Annexes to SEC(2010)659 - Sec(2010)659/f1 - Main contents
Please note
This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
dossier | SEC(2010)659 - Sec(2010)659/f1. |
---|---|
document | SEC(2010)659 |
date | June 1, 2010 |
Under the procedures set out pursuant to Article 7 of the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), national regulatory authorities (NRAs) must define the boundaries of relevant markets in accordance with competition law principles, taking utmost account of the SMP Guidelines1 and the Recommendation of relevant markets2. If they find that relevant markets are not effectively competitive, NRAs are obliged to propose appropriate regulatory measures to address market failures. A market is not effectively competitive if one or more players have significant market power (SMP) in this market. Where operators are found to have SMP, NRAs are required to propose appropriate regulatory remedies to ensure effective competition. In the event of effective competition on the market, existing regulation has to be lifted. The market analysis has to be carried out in cooperation with the national competition authorities.
Before adopting final measures on market definition, market analysis and the imposition of remedies NRAs must not only carry out a national consultation, but are also required to notify their draft measures to the Commission, either by means of standard notification procedure or, in certain cases3, by means of a short notification form which, in principle, will not trigger comments from the Commission. Once an NRA notifies the Commission of its proposed measure for a particular market, the case is registered, and an ad hoc case team comprising officials of the services of both the Information Society and Media and Competition Directorates General is appointed. The case team analyses the notification and may ask the NRA concerned to provide some further information or clarification for the purpose of conducting the assessment. The team must carry out its assessment and comply with the necessary internal checks and balances, within the legally binding deadline of one month. At the end of this period and provided that the notified measure does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with EU law, the Commission may decide to make comments. NRAs are to take utmost account of comments issued by the Commission before adopting the draft measure in question.
In the event the Commission expresses serious doubts, the investigation period is extended by a further two months (phase two investigation) during which the NRA may not adopt its proposed measure. During these two months, the case team resumes an in-depth examination of the case and the Commission invites third parties to make known their views. What follows thereafter is an intense exchange of information between all interested parties (including the NRAs and industry players) and all data provided and views expressed are carefully considered by the Commission. At the end of the investigation period, the Commission may withdraw its serious doubts (in which case the NRA may adopt the draft measure), make comments (of which the NRA must take utmost account when implementing the draft measure) or require the NRA to withdraw its proposed measure. In such an event, the Commission submits its draft decision to the Communications Committee for an opinion. In both phases the NRA may withdraw its draft measure.
Overview phase 1 investigation
Overview phase 2 investigation
ANNEX II: TABLE CONCERNING COMPETITION/REGULATION IN THE EU (31/12/2009)
ANNEX III: DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF PLAY PER MARKET4
1.Retail access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential and non-residential customers (market 1)
In almost all Member States, NRAs found the access markets to be non-competitive and imposed regulatory obligations on the incumbent operators, owing still very high market shares (around 90%). However, as a result of effective wholesale regulation in place, NRAs in the Netherlands5 and the UK6 proposed the withdrawal of retail fixed access remedies.
1.1.Issues related to the market definition
As defined in the Recommendation, the retail access market includes the provision of a connection or access (at a fixed location or address) to the public telephone network for the purpose of making and/or receiving telephone calls and related services (such as fax).
The revised Recommendation no longer distinguishes between residential and non-residential customers in the retail fixed access markets since in most Member States contractual terms do not differ significantly between the two types of access. In line with this new approach most NRAs have, after the end of 2007, defined one single narrowband access market for residential and non-residential customers. However, based on national market circumstances, such as differences in demand of services, price structures and marketing approaches towards the two customer groups, the Commission has accepted to maintain such distinction in some countries7.
As regards the product market definition, the Cypriot, Greek and Irish NRAs differentiated between lower and higher level narrowband access markets, whereas the British NRA distinguished between analogue and ISDN fixed access markets8. Some NRAs included alternative means of access in the market definition, such as cable9 and optical fibre10 networks or wireless local loop11. Home-zone access services12 provided over mobile networks belong to the relevant market in Spain, Romania and Bulgaria. The Hungarian NRA concluded that within the timeframe of the review home-zone products will not form part of the relevant market. Nevertheless, the Commission invited the NRA to examine in its final measure the substitutability in terms of functionality and prices in this respect. In most cases, the broader market definition did not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation.
The Commission has pursued a consequent line regarding the inclusion of broadband access services in the relevant market. In particular, the Commission has pointed out that to underpin increased substitutability between broadband access and narrowband access products, NRAs must demonstrate that as a result of a small but significant non-transitory price increase (SSNIP) customers would switch from a narrowband connection to a broadband connection only. It requested the Polish NRA to withdraw its measures13 concerning retail access markets because it had not provided sufficient data to support the inclusion of xDSL access services. The NRA in its re-notified draft measure14 excludes any form of broadband access from the relevant market. In Austria15, Bulgaria16 and Italy17 different broadband access products are included in the relevant market and NRAs have not always provided exhaustive analysis of substitutability, particularly as to pricing structure. Whilst in its comments letters the Commission has expressed its concerns, the question of the market definition could be left open as the inclusion of these services would not affect the SMP assessment and none of the NRAs would impose regulatory obligations concerning these services. On the other hand, the Commission did not contest the German NRA's conclusion to include complete connections18 in the retail access market definition, based on the evidence provided on the increased substitutability between traditional narrowband connections and complete connections, especially as regards their functionality19 and pricing structure. Furthermore, the Commission did not challenge the inclusion of managed VoIP connections in the relevant access market in Romania and of IP-based telephony access with numbers in Sweden20 on the basis of the substitutability of these access products with traditional narrowband connections (particularly in terms of function, price, and intended use). However, the Commission called upon these NRAs to closely monitor market developments and adapt their market definition and regulatory intervention accordingly, should the market structure change with regard to the increased substitutability of different access products.
Referring to national circumstances21, the Dutch NRA defined the relevant market as including both fixed telephony access and voice calls services. While the Commission was not convinced that the arguments and evidence put forward demonstrated this conclusively, it concluded that the exact scope of the market definition did not affect the regulatory outcome.
The geographical market is mainly national in scope except for Finland, Hungary and the UK where it corresponds to the networks of multiple incumbent operators22.
1.2.Issues related to remedies
In the fixed access markets the selection of remedies supporting the access obligation (transparency, non-discrimination, price control and accounting separation) shows a great diversity.
Looking at the individual remedies imposed, carrier selection/carrier pre-selection (CS/CPS) and wholesale line rental (WLR) are imposed in most Member States either in the access market or in the call origination market. WLR is vital to encourage alternative operators to climb the ladder of investment towards full unbundling and it also allows the incumbent’s competitors to bundle their products and services in the retail markets as WLR is deemed most efficient, complementing CS/CPS. However, in quite a few Member States, WLR is not imposed or not well implemented23. To this end the Commission invited NRAs to consider imposing this obligation.24
Price control and price/cost calculation methodologies play a key role in regulating telecommunication markets. Inappropriate prices (e.g. those discouraging operators from investments or becoming efficient over time) can lead to significant distortions. Therefore, remedies related comments of the Commission address in most cases the proposed price control and the cost accounting obligation25, where a great variety of methodologies are notified under the Article 7 consultation procedure. The Commission has stressed on various occasions that WLR conditions should be designed in a way to avoid margin squeeze, while not discouraging investments in LLU in geographic areas where such investment would be economically feasible26. The Commission has invited NRAs to impose or maintain ex ante price control obligations where wholesale regulation has not yet proved sufficient to ensure competition at retail level27 or there was a risk of excessive pricing by the SMP operator28. In several cases, comments concern the lack of details of the price control obligation provided in the notifications29, which failed to ensure adequate transparency and legal certainty for market players.
The Commission made fewer comments with regard to non-discrimination, transparency and accounting separation obligations. In one case, the Commission reminded the NRA30 that voluntary undertakings of the incumbent, providing additional guarantees of non-discrimination and transparency, must be notified under the EU consultation procedure.
Finally, the Commission also commented on the differentiation of the transparency obligation31 as regards categories of access products belonging to the same relevant market in Spain (i.e. between standardized and customized offers32); as well as on the non-imposition of accounting separation in Latvia and Slovakia33.
2.Wholesale fixed call origination (market 2)
Call origination markets are characterized by the lack of effective competition in all Member States; NRAs designated incumbent operators, having still very high market shares, as operators with significant market power.
2.1.Issues related to the market definition
Call origination is one of the key wholesale inputs required to provide retail fixed telephone services, including voice calls and dial-up Internet services. Call origination may also include switching and/or call conveyance services.
Most NRAs have defined the relevant market in line with the Recommendation on relevant markets. However, the Danish and the Dutch34 NRAs have proposed a market delineation that includes both wholesale access and call origination services. The Commission expressed doubts over the inclusion of wholesale access services in the wholesale call origination market, as access services are complements to rather than substitutes for call origination services. Furthermore the Commission was also not convinced of the Dutch NRA's proposal to subdivide the relevant market into two distinct markets for residential and business customers35 since call origination services are in the two market segments functionally identical; an operator providing these services to residential customers could easily switch to provide the same services to business customers and vice versa. Nevertheless, in both cases the question of the market delineation could be left open since it had no impact on the assessment of SMP or on the proposed remedies.
As the above market definitions deviate from those identified in the Recommendation on relevant markets the Danish and Dutch NRAs carried out the three criteria test to justify ex ante regulation of the defined broader markets in accordance with Article 15(3) of the Framework Directive and the Recommendation. As regards the Netherlands, the Commission explicitly invited the NRA to present its assessment on the three criteria test also in its final measure.
NRAs have predominantly defined the geographic scope of the relevant markets as national with the exception of Finland, Hungary and the UK where it corresponds to the operating areas of the incumbents' local networks36.
2.2.Issues related to remedies
As regards remedies, most NRAs imposed the full set of obligations available under the Access Directive. The Commission was concerned with the effectiveness of wholesale regulation applied in Latvia and in Malta37.
Some NRAs38 imposed carrier selection/carrier pre-selection (CS/CPS) and wholesale line rental (WLR) not in the retail fixed access markets but in the call origination market. In this context the Commission called upon the Slovak NRA39 to ensure the effective implementation of CS/CPS services and to consider imposing a WLR remedy which should also render the CS/CPS services more effective.
Similarly to other markets, the Commission commented on several occasions40 on price control and price/cost calculating methodologies in the wholesale call origination market; it requested for instance the Slovak NRA to enforce the implementation of the price control obligation without delay. Furthermore, the Commission expressed concerns over the lack of details of the price control/cost accounting obligations notified, which fails to provide adequate transparency and legal certainty for market players41. Finally, it stressed the need to notify cost oriented price caps, glide-paths or interconnection rates under the EU consultation procedure in order to ensure transparency and coherence of the applied remedies42.
From the procedural point of view, the Commission pointed out, that it considers the German approach to separately notify the proposed remedies by a subsequent notification as an ineffective approach to address swiftly the competition problems identified43. Moreover, it reminded the Irish NRA that under the Regulatory Framework notified draft measures should be adopted within a reasonable timeframe44.
3.Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location (market 3)
Wholesale call termination is the service which operators provide to each other to connect incoming calls to subscribers located on their networks. In the EU, the calling party pays entirely for the call45, and the wholesale termination rate paid by the originating operator is normally passed to its end customer. As the called party is not billed for incoming calls, it is generally indifferent to the termination charge set by its network provider and has little or no incentive to change network in the event that those charges are raised46. Consequently, in the absence of other factors potentially limiting market power such as countervailing buyer power, the criteria to merit ex ante regulation are normally met, and the terminating operator is designated as having SMP.
Since the previous Communication, all NRAs have notified their relevant markets for fixed call termination. The market was found to be non-competitive and is consequently regulated in all Member States47.
3.1.Issues related to market definition
As noted in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation on relevant markets, call termination is the least replicable element in the series of inputs required to provide retail call services.
Call termination can only be supplied by the network provider to which the called party is connected. There are currently no demand- or supply-side substitutes for call termination on an individual network. Therefore, in line with the Recommendation on relevant markets, all NRAs have defined each individual fixed network operator as constituting a distinct relevant network market for call termination.
The market has frequently been defined independently of the underlying technology. For example, termination of calls at fixed locations using managed Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)/Voice over Broadband (VoB) technology which provides a high level of quality management has been included in the relevant market by a number of Member States48.
The market has also been generally defined independently of the origin of the call (i.e. fixed or mobile, national or international)49.
In view of the different substitution possibilities50 calls to service providers are also generally excluded from the relevant market51. Call termination to certain non-geographic numbers (frequently for emergency or public interest services) have however been included in the relevant market definition where they are subject to the same supply and demand conditions as call termination to standard geographic numbers52.
Voice call termination services to integrated fixed/mobile offers were increasingly identified as part of the relevant market for call termination on geographic numbers at fixed locations in view of their more limited mobility and similar pricing to fixed calls53, although in Germany they fell to be considered as part of the mobile call termination markets54.
3.2.Issues related to remedies
In view of the potential for excessive pricing, the Commission has consistently called on regulators to ensure an effective implementation of the cost orientation obligation55 and to apply effective price regulation also in the case of alternative network operators which have been designated with SMP56. In the absence of a fully functioning cost orientation obligation, the Commission has recognised benchmarking as a temporary measure57.
The Commission has continuously reiterated the importance of bringing termination rates to the level of the cost of an efficient operator as soon as possible and has further invited NRAs to apply a forward-looking LRIC model for setting termination rates58.
