU and shall take over the authorisation procedure from the date of that notification.

• 5. 

  In cases of reauthorisation, the authorising competent authority shall ensure that the process is as streamlined as possible and that information from existing authorisations is taken into account.

• 6. 

  EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify:

Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 26 December 2020.’;

in Article 18, the following point is inserted:

Article 20 is amended as follows:

in Article 21b, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:

‘5.   For the purposes of this Article:

(*8)  Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 84)’;"

Title IV is deleted;

in Article 51(1), the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘1.   The competent authorities of a host Member State may request the consolidating supervisor, where Article 112(1) applies, or the competent authorities of the home Member State, that a branch of a credit institution shall be considered to be significant.’;

in Article 53, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘2.   Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the competent authorities from exchanging information with each other or transmitting information to the ESRB, EBA, or the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (“ESMA”) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (*9) in accordance with this Directive, with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, with Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council (*10), with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, with Articles 31, 35 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and with Articles 31 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, with Directive (EU) 2019/2034 of the European Parliament and of the Council (*11) and with other directives applicable to credit institutions. That information shall be subject to paragraph 1.

(*9)  Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84)."

(*10)  Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential requirements of investment firms and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 806/2014 (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 1)."

(*11)  Directive (EU) 2019/2034 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential supervision of investment firms and amending Directives 2002/87/EC, 2009/65/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU, 2014/59/EU and 2014/65/EU (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 64).’;"

in Article 66(1), the following point is inserted:

in Article 76(5), the sixth subparagraph is deleted;

in Article 86, paragraph 11 is replaced by the following:

‘11.   Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have in place liquidity recovery plans setting out adequate strategies and proper implementation measures to address possible liquidity shortfalls, including in relation to branches established in another Member State. Competent authorities shall ensure that those plans are tested by the institutions at least annually, updated on the basis of the outcome of the alternative scenarios set out in paragraph 8, reported to and approved by senior management, so that internal policies and processes can be adjusted accordingly. Institutions shall take the necessary operational steps in advance to ensure that liquidity recovery plans can be implemented immediately. Those operational steps shall include holding collateral immediately available for central bank funding. This includes holding collateral in the currency of another Member State where necessary, or the currency of a third country to which the institution has exposures, and where operationally necessary within the territory of a host Member State or of a third country to whose currency it is exposed.’;

in Article 110, paragraph 2 is deleted;

Article 111 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 111

Determination of the consolidating supervisor

• 1. 

  Where a parent undertaking is a parent credit institution in a Member State or an EU parent credit institution, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority that supervises that parent credit institution in the Member State or that EU parent credit institution on an individual basis.

Where a parent undertaking is a parent investment firm in a Member State or an EU parent investment firm and none of its subsidiaries is a credit institution, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority that supervises that parent investment firm in the Member State or that EU parent investment firm on an individual basis.

Where a parent undertaking is a parent investment firm in a Member State or an EU parent investment firm, and at least one of its subsidiaries is a credit institution, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority of the credit institution, or where there are several credit institutions, the credit institution with the largest balance sheet total.

• 2. 

  Where the parent of a credit institution or investment firm is a parent financial holding company in a Member State, a parent mixed financial holding company in a Member State, an EU parent financial holding company or an EU parent mixed financial holding company, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority that supervises the credit institution or investment firm on an individual basis.

• 3. 

  Where two or more credit institutions or investment firms authorised in the Union have the same parent financial holding company in a Member State, parent mixed financial holding company in a Member State, EU parent financial holding company or EU parent mixed financial holding company, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by:

• 4. 

  Where consolidation is required pursuant to Article 18(3) or (6) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority of the credit institution with the largest balance sheet total or, where the group does not include any credit institution, by the competent authority of the investment firm with the largest balance sheet total.

• 5. 

  By way of derogation from the third subparagraph of paragraph 1, from point (b) of paragraph 3 and from paragraph 4, where a competent authority supervises on an individual basis more than one credit institution within a group, the consolidating supervisor shall be the competent authority that supervises on an individual basis one or more credit institutions within the group where the sum of the balance sheet totals of those supervised credit institutions is higher than that of the credit institutions supervised on an individual basis by any other competent authority.