In terms of costs included in the relevant cost model, the Commission has underlined that as wholesale call termination services are traffic-related services, relevant costs considered for wholesale call termination charging purposes are typically those costs which vary in response to increased levels of wholesale call termination traffic and which reflect the additional costs directly involved in providing the service in question59. In response to one notification, the Commission also noted that a hybrid cost model implemented by way of a simple averaging of the results of the top-down and the bottom-up LRAIC models does not seem to be the most appropriate means of reconciliation nor consistent with the principle of forward-looking economic efficiency60.
The Commission has also on numerous occasions stated that termination rates should normally be symmetric and that asymmetry should be adequately justified by objective cost differences and limited to a transitory period taking into account the need for alternative operators to become efficient over time61. The Commission has also encouraged NRAs to impose effective access obligations on all SMP operators62. The Commission has further called for regulators to ensure a symmetric wholesale rate is applied by terminating operators irrespective of the origin of the call, i.e. fixed-to-fixed and mobile-to-fixed calls63.
In recent cases, the Commission has underlined the importance of NRAs notifying their actually proposed glide paths as part of the consultation procedure under Article 7(3), as price levels, amendments to cost methodologies, as well as the determination of glide-paths are considered to have a material impact on the relevant markets64.
Furthermore, the Commission has consistently called upon the national regulators to work together towards a coherent European approach to cost accounting and has adopted, in May 2009, a Recommendation which sets out a coherent costing approach for the regulatory treatment of fixed and mobile termination rates in the EU.65 Over the next regulatory period, we can expect NRAs to increasingly align their regulatory practice with the Recommendation66 which holds that all Member States should set their termination rates according to the cost of an efficient operator by 31 December 2012.67
4.Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (market 4)
The 2003 Recommendation on relevant markets identified the market for wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to metallic loops and sub-loops as one of the two wholesale markets linked to the broadband retail market. As set out in the Explanatory note to the 2007 Recommendation,68 technological change implied that, contrary to a strict limitation to the metallic loop or sub-loops, all relevant physical infrastructure necessary to reach the end consumer would be included in the relevant market. Accordingly, the relevant market identified as being susceptible to ex ante regulation is the wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) at a fixed location (LLU market).
This market was found to be non-competitive and is regulated in all Member States that have notified it to the Commission.69
4.1.Issues related to the market definition
In the period under review, the upgrading of copper access networks to next generation access (NGA) networks and the (potential) rollout of new fibre networks have had the greatest impact on regulatory measures. The deployment of NGA networks brought along new issues related to market definition and to the imposition of remedies.
The impact was especially pronounced in terms of market definition, since NRAs had to decide on the exclusion or inclusion of certain technologies and/or infrastructure in the market definition. In even more concrete terms, the inclusion of access products based on FttN/FttC70 (or VDSL) and FttH71 has been an issue dealt with by NRAs.
While several NRAs decided to include fibre based access products in their definitions of the LLU market72, some defined the relevant market excluding FttH and/or fibre access products73. The Commission generally invited NRAs to analyse the substitutability between copper and fibre based access products in both the LLU and WBA markets in a forward looking, technologically neutral manner and, in the presence of continued lack of effective competition, to impose remedies on fibre as appropriate in the following market reviews.74 Where NRAs excluded fibre access products from the market because operators only limitedly had started deploying their fibre access networks, the Commission called on the NRAs to monitor market developments in order to take account of prospective roll-out plans of operators and to reassess their market analyses when appropriate.75
The French NRA included civil works infrastructure (ducts) in the product market definition and the Estonian NRA included access support services (including co-location, duct access and shared use of buildings).76 While acknowledging that access to such supporting infrastructure was an appropriate remedy for the market at stake, the Commission also recalled that such access obligation could be imposed without the supporting infrastructure being included in the relevant market.77
4.2.Issues related to remedies
The most important development with regard to remedies is also linked to the deployment of NGAs. New regulatory remedies were specifically devised by NRAs in order to address the increasing deployment of fibre based products.
Most NRAs mandated access to SMP operators' civil work infrastructures (ducts) and/or dark fibre in order to foster the rollout of alternative fibre networks.78 In the Spanish case, the Commission welcomed the imposition of the obligation of access to the physical network infrastructure, yet requested the NRA to develop a reference offer and the corresponding price control obligations, as these obligations were key to ensure effective access to such bottleneck input. The Spanish NRA proceeded accordingly.79 In terms of price regulation of access to passive infrastructures, most NRAs adopted cost-orientation. The Commission insisted in several cases on the adequacy of such -tariff regulation.80
In an FttN/FttC (VDSL) scenario, some NRAs imposed obligations to ensure unbundled access at the street cabinet level (also referred to as sub-loop unbundling), ancillary services (co-location) and appropriate backhaul (duct, unlit/dark fibre, Ethernet).81 As regards FttH-based access, the Dutch, the Finish and the Slovenian NRAs put in place measures mandating unbundled access to fibre loops, although they implemented different price regulation.82 The Dutch NRA, OPTA, imposed cost-oriented prices for unbundled access to the fibre access and proposed a cost model including a form of risk premium.83 Because the proposed investment risks' parameters (internal rate of return and payback period) could lead to an over-estimation of the investment risk, the Commission invited the Dutch NRA to review the parameters in case competitive conditions changed. OPTA proposed to differentiate between FttH and FttO84 ODF-access prices, considering that the level of investment required for FttH is higher than for FttO and aligning the costing methodology for the latter with the one used for the tariff regulation of copper.85 The Finnish NRA instead did not intend to impose a cost-orientation obligation on the prices for unbundled access to the fibre loop since fibre deployment was only in its early stage in Finland. The Commission urged FICORA to ensure that the access measures were supplemented by appropriate costing remedies and to consider imposing on fibre loops similar remedies as proposed for copper loops.86 The Slovenian NRA proposed to implement cost-oriented access based on a LRIC+ methodology. The Commission invited APEK to reassess the parameters of the proposed cost model87.
The issue of transparency88 and migration from copper to fibre networks89 were explicitly addressed by some Member States in their measures. As for the migration process, the Commission pointed out that migration from copper to fibre loops and the dismantling of exchanges substantially affects the business case for alternative operators. In the cases where NRAs did not develop remedies specifying in detail the migration process (e.g. information to be provided by SMP operators concerning their network rollout plans, the conditions for closing down exchanges and the methods of collocation at the newly-built access points for LLU operators, and/or the provision of appropriate backhaul facilities), the Commission invited them to do so.90
On the basis of the early stage of development of fibre networks, some Member States proposed to apply lighter regulation on fibre-based access products, exempting such networks from specific obligations.91 In such cases the Commission inter alia pointed to the increasing roll-out of/investment in fibre access networks and the need to monitor market developments. The Commission also invited NRAs to consider the application of additional remedies on fibre products.
Although strictly speaking not part of a review of the LLU market, complementary symmetric measures pertaining to in-building wiring92 – based on national laws or on Article 12 of the Framework Directive93 - were also developed in some countries to tackle the remaining physical bottlenecks associated with FttH deployment.94 In Spain, CMT imposed a symmetric obligation requiring the first operator having deployed a fibre access solution in the building to meet reasonable requests for access and use of its equipments within the building. The Commission, whilst acknowledging the importance of in-building cabling, requested the NRA to provide specific justification supporting the use of Article 12 of the Framework Directive and asked CMT to consider imposing additional obligations. In France, as a complement to the obligation of access to France Telecom's civil works infrastructures, ARCEP mandated (i) the sharing of in-house wiring of any operator deploying a fibre network inside a building and, (ii) in very dense areas, where it is economically most profitable for operators to roll-out their own fibre networks into the homes, required all in-building operators to roll-out multiple fibre lines (i.e. additional dedicated fibre lines) on condition that the requesting operators are willing to co-invest.95 The Commission invited the French NRA inter alia to carefully monitor the development of fibre network roll-out in France and to verify whether the proposed symmetrical regulation, coupled with the remedies imposed in the broadband markets (access to civil works infrastructure), would be sufficient to ensure effective competition within the foreseeable timeframe. Should this not be the case, ARCEP should consider imposing on the SMP operator other remedies, e.g. unbundled access to the fibre loops.
In parallel, the Commission also had the opportunity to comment on the modification of price control remedies related to the LLU market, more specifically on the increase of the LLU prices. In this regard, two cases are worth mentioning. In the Italian case, AGCOM notified to the Commission the modification of the prices of the local loop unbundling (LLU) services. In line with Telecom Italia's proposal, AGCOM proposed to allow increases in the LLU prices charged by Telecom Italia in 2009. In the UK case, Ofcom proposed to amend the price control remedies related to LLU services and to the wholesale line rental ("WLR"), by increasing the price for fully unbundled loops, shared lines and residential WLR and by lowering the price for business WLR. In both cases, noting in particular that at EU level regulators adopted different costing methodologies to calculate LLU prices, the Commission invited the Italian and British regulators to discuss with other NRAs and with the Commission on how to achieve more consistency in the costing methodologies used for calculating LLU prices.
5.Wholesale broadband access (market 5)
This market was found to be non-competitive and is regulated in all Member States with the exception of Malta, where the market was found to be competitive.96
In the UK and in Portugal, the market was geographically segmented and parts of the national territory were found to be effectively competitive.97 Geographical segmentation of the wholesale broadband access market was a genuinely novel issue which was examined by the Commission in several cases during the period under review.98
5.1.Issues related to the market definition
As in the LLU market, the upgrading of copper access networks to NGA networks and the (potential) roll-out of new fibre networks had a great impact in the definitions of the WBA market.99 The NRAs dealt with the inclusion of access products based on FttN/C (VDSL) and FttH/B. Some NRAs excluded VDSL and/or other fibre-based access products from their market definitions on the basis of a lack of (extensive) deployment of fibre access networks during the on-going market review period.100 The Commission generally urged NRAs to properly assess the substitutability of fibre-based products with copper in a forward looking technologically neutral manner and to monitor market developments.
In two specific cases, the exclusion of specific access products from the relevant market gave rise to serious doubts from the Commission. In its first notification of the WBA, the German regulator (BNetzA) excluded the new FTTN/VDSL infrastructure of Deutsche Telekom from the relevant market. The Commission launched a Phase II investigation on the grounds that there was no evidence of a lack of substitution between VDSL and other DSL products.101 Following the Commission's serious doubts letter, BNetzA finally included VDSL infrastructure in the WBA market to the extent that such infrastructure is substitutable with other bitstream access products in this market. Similarly, the Commission expressed serious doubts on the proposal of the Spanish regulator, CMT, to exclude wholesale broadband access at speeds above 30 Mbps from the relevant product market.102 While CMT considered that, due to uncertainties surrounding the substitutability pattern at both the retail and wholesale level, speeds above 30 Mbps should be excluded from the market, the Commission stressed that, in the absence of detailed factual information and of a sound substitutability analysis, it was not possible to draw such a conclusion. Rather, the Commission noted that there seemed to be a general trend towards higher speeds in Spain, and that it was artificial to limit the relevant market to speeds below 30 Mbps. CMT eventually withdrew the speed limit from its market definition.
Another relevant issue concerned the definition of geographically segmented markets. While in the first round of market analyses all NRAs defined national markets, the second round revealed that previously imposed regulation of relevant wholesale inputs (LLU and bitstream) lead to certain developments. Particularly in certain regions, mostly densely populated areas, competitors were able to build their own networks and to connect them to the incumbent's local loop. This has lead NRAs to address the question whether to regionally segment markets or to reduce or completely remove regulation in some areas.
The first regulator to notify such segmentation was Ofcom.103 In its comments letter, the Commission set the criteria and type of evidence required for geographic segmentation of the wholesale broadband access market. The Commission stated, inter alia, that the definition of geographic sub-markets had to be based on a thorough analysis of structural and behavioural factors. This should include not only structural indicators, such as the number of competitors present in a given exchange area, but also other potentially relevant factors, such as the size/density of the areas in question, in order to establish that the presence of alternative operators is sustainable. The distribution of market shares and their development over time within individual exchange areas should also be looked into. Relevant behavioural indicators would include a preliminary analysis of pricing, price trends and price differentiation at retail and wholesale level, as well as any differences in supply and demand characteristics, such as the commercial strategies and product/service offerings observed in the different areas. The definition of geographic sub-markets would also entail the assessment of whether any proposed market boundaries would be sufficiently stable over time.
Subsequently, in February 2008, the Austrian regulator (TKK)104 decided to define a national market but to geographically differentiate the remedies imposed on the SMP operator on the basis of the competition faced by this operator in the different areas. The Commission accepted this approach, yet in its comments letter set out the criteria under which such differentiation of remedies would be justified. The Commission stated, inter alia, that the abovementioned differentiation could be appropriate in those situations where, for example, the boundary between areas where there is different competitive pressure is variable and likely to change over time, or where significant differences in competitive conditions are observed but the evidence may not be such as to justify the definition of sub-national markets. In addition, differentiation of remedies may be appropriate where premature removal of ex ante regulation could have significant detrimental consequences for consumers and the competitive process.105
The Portuguese NRA has also proposed to geographically segment the market.106 The Commission found that the geographical segmentation was substantiated to the required degree, yet pointed out that the NRA should carefully monitor the market in the context of the NGA rollout, as the deployment of new infrastructure could well reverse the development of competition in the referred market. Other NRAs, such as CMT107 (Spanish regulator) and Ficora108 (Finish regulator), were also contemplating a geographical differentiation of the market. In these cases, however, the Commission considered that further justification would be necessary to remove regulation.
The Commission has also systematically elaborated on the appropriateness of the inclusion of cable in the relevant market. When assessing NRAs' notifications, the Commission has reiterated the need for a thorough assessment of the direct competitive constraints exerted by cable operators on traditional broadband access products for the purposes of properly delineating the relevant wholesale broadband access market.109 Where cable could not be included in the product market definition on this basis, the Commission indicated that, even in the absence of a relevant wholesale access offer, competition at the retail level from vertically integrated undertakings may be such as to exert an indirect constraint on the market for wholesale access services. Such indirect pricing constraints should be taken into account in the context of the SMP assessment.110
The Commission underlined that if weak constraints are automatically taken into account at the market definition stage there is also a risk of understating the real extent of market power at the wholesale level by including self-supplied market shares for all vertically integrated competitors irrespective of whether the latter are actually constraining the market behaviour of the incumbent. It is therefore essential that the degree or strength of the constraint posed is correctly estimated in the assessment. When assessing the effect of indirect substitution through a SSNIP (small but significant non-transitory increase in prices) test, NRAs are required to demonstrated that:111
(i) based on the wholesale/retail price ratio, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) would not be able to absorb and would therefore be forced to pass a hypothetical wholesale price increase on to their consumers at the retail level;
(ii) there would be sufficient demand substitution, at the retail level, to retail services based on indirect constraints such as to render the wholesale price increase unprofitable; and
(iii) the customers of the ISPs would not switch to a significant extent to the retail arm of the integrated hypothetical monopolist, in particular if the latter does not raise its own retail prices.
Two cases have shown specificities which are worth mentioning. In the Maltese case the NRA included the provision of wholesale products over cable networks in the relevant market on the basis of direct constraints, which resulted from the particular characteristics of the Maltese market. The Maltese NRA sustained that: (i) although cable modem and DSL technologies differed, the services presented similar network architectures, similar possible points of interconnection and similar cost structures, which rendered them equivalent wholesale products; (ii) on the demand side, both platforms provided equivalent products, had ubiquitous coverage of the national territory and the interconnection for ISPs and wholesale providers was simple and cost-effective; and (iii) on the supply side, despite high entry barriers to the roll-out of a new fixed network, DSL and cable modem wholesale providers could counteract any price increase by their competitor by providing a similar product through their own access network. The Commission invited the NRA to monitor market developments. 112
In the Danish case, the main justification put forward by the regulator to include cable in the relevant market was the fact that in Denmark the largest cable TV network was controlled by the incumbent operator (TDC), which owned the copper network. The Danish NRA considered that this fact could in itself have a direct impact on the supply of broadband connections based on copper networks113. Although the Commission was not convinced that sufficient evidence on the direct constraints between copper and cable had been provided to justify the inclusion of cable in the relevant market, it acknowledged, however, that the joint control over both parallel networks and the absence of appropriate obligations imposed on cable could lead TDC to circumvent existing regulation limited to traditional copper-based wholesale broadband access products, thereby distorting competition by depriving its wholesale customers reliant on TDC´s DSL bitstream access products from the ability to match the high bandwidth retail offers provided via the incumbent's cable network. Therefore, on the basis of Article 8(2) of the Framework Directive and of Article 8(4) of the Access Directive, the Commission considered that it was justified to extend the remedies applicable to the copper-based network to TDC's cable network.114
In several other cases analysed by the Commission, the exclusion of cable-based wholesale broadband access services from the relevant market would have neither changed the SMP finding nor led to a different regulatory outcome.115 Consequently the issue of the inclusion of cable-based wholesale broadband access services in the relevant market has been left open.
Finally, in one of the cases notified, the Commission addressed the issue of substitutability, at retail level (residential market), between mobile and fixed broadband. In this regard, in its third round review of the WBA market, the Austrian NRA identified two separate markets for broadband access at the retail level, for residential and business customers respectively.116 Whereas the business market included only DSL based connections, the residential market comprised DSL as well as cable TV and mobile broadband connections. On the basis of the situation at the retail level, RTR concluded that only the wholesale broadband access market based on bitstream connections for the subsequent use of business customers would warrant ex ante regulation. The Commission had serious doubts as to the inclusion of mobile broadband in the retail broadband market for residential customers and as to the treatment of external and internal supply of bitstream connections, for the subsequent use by residential customers, in the definition of the wholesale market. The Commission eventually accepted RTR's conclusion that, on the basis of the market situation, mobile broadband connections for fixed broadband connections for residential users could be substitutes. The Austrian NRA was however invited to closely monitor market developments, in particular the constraints of further mobile take-up in comparison with the evolution of fixed broadband networks and the impact of NGA deployment.
5.2.Issues related to remedies
The transition to NGA has brought along new issues related to the imposition of remedies. Some NRAs have refrained from regulating or have proposed lighter regulation on certain networks or functionalities. In this regard, some NRAs have included fibre based products in their market definitions but have proposed not to impose remedies or to limit such imposition in respect of fibre-based products.117
In Denmark,118 the regulator proposed not to impose any obligations on fibre, stating that in case the incumbent started to deploy fibre in the local loop in order to provide high bandwidth broadband services to end-users, such remedies could be imposed by means of an additional decision. The Commission invited the Danish regulator to closely monitor the overall level of retail competition and the development of fibre access networks in Denmark and to perform a new market analysis in the event the incumbent launched fibre based retail product offerings on a larger scale. Furthermore, in case of continued lack of effective competition, the Commission invited the Danish NRA to impose remedies on fibre access products.
In the Netherlands,119 whilst including fibre in both the low and high wholesale broadband access markets, the regulator proposed not to impose regulatory obligations on bitstream access via fibre networks in the low quality market. The Dutch NRA considered that WBA access over fibre was in casu unnecessary due to the fact that unbundled fibre ODF access in the LLU market would already allow for market players to gradually build up a geographical coverage based on unbundled fibre access. It considered, moreover, that mandating WBA over copper was sufficient to remedy competition problems in the WBA market and in the underlying retail markets. The Commission, while considering the exclusion of fibre from the WBA market as potentially justifiable, pointed to the uncertainties regarding the successful implementation of ODF unbundled access and invited the Dutch NRA to closely monitor market developments and to extend the proposed remedies to fibre networks if the obligations imposed proved insufficient to ensure competition.
In Germany,120 following the Commission's serious doubts on to the exclusion of VDSL infrastructure from the WBA market,121 the NRA included such infrastructure in the market but considered that substitutability could not yet be assessed given the marginal demand for retail products based on VDSL. Therefore it did not mandate VDSL bitstream.
In Estonia, the regulator imposed on the SMP operator fibre bitstream at national and local level, but specified that the obligation to provide bitstream at DSLAM level and the related price control obligation would not apply to the SMP operator's fibre infrastructure since, otherwise, there would a duplication of the access remedies applied in the LLU market.
The absence of regulation of specific offers was also an issue dealt with by the Commission in the Spanish case.122 As previously mentioned, following the serious doubts put forward by the Commission on the exclusion of wholesale broadband access at speeds above 30 Mbps from the relevant product market, the Spanish NRA eventually withdrew the speed limit from its market definition123 but maintained the distinction in terms of the access remedy applied. In this regard, the Spanish regulator proposed to regulate only bitstream offers up to 30 Mb/s, considering that such an approach would contribute to fostering infrastructure competition and that the imposition of access to passive infrastructure in the LLU market would already allow entrants to roll out their own fibre. The Commission pointed out that since the prospects for enhanced infrastructure-based competition did not appear to be particularly strong, there was a risk that, with a fibre-based wholesale broadband access product limited in speed, Telefónica could pre-empt the market for retail broadband services during the period in which the deployment of fibre was taking up in Spain. The Commission therefore urged the Spanish regulator to reconsider imposing remedies for wholesale access products also in excess of 30 Mb/s.
The non imposition of specific remedies was also criticised by the Commission e.g. in the Finnish case,124 where the regulator proposed not to impose any price obligation in the WBA market. The Commission invited the regulator to reconsider imposing such obligation in order to avoid competition problems, given that the absence of such a remedy could create a risk of access regulation being de facto annihilated by supra competitive prices.
6.Terminating segments of leased lines (market 6)
A leased line is a dedicated permanent communication link between two locations and is used for providing telephone, data or internet services. At wholesale level, leased lines are rented from and by telecoms operators either to complete their own infrastructure or to provide leased line services at retail level. At retail level, leased lines are typically rented by large businesses to connect branch offices since these lines guarantee bandwidth for network traffic. The "terminating segment" of leased lines (as opposed to the "trunk segment"125) refers to the segment of a leased line which ends at the site of a final user. Twenty-five NRAs have notified the market for terminating segments for leased lines126. All notifying NRAs found that the fixed incumbent operator(s) had SMP on this market, although the British NRA found that there was no SMP on the more narrowly defined market for very high capacity terminating segments of leased lines, the Austrian regulator assessed the wholesale market for terminating segments of leased lines for very high bandwidths and found the wholesale market for leased lines with high bandwidths in Area 1127 as not susceptible to ex ante regulation, whereas the Lithuanian NRA designated the incumbent operator as having SMP only on the market for low capacity leased lines.
6.1.Issues related to the market definition
The precise delineation between trunk and terminating segments of leased lines is highly dependent on the national network topologies128. Some NRAs segmented wholesale terminating segments of leased lines according to bandwidth129. Other NRAs instead identified significant geographic variations in competitive conditions and proposed to define separate geographic markets accordingly. The British130 and the Austrian131 NRAs identified different competitive conditions with regard to the areas132 where business customers are located and alternative operators are rolling out high bandwidth networks. The Finish133 NRA proposed the regional definition of the geographic market, which follows the borders of the traditional operating areas134 of telecommunications operators that provide fixed local telephone services. One NRA135 segmented terminating segments of leased lines according to intended use and proposed to deregulate leased lines connecting with base stations of mobile network operators. As to the geographical differentiation of the market for terminating segments of leased lines, the Commission in its comment letters provided guidelines for the regulatory authorities. In particular the Commission underlined that in order to determine whether the market is characterised by different competitive conditions NRAs have to analyse also other structural and behavioural factors than the number of operators capable of providing services in a given area. The Commission also made it clear that the notified market definition should reflect the actual market reality.
Some NRAs136 included alternative interfaces in the wholesale leased lines markets because they are functionally equivalent to wholesale leased lines with traditional interfaces. In that respect the Commission considered the inclusion of wholesale leased lines with functionally equivalent alternative interfaces (in particular Ethernet) in the market definition as being technologically neutral. The British NRA defined however separate markets for traditional and alternative interfaces137.
With regard to NRAs that notify their market definitions (including the three criteria test) separately from their SMP assessment and regulatory remedies, the Commission has reserved its right to re-assess the market definition in the context of all elements of the draft regulatory decision138, stressing that such an approach harbours a high potential risk that the SMP analysis is based on a market, which is either wrongly delineated or no longer susceptible to ex ante regulation.
6.2.Issues related to remedies
As to the remedies in the market for wholesale terminating segments of leased lines, in the context of the Dutch notification139 where the proposed access obligation was supposed to cover part of the market for trunk segments of leased lines, the Commission stressed that the scope of the proposed obligations should be limited to remedying the lack of competition in the market at hand only.
Commenting upon the British notification140, the Commission expressed its view that timeframes for regulatory obligations should not be fixed for a too long period if competitive conditions are likely to improve in the short or mid term. In such a case NRAs should be in a position to conduct market analysis at any moment and remove unnecessary obligations if proportionate and justified.
With regard to price control obligations, the Commission has in its comment letter concerning the Estonian notification141 recommended direct regulatory intervention by imposing concrete prices to be applied rather than self regulation by the incumbent operator, who could itself determine cost oriented prices.
In the context of the Italian notification in which AGCOM proposed to lift the regulation for leased lines leading to mobile operators' base stations , the Commission stressed that regulatory obligations should be withdrawn only after a transition period long enough to enable alternative operators to eliminate remaining bottlenecks in their networks.142
7.Voice call termination on individual mobile networks (market 7)
7.1.Issues related to market definition
As for fixed telephony, the absence of effective substitution possibilities and the presence of the CPP principle in the EU have led NRAs to consistently find each individual mobile network operator as constituting a distinct relevant network market for terminating calls on their own networks.
A number of NRAs have also identified relevant termination markets for mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) to the extent that such MVNOs can determine their commercial terms and conditions for call termination independently of their host network operators143.
The market definition generally includes all calls terminated on the mobile network, irrespective of the technology used (i.e. 2G or 3G) and regardless of the origin of the call144.
Two NRAs also identified separate relevant markets for wholesale SMS termination on individual mobile networks (not listed in the Recommendation on relevant markets) as susceptible to ex-ante regulation145.
7.2.Issues related to remedies
As in case of fixed call termination, the Commission has also underlined the importance of effective cost orientation146 and continuously reiterated the importance of bringing mobile termination rates down to the level which reflects the cost of an efficient operator as soon as possible147. While the Regulatory Framework does not exclude a price control mechanism based on comparison with other countries, the Commission has noted that any such benchmarking should serve to promote efficiency and sustainable competition and maximise consumer benefits. Furthermore, the prices can be considered as appropriate to serve as a basis for comparison only if they have been set based on an appropriate cost accounting model and relevant cost accounting data to reflect cost orientation148.