By way of derogation from point (c) of paragraph 3, where a competent authority supervises on an individual basis more than one investment firm within a group, the consolidating supervisor shall be the competent authority that supervises on an individual basis one or more investment firms within the group with the highest balance sheet total in aggregate.

• 6. 

  In particular cases, the competent authorities may waive by common agreement the criteria referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 and appoint a different competent authority to exercise supervision on a consolidated basis where the application of the criteria referred to therein would be inappropriate, taking into account the credit institutions or investment firms concerned and the relative importance of their activities in the relevant Member States, or the need to ensure the continuity of supervision on a consolidated basis by the same competent authority. In such cases, the EU parent institution, EU parent financial holding company, EU parent mixed financial holding company or the credit institution or investment firm with the largest balance sheet total, as applicable, shall have the right to be heard before the competent authorities take the decision.

• 7. 

  The competent authorities shall notify the Commission and EBA without delay of any agreement falling within paragraph 6.’;

in Article 114(1), the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘1.   Where an emergency situation arises, including a situation as described in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 or a situation of adverse developments in markets, which potentially jeopardises the market liquidity and the stability of the financial system in any of the Member States where entities of a group have been authorised or where significant branches as referred to in Article 51 are established, the consolidating supervisor shall, subject to Section 2 of Chapter 1 of Title VII of this Directive and where applicable Section 2 of Chapter 1 of Title IV of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, alert as soon as is practicable, EBA and the authorities referred to in Article 58(4) and Article 59 and shall communicate all information essential for the performance of their tasks. Those obligations shall apply to all competent authorities.’;

Article 116 is amended as follows:

in Article 125, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘2.   Information received within the framework of supervision on a consolidated basis, and in particular any exchange of information between competent authorities which is provided for in this Directive, shall be subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1) of this Directive for credit institutions or under Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034.’;

in Article 128, the fifth paragraph is deleted;

in Article 129, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 are deleted;

in Article 130, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 are deleted;

in Article 143(1), point (d) is replaced by the following:

in Article 2(1), point (3) is replaced by the following:

(*12)  Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential requirements of investment firms and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 806/2014 (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 1)."

(*13)  Directive (EU) 2019/2034 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential supervision of investment firms and amending Directives 2002/87/EC, 2009/65/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU, 2014/59/EU and 2014/65/EU (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 64).’;"

in Article 45, the following paragraph is added:

‘3.   In accordance with Article 65(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, references to Article 92 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 in this Directive as regards the own funds requirements on an individual basis of investment firms referred to in point 3 of Article 2(1) of this Directive and which are not investment firms referred to in Article 1(2) or (5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 shall be construed in the following way:

In accordance with Article 65 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034, references in this Directive to Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU as regards additional own funds requirements of investment firms referred to in point 3 of Article 2(1) of this Directive and which are not investment firms referred to in Article 1(2) or (5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 shall be construed as referring to Article 40 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034.’.

in Article 8, point (c) is replaced by the following:

(*14)  Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential requirements of investment firms and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 806/2014 (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 1).’;"

Article 15 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 15

Initial capital endowment

Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities do not grant authorisation unless the investment firm has sufficient initial capital in accordance with the requirements of Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2019/2034 of the European Parliament and of the Council (*15), having regard to the nature of the investment service or activity in question.

(*15)  Directive (EU) 2019/2034 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on the prudential supervision of investment firms and amending Directives 2002/87/EC, 2009/65/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU, 2014/59/EU and 2014/65/EU (OJ L 314, 5.12.2019, p. 64).’;"

Article 41 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 41

Granting of the authorisation

• 1. 

  The competent authority of the Member State where the third‐country firm has established or intends to establish its branch shall only grant authorisation where the competent authority is satisfied that:

The competent authority shall inform the third‐country firm, within six months of submission of a complete application, whether or not the authorisation has been granted.

• 2. 