In urging NRAs to specify their cost-orientation obligation as soon as possible, the Commission has frequently invited them to apply a forward-looking LRIC model149 and has also noted that a glide path towards an efficient rate should be established without delay as any grace period could remove the incentive to become cost-effective as quickly as possible150. In terms of costs included in the relevant cost model, the Commission has continued to highlight the importance of LRIC models using the current costs of an efficient operator employing efficient technology and not historical costs, which risk overestimating the appropriate costs considerably151. Where, for example, spectrum is included in the cost model, the Commission has noted that the value of spectrum licences should be calculated at current value on a forward-looking basis and not on the basis of values which approximate past levels152.
Furthermore, the Commission has underlined that as wholesale call termination services are traffic-related services, relevant costs considered for wholesale call termination charging purposes are typically those costs which vary in response to increased levels of wholesale call termination traffic, i.e. the additional costs involved in providing the service in question153. For example, there are costs of spectrum usage, which are not traffic-related and, as such, should not be calculated as part of the wholesale call termination service154.
The Commission has also on numerous occasions stated that mobile termination rates should normally be symmetric and that asymmetry should be adequately justified by objective cost differences and limited to a transitory period155. The Commission has further encouraged NRAs to impose effective access obligations on all SMP operators156. In addition, the Commission has called for regulators to ensure a symmetric wholesale rate is applied irrespective of the origin of the call, i.e. fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls157.
As for fixed termination, the Commission has consistently called on the national regulators to work together towards a coherent cost accounting method for estimating mobile termination rates. Moreover, the Commission has in recent cases underlined the importance of NRAs notifying their actually proposed glide paths as part of the consultation procedure under Article 7(3), as price levels, amendments to methodologies used to calculate costs or prices, as well as the determination of glide paths are considered to have a material impact on the relevant markets158.
Finally, in recent notifications a number of regulators have already signalled their intention to implement the costing approach set out in the Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in their next market reviews159. In its notification, the French regulator, ARCEP, considered that cost orientation towards LRIC, where the relevant increment is defined as the wholesale call termination service provided to third parties, provides the efficient signal for operators in the long term and has identified the target efficient cost-based mobile termination rate to be eventually reached by all mobile operators at between 1 and 2 €cent/min160.
8.Other markets (outside the Recommendation on relevant markets)
In its Recommendation 2007 on relevant markets the Commission removed a series of markets listed in the Recommendation on relevant markets 2003. One set of those removed markets covers certain retail markets, in particular the markets for calls from fixed location and the retail market for the minimum set of leased lines. Those markets have been removed from the Recommendation on relevant markets based on the expected erosion of market entry barriers due to efficient wholesale regulation.
A further set of markets removed from the Recommendation covers certain wholesale markets, in particular the transit interconnection market, the trunk leased lines market, the market for access and call origination on mobile networks and the broadcasting transmission market. Regarding those markets it is duplication of the network and/or the dynamics of competition shown within the notification procedure have led to the conclusion that at European level, those markets do not fulfill anymore the three criteria test.
Where NRAs nevertheless propose to regulate one of those markets no longer considered a priori suscepble to ex ante regulation, there are recommended to justify maintenance of regulation based on the evidence that given the specificities of their national market the three criteria test161 is still fulfilled and SMP is found.162
8.1.Issues related to the retail call markets (former markets 3-6)
These markets comprise all outgoing telephone calls from a fixed location. They have been removed from the Recommendation on relevant markets based on the expected erosion of market entry barriers due to efficient wholesale regulation.
The majority of NRAs163 which have more recently analyzed the three criteria test in those markets also came to the conclusion that the markets were not any longer susceptible to ex ante regulation. For instance, the first criterion (high and non transitory market entry barriers) was assessed on the basis of the efficiency of wholesale regulation in place, in particular CPS and CS and WLR, which have substantially reduced market entry barriers. Furthermore, the progression of new technologies (e.g. VoIP) has been at the basis of findings of competition dynamics (the second criterion of the 3-criteria test). Accordingly, since 2007, in those countries regulation of the retail calls markets has been withdrawn. However, in some Member States regulation was maintained based on a recent finding of the fulfillment of the three criteria test and finding of SMP164. In all cases where an NRA concluded on the necessity of maintaining regulation the Commission stressed the need to strengthen the efficiency of wholesale regulation, to monitor market developments and assess whether wholesale remedies alone will be sufficient to achieve the objectives of the framework.
Overall, experience with market reviews carried out by the NRAs during the reporting period largely confirm the Commission's assessment that at EU level this market no longer warrants ex ante regulation. Also, the conclusions and recommendations made by the Commission in its 2nd report on the need to strengthen the efficiency of wholesale regulation enabling the removal of regulation at retail level remain fully valid165.
8.2.Issues related to the market for the minimum set of leased lines (former market 7)
The market for the retail minimum set of leased lines has been removed from the Recommendation on relevant markets based on the expected removal of market entry barriers due to the efficiency of wholesale regulation. The three criteria test carried out by the NRAs during the reporting period largely confirmed this assessment.
Article 18 of the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC166 provides for the minimum set of leased lines to be offered in accordance with Annex VII of this Directive. The minimum set of leased lines was defined in the Commission Decision 2003/548/EC167, while Decision 2008/60/EC168 has set a null-set, i.e. NRAs are no longer under an obligation to ensure that a defined set of leased lines is provided at retail level. While previously the retail leased lines market was regulated in all Member States, the majority of telecom regulators having more recently analyzed this market confirmed that the market was not susceptible to ex ante regulation169. Those conclusions were based on the technical evolution towards higher bandwidth, together with the efficiency of wholesale regulation for the competitiveness retail level, thus largely confirming the conclusions made by the Commission in its 2007 Communication on market reviews. However, two NRAs170 concluded on the fulfillment of the three criteria test. The Commission questioned this finding stressing the need to carry out a prospective market analysis and to rely on wholesale regulation. While accepting the conclusions of the British NRA based on the evidence of national specific circumstances, the Commission recalled that NRAs should append detailed reasoning to their (new) analysis outlining why, in the particular circumstances, the three criteria are satisfied.
8.3.Issues related to the market for fixed transit services (former market 10)
The market for transit services refers to the conveyance of calls at a higher network level and may be defined as pure transit between nodes (unbundled transit) or as being complemented by the call origination and call termination services (bundled transit). The market has been removed from the Recommendation on relevant market based on the observation of replication of networks at a higher network level which indicates that market entry barriers cannot be regarded any longer as high and non transitory.
While a substantial number of NRAs171 had already concluded on the competitiveness (absence of SMP) of the transit market at a time when this market was still listed in the Recommendation on relevant markets, the majority of NRAs having analyzed this market under the new Recommendation withdrew regulation based on a finding of absence of the fulfillment of the three criteria test172 supported by the commercial availability of transit services and decreasing market shares, together with self-supply and the replication of the network at transit level, while one NRA173 based the withdrawal of regulation on the absence of SMP. In one case the Commission opposed the three criteria test, together with the SMP-finding, of an NRA174. The Commission in particular stressed that the scale of market entry and the roll out of parallel infrastructures indicated the absence of high and non-transitory market entry barriers and thus the absence of the fulfilment of the first criterion of the three criteria test. In addition, on the basis of decreasing market shares below 40% and no further evidence the conclusion that the second criterion is met would not be justifiable. Subsequently, the NRA withdrew regulation.
Thus, the experience over the reporting period with the analysis of the three criteria test at the national level largely confirms the Commission's statement made in its 2007 Communication on market reviews. Indeed, duplication of the backbone infrastructure in the transit segment has continued and the developments have shown that this market does not anymore warrant ex ante regulation.
8.4.Issues related to the trunk leased lines market (former market 14)
The market for the provision of wholesale trunk leased lines has been removed from the Recommendation on relevant markets based on the observed and expected replication of the network. However, given that – depending also on the network level at which NRA delineate the trunk part from the terminating segment – not all trunk routes may be duplicated, the fulfillment of the three criteria test may also be subject to the fact whether the replication of the network is expected to occur to a sufficient extent to allow operators to compete on the relevant market.
Since the last report two NRAs concluded on the absence of the fulfillment of the three criteria test and two further NRAs withdrew regulation based on a finding of absence of SMP175. Among those NRAs which have regarded the three criteria test to be fulfilled, one NRA176 concluded on SMP still under the former Recommendation while two NRAs concluded on SMP in parts of the market under the new Recommendation177. The Commission commented on the need to carry out the three criteria test, to monitor market dynamics and to provide more evidence for market definition and for concluding on the need of ex ante regulation. The Commission in particular stressed that (1) in the absence of a detailed analysis as to what extent the areas with duplication/multiplication of the trunk infrastructure and those which are only connected to the incumbent's network can be regarded to form a substantial part of the relevant market, it is not possible to assess the degree to which the market is constrained with high market entry barriers; and (2) in the absence of an analysis of price trends and pricing behaviour of different operators, which give valuable information on whether the market tends towards effective competition, it is not possible to conclude that the second criterion is met.
Thus, the analysis of the three criteria test at national level largely confirms the Commission's statement made in its 2007 Communication on market reviews. Indeed, duplication of the backbone infrastructure at trunk level progressed and allowed a series of further NRAs to withdraw regulation. The developments have shown that this market does not anymore warrant ex ante regulation. Furthermore, it should be noted that the assessment as to whether the replication of the network is expected to occur to a sufficient extent to allow operators to compete on the relevant market in particular requires NRAs to analyse the impact of a partial duplication of the network on the whole trunk market – which may also include also the non-duplicated trunk lines. A more in depth analysis of this impact may have led to further withdrawals of regulation than registered over the reporting period.
8.5.Issues related to the market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks (former market 15)
The market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks has been deleted from the Recommendation on relevant markets based on an observed finding of absence of SMP in the large majority of Member States, the emergence of a competitive wholesale market in a substantial number of countries and the status of retail competition.
The large majority of NRAs which had already found the market for access and call origination to be competitive has not undertaken a new market analysis, in line with the withdrawal of this market from the Recommendation178. One NRA proposed in its draft measures regulation based on a deviation from the Recommendation by defining separate markets for the access and the calls markets, this latter including calls to reach value added services by dialing premium rate numbers, however, the notification was withdrawn and subsequently the NRA adjusted its market definition and concluded on the absence of SMP179. The two NRAs having concluded previously on single dominance re-confirmed their findings in a second round notification and imposed a set of remedies including access and price control180. With regard to the proposed measures by the Slovenian NRA181 the Commission stressed the need to provide evidence regarding the fulfillment of the three criteria test, in addition to and separately from the evidence provided as part of the SMP analysis, and also called on the Slovenian NRA to monitor market developments with a view to promote effective infrastructure competition and investment, especially when imposing price control, and on the requirement to notify decisions on access prices.
On the background that the large majority of NRAs did not identify a need to carry out a new market analysis following withdrawal of remedies and given that keeping regulation in place in two countries could be regarded as justified only on the basis of very specific national circumstances, the developments over the reporting period support the Commission's conclusions in its 2007 Recommendation on relevant markets to withdraw this market from the list of markets susceptible to ex ante regulation.
While in its previous communication on market reviews the Commission focused on the emergence, the potential and the existence of MVNO agreements as an important parameter to assess the development of competition182, over the current reporting period the Commission also stressed the relevance of (indirect) pricing constraints at the wholesale level resulting from the competition at retail level in order to assess the second criterion of the three criteria test, i.e. the dynamics of competition.
8.6.Broadcasting transmission services for the provision of content to end users (former market 18)
The market for broadcasting transmission services was withdrawn from the Recommendation on relevant markets on the basis of, inter alia, the emergence of new digital transmission technologies reducing capacity constraints and the emergence of new transmission platform creating dynamics of competition which would erode the fulfillment of the second criterion of the three criteria test. Also, the last report on Article 7 pointed to increased platform competition due to the emergence of further distribution platforms, in particular terrestrial digital television and internet television.
A number of NRAs183 concluded on the absence of the fulfillment of the 3 criteria test and withdrew regulation. However, the previous approach of the NRA which could predominantly be observed and which was based on a splitting of the market according to different platforms and the finding of SMP in one of the markets identified, i.e. the terrestrial transmission market184, could also be observed during the present reporting period, while some NRAs extended regulation also to digital terrestrial transmission services185 and/or proposed also in the second round notification to regulate the cable access market.186 In its comments letters, the Commission reiterated the need to monitor the competitiveness of the market in order to assess whether broadcasting transmission services provided over different platforms are developing to the extent that they become viable substitutes, so that the terrestrial platform would not constitute a market on its own, and therefore enable competitive pressure on the retail market absent regulation so that the first and/or second criteria of the three criteria test are no longer met.
On the background that a number of NRAs concluded on the absence of the fulfillment of the three criteria test it may be concluded that the Commission's prognosis as to the development of competition dynamics as a result of the emergence of new platforms has been confirmed. Accordingly, the experience with the measures notified further support that the withdrawal of the market from the list of markets susceptible to ex ante regulation is still justified.
However, due to a large number of diverging technical, economic and regulatory obstacles to the development of direct competition between the different transmission platforms, both at retail and wholesale level, competition in the market for broadcasting transmission services, to deliver content to end-users has not yet developed to its full potential and therefore, NRAs may still conclude on the fulfillment of the three criteria test in certain parts of the market. Where NRAs intend to continue to regulate certain parts of the broadcasting transmission services, it is recommended that in particular the assessment of the second criterion of the three criteria test should include an analysis of the status of competition on the entire broadcasting transmission market at retail level, together with the interrelationship of the markets, where applicable, and also provide evidence on the absence of relevant indirect pricing constraints at wholesale level – taking into account of all those constraints derived from any of the transmission platforms - as one of the preconditions to demonstrate the three criteria test is fulfilled.
ANNEX 4: Table overview per market187
Market 1: Retail access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential and non-residential customers | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with Recom-mendation | Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Carrier (Pre-) selec-tion | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT188 | AT/2004/0109 AT/2004/0110 AT/2007/0579 AT/2007/0580 AT/2008/0832 | NO** VoB is incl. | 1 | YES +WLR | YES | NO | Cost-orientation and ex ante tariff authorisation | YES | Inclusion in the access markets of broadband access lines over which VoB services are provided; Efficiency of wholesale regulation |
BE | BE/2006/0400 BE/2006/0401 BE/2007/0640 BE/2007/0657 BE/2008/0750 | NO** | 1 | YES +WLR | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for CS/CPS (top-down model) + approval of tariffs submitted by the incumbent and retail minus for WLR | YES | Application of the margin squeeze test to markets non-regulated at the retail level; Application of a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methodology (BE/2007/0640) |
BG | BG/2009/0911 | NO Homezone and wireless broadband incl.; Separate markets for res. and non-res. customers | 1 | YES +WLR | YES (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Cost-orientation for CS/CPS and retail minus for WLR (wholesale level) | YES (imposed at M2 & M3) | Inclusion of wireless broadband access services in the market for retail access; Retail remedies versus wholesale remedies |
YES (retail level) | YES (retail level) | Cost-orientation; price cap; and requirement to provide information on price changes of the access price one month in advance (retail level) | NO | ||||||
CY | CY/2006/0485 CY/2006/0486 | NO** Submarkets for lower/higher level | 1 | YES +WLR | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (FDC costing methodology) and retail minus for WLR | YES | No comments |
CZ | CZ/2006/0356 CZ/2006/0357 CZ/2008/0755 | YES | 1 | YES | NO | NO | NO | YES | Efficiency of the proposed remedies in resolving identified market failures (CZ/2006/0356) Insufficient justification for withdrawal of the price regulation. (CZ/2008/0755) |
DK | DK/2005/0183 DK/2005/0184 | YES | 1 | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
EE | EE/2007/0637 EE/2007/0638 | YES | 1 | YES | NO | NO | Cost orientation for CS/CPS | NO | Effectiveness of the proposed remedies in resolving the identified market failure in the fixed access market; Details of cost-orientation of CS/CPS |
FI | FI/2003/0020 FI/2003/0021 | YES Geo. submarkets corresponding to the respective operating areas of the incumbents' local network | 43 | YES | NO | YES | NO | NO | Remedies at retail level |
FR | FR/2005/0221 FR/2005/0222 FR/2007/0648 FR/2008/0782 | NO Separate markets for res. and non-res. customers | 1 | YES +WLR | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
DE | DE/2005/0306 DE/2005/0307 DE/2006/0402 DE/2009/0897 DE/2009/1006 | NO** Complete connections (~naked DSL) incl. | 1 | YES | NO | NO | Ex-post price control | NO | Inclusion of complete connections in the market for retail access; Notification of remedies at a later stage (DE/2009/0897) Need to impose an appropriate price control for the provision of WLR; Need to review DT's voluntary undertakings (DE/2009/1006) |
EL | EL/2006/0500 EL/2006/0501 EL/2006/0555 EL/2008/0751 | NO** Submarkets for lower/higher level | 1 | NO But WLR | YES (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Retail minus for WLR (FDC /CCA) (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | No comments |
YES (retail level for low and high capacity lines) | YES (retail level diff. for low and high capacity lines) | Price cap and a sub-cap for new connections (Consumer Price Index) (retail level) | YES (retail level for low capacity lines) | ||||||
HU | HU/2005/0130 HU/2005/0131 HU/2007/0662 HU/2007/0663 | YES Geo. submarkets corresponding to the respective operating areas of the incumbents' local network | 5 | YES | YES | NO | Prohibition of unjustifiably high fees by imposing an annual ceiling of price increase equivalent to the consumer price index | NO | Product market definition (exclusion of home-zone products); Imposition of wholesale line rental remedy |
IE | IE/2005/0158 IE/2005/0159 IE/2007/0632 IE/2008/0852 IE/2009/0928 | NO** Submarkets for lower/higher level | 1 | YES +WLR | YES (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Retail minus for Single Billing-WLR (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Further consultation planned by ComReg (IE/2007/0632) |
IT | IT/2005/0260 IT/2005/0261 IT/2007/0611 IT/2007/0612 IT/2008/0842 IT/2009/0890 IT/2009/0987 | NO* Separate markets for res. and non-res. customers; VoIP connections incl. | 1 | NO But WLR189 | YES (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Cost accounting (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Inclusion of broadband access enabling VoIP services in the market for retail access; Lack of notification of the remedies (IT/2009/0890) Modification of the undertakings; Implementation and monitoring of the undertakings of Telecom Italia; The Supervisory Board and OTA Italia; Notification requirements as to the price control obligation(IT/2009/0987) |
NO (retail level) | YES (retail level) | Cost accounting (retail level) | NO (retail level) | ||||||
LV | LV/2007/0565 LV/2007/0566 LV/2009/0994 | NO Separate markets for res. and non-res. customers | 1 | YES | NO | NO | Cost-orientation and cost accounting | NO | Implementation of existing remedies and non-imposition of a wholesale line rental remedy; Lack of details concerning price control obligation and non-imposition of accounting separation |
LT | LT/2006/0411 LT/2006/0412 LT/2006/0512 LT/2006/0513 | YES | 1 | YES +WLR | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (FDC methodology based on historical cost accounting) | YES | The inclusion of wireless radio, optic cable and local area networks in the same market as fixed residential analogue and cable access lines (LT/2006/0411 and LT/2006/0412) |
LU | LU/2006/0526 LU/2006/0527 | NO** | 1 | YES +WLR | YES (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Cost-orientation for CS/CPS and retail minus for WLR (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Price control obligation |
YES (retail level) | YES (retail level) | To charge reasonable prices (retail level) | NO | ||||||
MT190 | MT/2006/0394 MT/2006/0395 | NO** | 1 | YES +WLR | YES (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Cost-orientation for CS/CPS and specified price control for WLR to be defined at a later stage (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | The inclusion of BWA in the same market as fixed residential analogue and cable access lines |
YES (retail level) | YES (retail level) | YES (retail level) | YES (retail level) | ||||||
NL | NL/2005/0287 NL/2005/0288 NL/2008/0821 | NO** voice calls services are incl.; Separate markets for res. and non-res. customers | 1 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Product market definition – inclusion of access and calls in the same market; Phasing out retail regulation of business market |
PL | PL/2006/0518 PL/2006/0524 PL/2007/0593 PL/2007/0647 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Prohibition of excessive pricing; Obligation to refrain from limiting competition by fixing prices below the costs of their provision; Cost orientation and cost accounting obligation on the basis of FL – FDC methodology; Obligation to submit for approval prices of service provision | NO | Regulatory obligations to be limited to correspond to the scope of market definition (PL/2007/0593) |
PT | PT/2004/0053 PT/2004/0054 PT/2004/0091 | YES | 1 | YES +WLR | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | YES | Wholesale line rental (PT/2004/0091) |
RO | RO/2009/1001191 | NO** Home zone products and managed VoIP connections incl. | 1 | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | Inclusion of managed VoIP products in the access market definition; Non-imposition of a wholesale line rental remedy |
SK | SK/2005/0172 SK/2005/0173 SK/2007/0676 SK/2007/0696 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | NO | NO (non-residential market) | NO | Market definition; Effectiveness of the proposed remedies (SK/2007/0676 and SK/2007/0696) |
YES (residential market) prohibition of charging excessive prices |
SI | SI/2005/0231 SI/2005/0232 SI/2007/0600 SI/2007/0601 | YES | 1 | YES +WLR | YES (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | Retail minus 10% for WLR (wholesale level) | YES (wholesale level) | No comments |
YES (retail level) | NO (retail level) | Prohibition to charge excessive prices (price cap for subscription fees); Cost-orientation (for other end-user prices (FAC - CCA); Prohibition to set predatory pricing (retail level) | NO (retail level) | ||||||
ES | ES/2005/0336 ES/2006/0337 ES/2007/0620 ES/2007/0621 ES/2008/0815 | NO** Homezone incl. | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Price cap related to (recurrent) subscription fees on the basis of an RPI-X factor | YES | Standardized and customized offers; Withdrawal of price regulation |
SE | SE/2004/0112 SE/2004/0113 SE/2009/0965 | NO** IP-based telephony incl. | 1 | YES +WLR | YES | YES | Retail minus for WLR and cost accounting (LRIC) | YES | Inclusion of IP-based telephony with numbers in the market for retail access |
UK | UK/2003/0009 UK/2003/0010 UK/2004/0045 UK/2007/0649 UK/2008/0854 UK/2009/0899 | NO** Geo. submarkets corresponding to the respective operating areas of the incumbents' local network; Separate markets for res. and non-res. customers; Submarkets for analogue and ISDN | 2 (in ISDN markets) | NO | YES (In the Hull area) | YES (In the Hull area) | NO | NO | No comments |
NO - in the UK excluding the Hull area With regard to ISDN 2 and ISDN 30 markets: sole reliance on wholesale remedies | |||||||||
GI | GI/2007/0710 GI/2007/0711 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Price cap - to be specified at the later stage (most likely RPI-x) | YES | Lack of details concerning price control obligations. |
*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators | |||||||||
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation |
Market 2: Wholesale call origination on the public telephone network at a fixed location | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with Recom-mendation | Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT192 | AT/2004/0105 AT/2006/0543 AT/2008/0833 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRAIC-model) | YES | Implementation of the proposed cost-orientation obligation; Reduction of minimum interconnection loads |
BE | BE/2006/0439 BE/2007/0657 BE/2008/0750 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Not specified | YES | No comments |
BG | BG/2009/0864 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (Fully Allocated Costing methodology) The future accounting methodology will be LRIC bottom up. | YES | No comments |
CY | CY/2006/0473 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRIC-model) | YES | No comments |
CZ | CZ/2006/0351 CZ/2009/0808 CZ/2009/0963 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Price cap (LRIC model) | YES | No comments |
DK | DK/2005/0141 DK/2006/0536 | NO** Wholesale access incl. | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRAIC model); Minor services may be priced according to modified historic cost | YES | Market for wholesale access connections (DK/2005/0141) |
EE | EE/2007/0597 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Fully distributed costs based on historical costs (HC FDC) | NO | No comments |
FI | FI/2003/0028 FI/2007/0703 | YES Geo. submarkets corresponding to the respective operating areas of the incumbents' local network | 34 | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | No comments |
FR | FR/2005/0227 FR/2007/0650 FR/2008/0783 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | YES | No comments |
DE | DE/2005/0143 DE/2005/0254 DE/2008/0843 DE/2008/0887 | YES 2 product submarkets | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Not specified price control (ex ante tariff authorization procedure) | NO | Notification of remedies at a later stage (DE/2008/0843) |
Need for transparency and coherence in the notification of remedies under the EU consultation procedure (DE/2009/0887) | |||||||||
EL | EL/2006/0493 EL/2008/0751 | YES | 1 | YES +C(P)S | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRAIC/CC) | YES | No comments |
HU | HU/2005/0151 HU/2007/0726 | YES Geo. submarkets corresponding to the respective operating areas of the incumbents' local network | 4 | YES | NO | YES | Cost-orientation (LRIC model) | YES | No comments |
IE | IE/2005/0190 IE/2007/0672 IE/2009/0916 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRIC model) | YES | Failure to adopt previously notified measures |
IT | IT/2006/0383 | YES | 1 | YES +C(P)S | YES | YES | Network cap mechanism | YES | No comments |
LV193 | LV/2006/0365 LV/2009/0960 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation and cost accounting (Activity based allocation of current costs, FDC) | YES | Implementation of existing remedies and non-imposition of a wholesale line rental remedy |
LT | LT/2006/0364 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (During a transitional period: top-down fully distributed costs (FDC); as of 2007: FL-LRAIC model) | YES | No comments |
LU | LU/2006/0541 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (fully allocated historic costs) | YES | No comments |
MT | MT/2006/0387 MT/2009/0979 | YES | 1 | YES +C(P)S + WLR | YES | YES | Cost orientation for call origination and C(P)S, Retail minus for WLR | YES | Need to monitor the effectiveness of the wholesale inputs |
NL | NL/2005/0286 NL/2006/0511 NL/2008/0770 NL/2008/0793 NL/2008/0822 NL/2009/0992 | NO wholesale access incl.; Separate markets for res. and non-res. customers | 1 | YES +C(P)S + WLR | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for call origination and CS/CPS and retail minus for WLR | NO | Inclusion of wholesale access services in the market for call origination; Subdivision of the wholesale market for fixed telephony into residential and business; The three criteria test (NL/2008/0822) |
PL | PL/2006/0380 | YES | 1 | YES + WLR | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRIC) after the calculations have been approved by an independent auditor; Until then: to set appropriate charges based on costs incurred, which may be verified by the NRA using benchmarking or other methods | YES | Price control before approval of LRIC cost calculation; Wholesale Line Rental |