  The branch of the third‐country firm authorised in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 16 to 20, 23, 24, 25 and 27, Article 28(1), and Articles 30, 31 and 32 of this Directive and in Articles 3 to 26 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and the measures adopted pursuant thereto and shall be subject to the supervision of the competent authority in the Member State where the authorisation was granted.

Member States shall not impose any additional requirements on the organisation and operation of the branch in respect of the matters covered by this Directive and shall not treat any branch of third‐country firms more favourably than Union firms.

Member States shall ensure that competent authorities notify ESMA on an annual basis of the list of branches of third‐country firms active on their territory.

ESMA shall publish on annual basis a list of third‐country branches active in the Union, including the name of the third‐country firm to which the branch belongs.

• 3. 

  The branch of the third‐country firm that is authorised in accordance with paragraph 1 shall report to the competent authority referred to in paragraph 2 the following information on an annual basis:

• 4. 

  Upon request, the competent authorities shall communicate the following information to ESMA:

• 5. 

  The competent authorities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, the competent authorities of entities that are part of the same group to which branches of third‐country firms authorised in accordance with paragraph 1 belong, and ESMA and EBA shall cooperate closely to ensure that all activities of that group in the Union are subject to comprehensive, consistent and effective supervision in accordance with this Directive, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Regulation (EU) No 600/2014, Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, Directive 2013/36/EU, and Directive (EU) 2019/2034.

• 6. 

  ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the format in which the information referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 is to be reported.

ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 26 September 2020.

Power is conferred on the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.’;

Article 42 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 42

Provision of services at the exclusive initiative of the client

• 1. 

  Member States shall ensure that where a retail client or professional client within the meaning of Section II of Annex II established or situated in the Union initiates at its own exclusive initiative the provision of an investment service or activity by a third‐country firm, the requirement for authorisation under Article 39 shall not apply to the provision of that service or activity by the third‐country firm to that person, including a relationship specifically relating to the provision of that service or activity.

Without prejudice to intragroup relations, where a third‐country firm, including through an entity acting on its behalf or having close links with such third‐country firm or any other person acting on behalf of such entity, solicits clients or potential clients in the Union, it shall not be deemed to be a service provided at the own exclusive initiative of the client.

• 2. 

  An initiative by a client as referred to in paragraph 1 shall not entitle the third‐country firm to market new categories of investment products or investment services to that client otherwise than through the branch, where one is required in accordance with national law.’;

in Article 49, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1.   Member States shall require regulated markets to adopt tick‐size regimes in shares, depositary receipts, exchange‐traded funds, certificates and other similar financial instruments and in any other financial instrument for which regulatory technical standards are developed in accordance with paragraph 4. The application of tick sizes shall not prevent regulated markets from matching orders large in scale at mid‐point within the current bid and offer prices.’;

in Article 81(3), point (a) is replaced by the following:

the following article is inserted:

‘Article 95a

Transitional provision on the authorisation of credit institution referred to in point (1)(b) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

Competent authorities shall inform the competent authority referred to in Article 8 of Directive 2013/36/EU where the envisaged total assets of an undertaking which has applied for authorisation pursuant to Title II of this Directive before 25 December 2019 in order to carry out the activities referred to in points (3) and (6) of Section A of Annex I are equal to or exceed EUR 30 billion, and notify the applicant thereof.’.

the provisions on remuneration in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 as well as in Directives 2009/65/EC and 2011/61/EU with the aim of achieving a level playing field for all investment firms active in the Union, including the application of those provisions;

the appropriateness of the reporting and disclosure requirements in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033, taking into account the principle of proportionality;

an assessment, which shall take into account the EBA report referred to in Article 35 and the taxonomy on sustainable finance, on whether any:

the effectiveness of information‐sharing arrangements under this Directive;

the cooperation of the Union and Member States with third countries in the application of this Directive and of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033;

the implementation of this Directive and of Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 to investment firms on the basis of their legal structure or ownership model;

the potential for investment firms to pose a risk of disruption in the financial system with serious negative consequences to the financial system and the real economy and appropriate macroprudential tools to address such a risk and replace the requirements of point (d) of Article 36(1) of this Directive;

the conditions under which the competent authorities may apply to investment firms, in accordance with Article 5 of this Directive, the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.