PT | PT/2004/0060 PT/2004/0092 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | YES | No comments |
RO | RO/2009/1002 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (hybrid (TD-BU) LRIC) | YES | Inclusion of conveyance services in the definition of the call origination network segment |
SK | SK/2004/0103 SK/2007/0740 SK/2008/0792 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation on the basis of a FL-LRAIC bottom up model | YES | Lack of effective implementation of CS/CPS services; Non-imposition of wholesale line rental (WLR) remedy; Timely enforcement of price control obligation (SK/2007/0740) |
SI | SI/2005/0257 SI/2007/0689 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRIC methodology) | YES | No comments |
ES | ES/2006/0355 ES/2007/0589 ES/2008/0816 | YES | 1 | YES +WLR | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | YES | No comments |
SE | SE/2004/0049 SE/2009/0966 SE/2009/1016 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (hybrid (TD-BU) LRIC in general, HC FDC for network capacity pricing) | YES | Need for transparency and coherence in the notification of remedies under the EU consultation procedure (SE/2009/1016) |
UK | UK/2003/0011 UK/2003/0012 UK/2004/0045 UK/2004/0064 UK/2004/0071 UK/2004/0088 UK/2004/0089 UK/2004/0122 UK/2005/0165 UK/2005/0166 UK/2005/0170 UK/2005/0180 UK/2005/0300 UK/2007/0585 UK/2007/0649 UK/2008/0769 UK/2008/0775 UK/2008/0854 UK/2009/0898 UK/2009/0972 | NO** Geo. submarkets corresponding to the respective operating areas of the incumbents' local network | 2 | YES +WLR +C(P)S | YES | YES | Charges of BT and KCOM must be set on the basis of LRIC plus an appropriate mark-up for costs which are common across products, and for recovery the cost of capital; charge control based on the RPI-/+X method | YES | Appropriateness of the proposed costing methodology and need for a coherent European approach |
GI | GI/2007/0716 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | YES | - LLack of details concerning price control and cost accounting obligations |
*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators | |||||||||
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation |
Market 3: Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with Recom-mendation | Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT | AT/2004/0106 AT/2004/0432 AT/2006/0544 AT/2008/0834194 AT/2009/0909 | YES | 12 | YES for Telekom Austria (TA) | YES for TA | YES for TA | Cost-orientation for Telekom Austria (TA) based on hybrid model, averaging of TD and BU LRAIC models. Benchmarking for ANOs to TA’s regional termination fees. | YES for TA | Implementation of proposed cost-orientation obligation should be specified and take into account need for ANOs to become efficient over time. TKK invited to address issue of minimum interconnection loads. (AT/2006/0544) Calculation of the rates on the basis of a "hybrid" LRAIC model. Commission's recommended approach. (AT/2009/0909) |
BE | BE/2006/0440 BE/2007/0588 BE/2008/0750 | YES | 20 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation for Belgacom based on TD approach possibly reconciled with BU approach. Prohibition of excessive pricing for ANOs and benchmarking against incumbent (max. mark-up of 15%). | YES for Belgacom | No comments |
BG | BG/2009/0865 | YES | 16 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for BTC based on benchmarking referring to 7 EU Member States that apply TD LRIC accounting systems. Methodology eventually in line with Recommendation. ANOs prices shall not exceed those of BTC. | YES for BTC | Further consultations planned by CRC. Need to set termination rates at cost of an efficient operator and need for a coherent European approach. Implementation of symmetry for fixed-to-fixed and mobile-to-fixed calls |
CY | CY/2006/0474 | YES | 3195 | YES for ATHK | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for ATHK (LRIC-model) Fair and reasonable prices for ANOs equal to the corresponding cost-oriented double transit rate of ATHK increased by 10% and a 3-year time delay. | YES (subject to a €50 million turnover threshold) | Remedies imposed on D.Y. Worldnet, Callsat and Telepassport (only notify when they enter the market and not to adopt the proposed measures at this stage). |
CZ | CZ/2006/0358 CZ/2007/0660 CZ/2009/0809 CZ/2009/0964 | YES | 24 | YES for TO2 | YES | YES | Maximum prices based on BU-LRIC model (NGN to be taken into account in the following round) | YES for TO2 | Need to impose the access and cost-orientation obligations also on ANOs |
DK | DK/2005/0207 DK/2005/0314 DK/2006/0523 DK/2007/0683 DK/2009/0984 | NO (includes dial-up internet access) | 6 | YES | YES for TDC | YES for TDC | Cost-orientation for TDC (LRAIC model) | YES for TDC | Asymmetric application of remedies. (DK/2005/0207) Need to review the market; Inclusion of calls to service-providers in the fixed call termination market (DK/2009/0984) |
EE | EE/2007/0598 | YES | 12 | YES for Elion | YES | YES | Cost orientation (FDC based on HCA) | NO | Non-imposition of an access obligation on the market for call termination on ANOs' networks Asymmetry of termination rates |
FI | FI/2003/0029 FI/2007/0704 | YES | 35 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation. According to the Finnish Communications Market Act it is up to each operator to select their cost-accounting model and to submit a description of the procedures to FICORA showing main cost categories and cost allocation rules. | YES (subject to a net sales threshold of €20 million). | Cost-orientation and cost accounting obligations in the fixed termination markets. Need for a coherent European approach |
FR | FR/2005/0228 FR/2008/0784 | YES | 21 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for France Telecom (FT) based on LRAIC Prohibition of excessive pricing for ANOs | YES for FT | Need for a coherent European approach (differentiated glide-paths for France Telecom and ANOs) |
DE | DE/2005/0144 DE/2005/0234 DE/2005/0239 DE/2006/0343 DE/2007/0671 DE/2007/0679 DE/2008/0844 DE/2009/0888 DE2009/0948 | YES | 57 (2 merged since original notification of 58 operators) | YES for Deutsche Telekom NO for 56 ANOs | YES | YES | Not a specified price control. Ex-ante tariff authorization procedure. In the authorisation procedure BNetzA ensures that prices do not exceed the cost of efficient service provisioning. Ex-post price control. ANOs' termination rates should not exceed cost level of an efficient operator. | NO | Notification of remedies at a later stage (ineffective approach) (DE/2008/0844) Need for transparency and coherence in the notification of remedies under the EU consultation procedure (DE/2009/0888 and DE/2009/0948) Need to impose a cost orientation obligation on the market for call termination on ANOs' networks; Non-imposition of access obligation on ANOs. (DE/2009/0948) |
EL | EL/2006/0494 EL/2008/0751 EL/2008/0754 | YES | 15 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRAIC-CCA for OTE). Delayed reciprocity for ANOs with OTE’s LRAIC-CCA fee. | YES for OTE | Need for a coherent European approach (EL/2008/0751 and EL/2008/0754) |
HU | HU/2005/0152 HU/2007/0727 | YES | 15 | YES for incumbents | YES | YES | Price control and cost accounting for the incumbents (to continue with FL-LRIC model pending outcome of consultation on wholesale price cap) | YES for incumbents | Remedy of non-discrimination Asymmetric remedies imposed on local incumbents and alternative operators Need for a coherent European approach. |
IE | IE/2005/0191 IE/2007/0701 IE/2009/0917 | YES | 7 | YES for Eircom | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for Eircom (LRIC model) Price control obligation on ANOs linked to market share threshold of 5% or 5 years from date of final decision, whichever is soonest. | YES for Eircom | Non-imposition of access obligation on the market for call termination on ANOs' networks. Price control obligation to be imposed on ANOs (does not address competition problem identified). Further consultations on wholesale price cap and glide path to be imposed on Eircom and ANOs Need for a coherent European approach. |
IT | IT/2006/0384 IT/2008/0753 IT/2008/0777 | YES | 41 | YES NO for 23 ANOs with low level of infrastructure | YES NO for 23 ANOs | YES | Price control through a network cap (CPI-X%) mechanism for Telecom Italia (TI). For 17 ANOs, starting value of glide paths determined in derogation proceedings. BU-LRAIC model used to calculate remaining values. NO for 23 ANOs | YES for TI | High starting points of ANOs' glide paths and asymmetry between ANOs. Inclusion of mark-up in ANO cost model for "competition costs". Inclusion of costs in ANO cost model related to customer premises equipment. (IT/2008/0753) Definition of obligations for call termination to geographic numbers at fixed locations for integrated fixed/mobile offers. Differentiation of remedies according to type of access employed. Need for a coherent European approach. (IT/2008/0753 and IT/2008/0777) |
LV | LV/2006/0366 LV/2009/0889 | YES | 18 | YES for Lattelecom | YES for Lattelecom | YES | Cost-orientation for Lattelecom. Subject to outcome of consultation and Commission Recommendation foresees glide path based on existing FDC-CCA model. Obligation on ANOs to publish price lists. | YES for Lattelecom | Further consultation planned by SPRK on price control and cost accounting obligation. Asymmetric remedies proposed for alternative operators. (SPRK invited to ensure that ANOs' termination rates are set at an efficient level). Need for a coherent European approach. |
LT | LT/2005/0263 LT/2007/0607 LT/2007/0681 LT/2009/0983 | YES | 10 | YES | YES for TEO | YES for TEO | Cost-orientation for TEO (HY-LRAIC) For ANOs: apply prices not higher than TEO's (when implementing the price control obligation) | YES for TEO | Need for an appropriate price control obligation Access obligations proposed for TEO and alternative operators (need to reconsider their scope and wording) |
LU | LU/2006/0560 | YES | 9 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for EPT (FDC) Obligation on ANOs to charge reasonable prices. Max mark-up of 20% on EPT's rates and subject to ILR's approval. | YES for EPT | No comments |
MT | MT/2006/0388 | YES | 2 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation for Maltacom (FAC-HCA; considering a move to CCA) Melita's termination rates are pegged to Maltacom's as a maximum. | YES for Maltacom | Level of termination charges – implementation of cost orientation. (Invites MCA to accelerate tariff reduction. Suggests benchmarking as temporary measure). |
NL | NL/2005/0284 NL/2007/0742 NL/2007/0743 NL/2008/0793 NL/2008/0830 NL/2009/0978 | YES | 33 | YES | NO | YES | Price control based on symmetric price caps for all operators from 1 January 2009. 3-year wholesale price caps which take KPN's prices into account based on TD-EDC. | NO | Need for a coherent EU approach - the proposed cost calculation methodology (NL/2008/0830, NL/2009/0978) |
PL | PL/2006/0381 PL/2006/0502 PL/2007/0633 PL/2007/0641 PL/2007/0685 PL/2008/0760 PL/2008/0761 PL/2008/0762 PL/2008/0776 PL/2008/0814 PL/2009/0903 | YES | Approx. 40 | YES | YES | YES | Price control only for Telekomunikacja Polska (TP) based on costs incurred, which may be verified by the NRA using benchmarking or other methods (e.g. Including price cap, retail minus, cost orientation/cost accounting) NO for ANOs | YES only for TP | Non-imposition of price control on ANOs (PL/2006/0502, PL/2007/0633, PL/2007/0641, PL/2007/0685, PL/2008/0760-0762, PL/2008/0776, PL/2008/0814) Need for a coherent European approach (PL/2008/0760-0762, PL/2008/0776, PL/2008/0814) Asymmetry of fixed termination rates (PL/2008/0814) Proposed price control and cost accounting obligation (for TP) and need for a coherent European approach for regulating wholesale fixed termination rates. (PL/2009/0903) Need for transparency and coherence in the notification of remedies under the EU consultation procedure. (PL/2009/0903) |
PT | PT/2004/0061 PT/2004/0092 | YES | 8 | YES | YES for Portugal Telecom (PT) | YES for PT | Cost-orientation for PT Obligation for fair and reasonable prices for ANOs. Max difference of 20% to PT’s rates. | YES for PT | Asymmetrical application of remedies; (assess whether assumptions on ‘fair and reasonable prices’ will remain relevant over market review). (PT/2004/0092) |
RO | RO/2007/0653 RO/2008/0774 RO/2009/1003 | YES (includes calls to public interest services) | 38 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation for Romtelecom based on LRIC Delayed reciprocity for ANOs | YES for Romtelecom | Inclusion of conveyance services in definition of the call termination network segment Need for a coherent European approach (RO/2008/0774) Scope and purpose of the draft measure / Justification of the use of Article 5 of the Access Directive (0653 RO/2009/1003) |
SK | SK/2004/0102 SK/2005/0187 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (conciliation between the TD-LRIC of the incumbent and BU-FL-LRAIC model developed by the regulator) | YES | No comments |
SI | SI/2005/0258 SI/2007/0690 | YES | 8 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation LRIC methodology for Telekom Slovenije (TS) and FAC-HCA methodology for T-2 (effective until December 2008). Other ANOs obliged to introduce prices based on a glide path towards cost-oriented price of TS | YES for TS | Need for a European approach |
ES | ES/2005/0250 ES/2008/0818 | YES | 28 | YES | YES for TESAU | YES for TESAU | Cost-orientation for TESAU (TD FAC). Reasonable prices for ANOs. 30% mark up above TESAU’s local level rates. | YES for TESAU | Asymmetry and the proposed cost calculation methodology Need for a coherent European approach |
SE | SE/2004/0050 SE/2009/0967 SE/2009/1017 | YES | 26 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for TeliaSonera (LRIC) Obligation on ANOs to charge fair and reasonable prices ; reciprocal FTRs (i.e. symmetry because non-discrimination) | YES | Need for transparency and coherence in the notification of remedies (i.e. need to notify revision of costing methodologies) The proposed cost methodology (i.e. includes non-traffic related costs) (SE/2009/1017) |
UK | UK/2003/0003 UK/2004/0045 UK/2004/0072 UK/2004/0122 UK/2005/0165 UK/2005/0217 UK/2005/0218 UK/2007/0585 UK/2007/0649 UK/2008/0769 UK/2009/0898 | YES196 | 5 | YES for KCOM and BT All other ANOs required to provide access on fair and reasonable terms | YES for KCOM and BT | YES for KCOM and BT | Cost orientation for BT and KCOM where charges set on the basis of LRIC plus an appropriate mark-up for costs which are common across products, and for recovery of the cost of capital. Uses FAC-CCA data to provide a proxy for the LRIC+ model. | NO | Appropriateness of the proposed costing methodology and need for a coherent European approach |
GI | GI/2007/0717 GI/2009/0976 | YES | 2 | YES for Gibtelecom | YES | YES for Gibtelecom | Cost-orientation (non specified) for Gibtelecom Fair and reasonable prices for CTS | YES for Gibtelecom | - LLack of details concerning price control and cost accounting obligations; - NNeed for a coherent European approach (GI/2007/0717) Non imposition of an access obligation; Need for ex ante price control and efficient termination rates(GI/2009/0976) |
Market 4: Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) at a fixed location | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with Recom-mendation | Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT197 | AT/2004/0098 AT/2005/0318 AT/2006/0537 AT/2007/0682 AT/2007/0795 AT/2008/0835 AT/2009/0871 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FL-LRIC | YES | No comments |
BE198 | BE/2007/0735 BE/2008/0801 BE/2009/0949 BE/2010/1033 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Bottom-up methodology reflecting the costs of an efficient operator. Margin squeeze test. | YES | Promotion of investment on infrastructure in relation to wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to the local loop and competition at the retail level (BE/2007/0735 and BE/2009/0949 ) Access to fibre infrastructure (BE/2007/0735 and BE/2009/0949 ) Timeframe for the market review and efficient enforcement of regulatory obligations (BE/2007/0735) The exact scope of wholesale services susceptible to ex-ante regulation (BE/2008/0801) |
BG | NOT YET NOTIFIED |
CY | CY/2006/0331 CY/2009/0869 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Bottom-up LRIC. Results reconciled with hybrid model based on FDC and LRIC models. Margin squeeze test. | YES | Reinforcing regulatory oversight Exclusion of fibre from the relevant market Remedies imposed in the context of NGA development and need for a consistent European approach |
CZ | CZ/2006/0340 CZ/2008/0773 CZ/2008/0828 CZ/2009/0933199 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | LRIC. Covers co-location services. | YES | No comments |
DK | DK/2005/0176 DK/2007/0683 DK/2008/0860 DK/2009/0984 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | LRAIC FAHC model applied transitionally to certain less closely related services and for the 2009 price caps for “best effort” local loops, backhaul sections and migration. | YES | Exclusion of fibre from the market Regulation of “best effort” local loops Remedies imposed in the context of NGA development and need for a consistent European approach |
EE | EE/2007/0577 EE/2009/0942 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | HC- FDC | YES | Inclusion of access support services in the wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access market definition Obligations with regard to fibre loops in the wholesale (physical) infrastructure access market |
FI* ** | FI/2003/0030 FI/2006/0547 FI/2008/0839 | YES | 32 | YES | YES | YES | Up to operator to choose its own cost accounting methodology. Ficora can issue mandatory regulations concerning cost accounting systems. Obligation not applicable to fibre loops. | YES Only on 9 SMP operators | Pricing of installation charges Obligations with regard to fibre loops (i) No cost orientation obligation (ii) Migration from copper to fibre local loops and access to passive infrastructure |
FR | FR/2005/0174 FR/2005/0301 FR/2008/0780 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost oriented prices. Access to the civil works infrastructure to be determined at a later stage. | YES | Market Definition Inclusion of civil works infrastructure in the wholesale physical network infrastructure access market Remedies Access to terminating segment of the access network Recommendation on NGA |
DE** | DE/2004/0119 DE/2005/0150 DE/2007/0646 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Ex ante price control based on the costs of the efficient provision of services. | NO | Access at the MDF to the new infrastructure Access to ducts leading to the street cabinet Access to unlit fibre Collocation in and at the street cabinet |
EL | EL/2006/0353 EL/2008/0751 EL/2009/0934 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | LRAIC | YES | Exclusion of fibre from the market definition |
HU** | HU/2005/0185 HU/2007/0731 | YES | Operating area of Magyar Telekom 1 | YES | YES | YES | LRIC | YES | No comments |
Operating area of Invitel | |||||||||
Operating area of Hungarotel | |||||||||
Operating area of Monortel | |||||||||
IE | IE/2004/0046 IE/2009/0875 IE/2009/0918 IE/2009/0923 IE/2009/0924 IE/2009/0969 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Prohibition of margin squeeze. LRIC for current generation LLU. Further consultation on NGA-based services. | Obligations concerning accounting separation to be subject to further consultation | Market definition (IE/2009/0875) Further consultation planned by ComReg (IE/2009/0875) Remedies imposed in the context of next-generation access (NGA) development and the need for a consistent European approach (IE/2009/0875) Need for an overall analysis of markets 4 and 5 (IE/2009/0875) |
IT | IT/2005/0244 IT/2007/0613 IT/2009/0867 IT/2009/0891 IT/2009/0988 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | BU- LRIC model. Network cap mechanism (IPC-X). | YES | Lack of notification of the remedies (IT/2009/0891) Modification of the undertakings (IT/2009/0988) Implementation and monitoring of the undertakings of Telecom Italia (IT/2009/0988) The Supervisory Board and OTA Italia (IT/2009/0988) Reasonable pricing for access to civil infrastructure and dark fibre (IT/2009/0988) Lack of fibre unbundling obligation under a forward-looking market analysis (IT/2009/0988) Migration process in a NGA context (IT/2009/0988) Remedies imposed in the context of NGA development and need for a consistent European approach (IT/2009/0988) Notification requirements as to the price control obligation (IT/2009/0988) |
LV | LV/2006/0539 LT/2009/0995 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FDC-CCA | YES | No comments |
LT | LT/2006/0391 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FDC | YES | No comments |
LU | LU/2006/0509 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-oriented prices calculated on the basis of the costs of an efficient operator. | YES | Details of the proposed price control obligation |
MT | MT/2006/0549 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FAC-HCA | YES | No comments |
NL | NL/2005/0280 NL/2007/0630 NL/2008/0793 NL/2008/0826 NL/2009/0868 NL/2009/0906 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-oriented prices. EDC for copper LLU and FTTO. DCF/IRR for FTTH. | NO (to be withdrawn) | Recommendation on NGA (NL/2008/0826) (NL/2009/0906) Parameters for the cost model Recommendation on NGA and further consultations on the price regulation in the market for LLU (NL/2009/0868) |
PL | PL/2006/0418 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FL LRIC Until an auditor confirms the accuracy of the calculations, the SMP operator will set appropriate charges based on costs incurred. The NRA will control such costs using comparison with competitive markets or other methods, such as “retail minus”, “bottom up” or best current practice. | YES | Price control before approval of LRIC cost calculation |
PT | PT/2004/0117 PT/2008/0850 PT/2009/0956 PT/2009/1012 | NO (Cable included) | 1 | YES | YES | YES | ANACOM uses the information provided by the SMP operator's cost accounting model, which is FDHC. ANACOM also uses other price references and international benchmarks. | YES | Inclusion of cable in market 4 on the basis of indirect constraints (PT/2008/0850) Regulation of fibre in market 4 and 5 (PT/2008/0850) |
RO | NOT YET NOTIFIED | ||||||||
SK | SK/2004/0107 SK/2009/0929200 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation | YES | Implementation of the proposed cost orientation obligation National public consultation |
SI | SI/2005/0142 SI/2005/0181 SI/2006/0519 SI/2009/0957 SI/2009/0981 SI/2009/1010 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | LRIC+ | YES | Remedies imposed in the context of NGA development and need for a consistent European approach (SI/2009/0957) Imposition of a different price control methodology without a new market analysis (SI/2009/0981) Parameters of the cost model (SI/2009/0981) Effective implementation of the glide-path towards cost-orientation for Greenfield optical fibres (SI/2009/1010) |
ES | ES/2006/0368 ES/2008/0804 ES/2009/0961 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | YES | Exclusion of FTTH from the market for wholesale network infrastructure access at a fixed location (ES/2008/0804) Reference offer and price control obligation as regards access to the physical network infrastructure (ES/2008/0804) Economic viability of access to ducts in Spain (ES/2008/0804) Recommendation on NGA networks (ES/2008/0804) |
SE | SE/2004/0084 SE/2009/1018 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | LRIC (mark-up LRIC for shared access) | YES | Need for transparency and coherence in the notification of remedies under the EU consultation procedure (SE/2009/1018) Need to carry out a new review of the LLU market (SE/2009/1018) |
UK** | UK/2004/0094 UK/2004/0123 UK/2007/0585 UK/2007/0649 UK/2007/0741 UK/2008/0854 UK/2009/0901 | NO (Cable included) | UK (excluding Hull area) 1 | YES | YES | YES | FAC-CCA | YES | Product market definition, including both copper loop-based and cable-based wholesale local accesses |
Hull area 1 | YES | YES | YES | FAC-CCA | NO | ||||
GI | GI/2007/0718 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-oriented prices. Details on the cost accounting model to be determined at a later stage. | YES | Lack of details concerning price control and cost accounting obligations |
* Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators | |||||||||
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation | |||||||||
*** Geographic differentiation of remedies | |||||||||
**** Market not included in the Recommendation |
Market 5: Wholesale broadband access | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with Recom-mendation | Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT201*** | AT/2005/0312 AT/2008/0757202 AT/2009/0970 | NO (Cable included) | 1 | Area 1 To be DEREGULATED | Area 1 YES | Market Definition (i) Strength of indirect constraint from vertically integrated competitors (ii) Geographic market definition SMP assessment and future possible constraints Sustainability of competition from alternative providers | |||
Area 2 YES | Area 2 YES | Area 2 YES | Area 2 Retail minus | Area 2 YES | |||||
BE203 | BE/2007/0736 BE/2008/0801 BE/2009/0950 BE/2010/1033 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-oriented prices on the basis of the costs of an efficient operator. VDSL and VDSL2, access price on the basis of reasonable costs with an eviction test. Margin squeeze test. | YES | Promotion of investment on infrastructure in relation to wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to the local loop and competition at the retail level (BE/2007/0736 and BE/2009/0949) Timeframe for the market review and efficient enforcement of regulatory obligations (BE/2007/0736) The exact scope of wholesale services susceptible to ex-ante regulation (BE/2008/0801) |
BG | NOT YET NOTIFIED | ||||||||
CY | CY/2006/0332 CY/2009/0870 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | LRIC in conjunction with a margin squeeze model. | YES | Reinforcing regulatory oversight Exclusion of fibre from the relevant market Remedies imposed in the context of NGA development and need for a consistent European approach |
CZ | CZ/2006/0449 CZ/2008/0797 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | Market definition SMP assessment |
DK | DK/2005/0182204 DK/2005/0209 DK/2008/0862 DK/2009/0984 | NO (Cable included) | 1 | YES | YES | YES | LRAIC for copper based access and collocation. The price control of cable access is based on FAHC but only effective upon a reasonable request for access. | YES | Inclusion of cable in the wholesale broadband access market The scope of the access obligation Regulation of fibre Remedies imposed in the context of NGA development and need for a consistent European approach |
EE | EE/2006/0522 EE/2009/0943 | NO (Cable included) | 1 | YES | YES | YES | ECPR for access at the national and local level and FDHC at the DSLAM level. ECPR provides for a result equivalent to retail minus. | YES | Inclusion of cable infrastructure in the WBA market definition |
FI** | FI/2004/0062 FI/2006/0548 FI/2008/0848205 FI/ 2009/0900 | NO (Geo. Diff./ Cable included) | 32 | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO | Inclusion of cable access in the market definition Absence of any price regulation Definition of geographic sub-markets for possible de-regulation in the future |
FR | FR/2005/0175 FR/2008/0781 | NO (Cable included) | 1 | YES Bitstream access on fibre is not mandated. | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | YES Obligation also applicable to fibre connections | Market Definition (i) Inclusion of cable in the wholesale broadband access market (ii) Inclusion of fibre in the wholesale broadband access market (iii) Geographic market definition of the wholesale broadband access market Remedies Recommendation on NGA |
DE** **** | DE/2005/0260 DE/2006/0457 DE/2007/0576 DE/2009/0908 | NO (2 markets: handover at (i) ATM-level and (ii IP-level) ) | 1 | YES | YES | YES | For IP bitstream access, tariffs are subject to prior approval by BNetza. According to German law, price control should be carried out by means of cost-orientation to efficient cost/benchmarking. For ATM bitstream access, ex post price control. | YES | Need to base any prior exclusion of products from the wholesale broadband access markets on a proper substitutability test (DE/2005/0260) Imposition of remedies (DE/2005/0260) Scope of access obligation (DE/2006/0457) Stand alone bitstream access (DE/2006/0457) Effective price regulation (DE/2006/0457) Notification of remedies concerning ATM bitstream to be submitted without further delay (DE/2006/0457) Need for ex-ante price control (DE/2007/0576) Stand alone bitstream access (DE/2007/0576) |
DE/2007/0639 DE/2007/0702 | NO (Wholesale broadband conveyance markets) | Regional broadband conveyance market 1 | YES | YES | YES | Price caps on the basis of the costs of an efficient service provider. | YES | Notification and adoption of remedies (DE/2007/0639) Implementation of bitstream remedies (DE/2007/0639 and DE/2007/0702) | |
Supra-regional conveyance market 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | ||||
EL | EL/2006/0372 EL/2007/0658 EL/2008/0751 EL/2009/0935 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | LRAIC | YES | Exclusion of fibre from the market definitions The scope of the non-discrimination obligation I market 5 |
HU** | HU/2005/0186 HU/2006/3632 HU/2007/0732 | NO (Geo. Diff.) | Operating area of Magyar Telekom 1 | YES | YES | YES | TD-LRIC for the local bitstream. Retail minus for the national bitstream. | YES | No comments |
Operating area of Invitel 1 | |||||||||
Operating area of Hungarotel 1 | |||||||||
Operating area of Monortel 1 | |||||||||
IE | IE/2004/0093 IE/2005/0313 IE/2008/0852 IE/2009/0919 | NO (Cable included) | YES | YES | YES | Retail minus. For the definition of the “minus”, Eircom’s costs and revenues will be used as the basis for establishing the costs and revenues of a similarly efficient operator. For the assessment of margins, DCF methodology will be carried over a 5-year period. The margin squeeze test shall be applied on a product-by-product basis, with separate control for each wholesale and retail product pair. The “minus” margin will be reviewed annually. (IE/2005/0313) | The inclusion of self-supply by cable operators and FWA operators in the relevant product market (IE/2004/0093) Further consultation planned by ComReg (IE/2004/0093) |
IT | IT/2005/0253 IT/2007/0609 IT/2007/0614 IT/2009/0892 IT/2009/0989 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | BU- LRIC model. Network cap mechanism (IPC-X). | YES | Geographic market definition of the wholesale broadband access market (IT/2009/0892) Inclusion of Wireless Local Loops (WLL) into the market definition (IT/2009/0892) Lack of notification of the remedies (IT/2009/0892) Modification of the undertakings (IT/2009/0988) Implementation and monitoring of the undertakings of Telecom Italia (IT/2009/0988) The Supervisory Board and OTA Italia (IT/2009/0988) Migration process in a NGA context (IT/2009/0988) Remedies imposed in the context of NGA development and need for a consistent European approach (IT/2009/0988) Notification requirements as to the price control obligation (IT/2009/0988) |
LV | LV/2006/0540 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FDC-CCA | YES | No comments |
LT | LT/2005/0267 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FDC | YES | No comments |
LU | LU/2006/0510 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Retail-minus based on the avoided costs of the incumbent. | YES | Access obligation Stand alone bitstream access Price control obligation |
MT | MT/2007/0563206 MT/2008/0803 | NO (Cable included) | 0 | TO BE WITHDRAWN AS FROM 1.07.2009. | Monitoring market developments | ||||
NL** | NL/2005/0281 NL/2008/0827 | NO (Segmentation/Cable included) | Low Quality 1 | YES Copper only | YES Copper only | YES | NO | NO | Inclusion of cable in market 5 on the basis of indirect constraints Regulatory treatment of fibre in the low quality WBA market Effectiveness of currently envisaged margin squeeze test Recommendation on NGA |
High Quality 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | NO | ||||
PL | PL/2006/0472 | NO (Cable included) | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FL-LRIC. Until auditor confirms accuracy of calculations, TP is obliged to set appropriate charges based on costs incurred and the NRA intends to control them on the basis of the retail minus method, where the wholesale price will be calculated as the lowest TP retail price minus the avoidable cost of the service. | YES | Defining the scope of the obligations imposed |
PT** | PT/2004/0118 PT/2008/0851 | NO (Geo. Diff./ Cable included) | "NC" areas 1 | YES | YES | YES | Retail minus. Cost orientation for naked ADSL. | YES | Inclusion of self-supply in market 5 on the basis of indirect constraints Monitoring of trend towards effective competition Regulation of fibre in market 4 and 5 |
"C" areas 0 | To be phased out after a transitory period of 12 months | To be phased out after a transitory period of 12 months | To be phased out after a transitory period of 12 months | To be withdrawn immediately | To be phased out after a transitory period of 12 months | ||||
RO | NOT YET NOTIFIED | ||||||||
SK | SK/2006/0465 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Retail minus | YES | Defining the scope of the access obligation imposed |
SI | SI/2006/0346 SI/2007/0664 SI/2009/0958 SI/2009/0982 SI/2009/1010 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Retail minus. Prohibition of margin squeeze. | YES | Market definition for WBA (SI/2009/0958) Remedies imposed in the context of NGA development and need for a consistent European approach (SI/2009/0958) Imposition of a different price control methodology without a new market analysis (SI/2009/0981) Parameters of the cost model (SI/2009/0981) |
ES | ES/2006/0370ES/2007/0626 ES/2008/0805 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | YES | Regulation of bitstream offers only up to 30 Mb/s |
Only for speeds up to 30Mb/s | |||||||||
SE | SE/2004/0083 | NO (Cable included) | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Retail minus. | YES | Cable-TV networks as alternative infrastructure for the provision of wholesale bitstream access |
UK** | UK/2003/0032 UK/2003/0033 UK/2003/0034 UK/2007/0585 UK/2007/0649 UK/2007/0733 UK/2008/0769 UK/2009/0901 | NO (Geo. Diff./ Cable included) | Market 1 1 (BT) | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | Strength of indirect constraint from vertically integrated competitors Geographic market definition and Ofcom’s definition of sub-national markets Monitoring of trend towards effective competition Sustainability of competition from alternative providers |
Market 2 1 (BT) | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | ||||
Market 3 No | Any existing obligation to be phased out within a transitional period of 1 year | ||||||||
Hull area 1 (Kingston | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES |
GI | GI/2007/0719 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-oriented prices. Details on the cost accounting model to be determined at a later stage. | YES | Broad regulation of wholesale broadband access |
* Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators | |||||||||
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation | |||||||||
*** Geographic differentiation of remedies | |||||||||
**** Market not included in the Recommendation |
Market 6: Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with Recom-mendation | Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT207 | AT/2004/0100 AT/2006/0508 AT/2008/0836 AT/2009/0932 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-oriented access prices according to efficient service provision cost; Price control by dispute settlement before the NRA | YES | Geographical delineation of the market for terminating segments of leased lines with high bandwidth |
BE | BE/2006/0552 BE/2009/0882 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Bottom up LRIC | NO | Cost accounting for wholesale terminating segments of leased lines |
BG | NOT YET NOTIFIED |
CY | CY/2006/0482 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Retail minus and later (once implemented) bottom up LRIC | YES | No comments |
CZ | CZ/2006/0450 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation obligation | YES | No comments |
DK | DK/2005/0245 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Modified historic costs | YES | Conditions of competition in low and high bandwidth terminating segments, and scope of remedies |
EE | EE/2007/0643 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | A price cap | YES | Price control, implementation of the cost-accounting system |
FI | FI/2004/0080 FI/2009/0986 | YES | 31 | YES | YES | YES | Non-discriminatory prices | NO | No comments |
FR | FR/2006/0416 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | The prohibition of predatory prices for all services; A cost orientation obligation for selected products | YES | Remedies for terminating segments of leased lines |
DE | DE/2006/0480 DE/2007/0677 DE/2007/0687 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Ex-post price control | NO | No comments |
EL | EL/2006/0422 | NO** | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FDC and later (once implemented) LRIC/CC | YES | No comments |
HU | HU/2005/0168 HU/2007/0738 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Retail minus | YES | No comments |
IE | IE/2005/0139 IE/2008/0791 IE/2009/0920 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | PPC: Cost orientation (FL-LRIC) WLL: retail minus | YES | Remedies concerning WLL products; Further consultation planned by ComReg |
IT | IT/2005/0272 IT/2009/1000 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Network cap mechanism | YES | Removal of regulatory obligations |
LV | LV/2007/0572 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES (not specified) | YES | No comments |
LT | LT/2006/0430 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FDC or "best practice" approach | YES | No comments |
LU | LU/2006/0561 | NO** | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FDC methodology | YES | Lack of sufficient evidence for not separating the markets for terminating and trunk segments of leased lines |
MT | MT/2006/0374 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Fully allocated historic costs | YES | The inclusion of international lines in the wholesale and retail market definitions |
NL | NL/2005/0282 NL/2008/0823 | NO** | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Wholesale price cap | NO | Scope of the access obligation |
PL | PL/2006/0516 PL/2007/0667 PL/2008/0771 | NO** | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Charges based on costs incurred | YES | No comments |
PT | PT/2005/0156 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | The cost-orientation obligation upon PTC’s costs and European benchmark practices | YES | No comments |
RO | NOT YET NOTIFIED | ||||||||
SK | SK/2006/0386 | NO** | 1 | YES | YES | YES | The method of fully allocated historical costs and a price cap | YES | Inclusion of optical and wireless networks in the market for wholesale terminating segments of leased lines; Parallel imposition of cost orientation obligation and price cap |
SI | SI/2005/0219 SI/2005/0305 SI/2008/0767 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | By 1 June 2009 glide path based on benchmarking, FAC CCA as from 1 June 2009 | YES | No comments |
ES | ES/2006/0458 ES/2009/0930 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | FDC based on current costs for traditional interfaces and a retail minus for Ethernet interfaces | YES | Limitation of the scope of the remedies in the market of terminating leased lines to services based on traditional interfaces |
SE | SE/2005/0200 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Fully distributed costs taking into account both historic and current costs | YES | Market share data |
UK | UK/2003/0037 UK/2003/0038 UK/2008/0747 UK/2008/0787 UK/2008/0858 UK/2008/0859 | NO** (Geo. Diff.) | 2 | YES | YES | YES | RPI (Retail Price Index)-X for BT; Conditional cost orientation for KCOM | NO | Geographic segmentation of the markets Re-notification of the draft measure; Timeframe of the validity of charge control; |
GI | GI/2007/0720 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | To be specified at the later stage | YES | Specification of the cost-orientation obligation |
*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators | |||||||||
** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets or geographic differentiation |
Market 7: Voice call termination on individual mobile networks | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with Recom-mendation | Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT | AT/2004/0099 AT/2004/0238 AT/2005/0256 AT/2004/0317 AT/2006/0538 AT/2007/0680 AT/2008/0837208 AT/2009/0885 AT/2009/0910 | YES | 4 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRAIC-model including mark-up for overheads). Uses lowest-cost operator as the benchmark for an efficient operator. Implementation of Recommendation on Termination Rates foreseen for next market review in 2011. | NO | Cost model of an efficient operator and need for a coherent EU approach. (Importance of LRIC models using forward-looking costs of an efficient operator and only those costs which vary in response to the wholesale termination traffic). |
BE | BE/2006/0433 BE/2007/0665 | YES | 3 | YES | YES (Internal non-discrimination obligation for Belgacom Mobile an Mobistar). | YES | Cost-orientation (TD-LRIC model). | YES (for Belgacom Mobile and Mobistar). | Need for a coherent European approach. Internal non-discrimination obligation (BE/2007/0665) |
BG | BG/2009/0866 | YES | 4 | YES | YES (for Mobiltel, Cosmo Bulgaria Mobile and BTC's GSM and UMTS network) | YES (less detailed for BTC's NMT/ CDMA network) | Cost-orientation for Mobiltel and Cosmo Bulgaria Mobile and reciprocity for BTC. Future accounting methodology will follow Recommendation. Interim glide path based on benchmarking. | YES (for Mobiltel and Cosmo Bulgaria Mobile) | Further consultations planned by CRC Cost of an efficient operator and need for a coherent European approach. (Need to reduce termination rates to the cost faced by an efficient operator as soon as possible). Implementation of symmetry for fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls. |
CY | CY/2006/0334 CY/2009/0874 | YES | 2 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for CYTA (LRIC-CCA model) Max MTR for MTN corresponds to CYTA's cost-oriented termination fee with additional percentage caps allowed in the next 3 years. | YES (subject to a €50 million annual turnover threshold for MTN) | Price control imposed on MTN and level of asymmetry. Need for a coherent European approach. |
CZ | CZ/2006/0359 CZ/2007/0661 CZ/2008/0841 CZ/2009/0959 | YES | 4 | YES Only for TO2, T-Mobile, Vodafone | YES | YES | Only for TO2, T-Mobile, Vodafone; Cost orientation FAC-HCA based on the lowest - cost operator (CZ/2009/0959) | YES Only for TO2, T-Mobile, Vodafone | Need to (i) impose the access and price control obligations also on MobilKom, (ii) to notify further planned individual decisions (on SMP and remedies) |
DK | DK/2005/0204 DK/2008/0752 DK/2008/0765 DK/2008/0785 DK/2009/1013 DK/2009/1014 DK/2009/0945 | YES (incl. MVNO) | 5 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (LRAIC model (generic hybrid model incl. TD data) for TDC, Sonofon/Telenor and Telia; transitory benchmark period for Hi3G; best practice approach for Barablu) | NO | Level of MTRs imposed on Hi3G and asymmetry of MTRs in Denmark. (DK/2008/0765) Symmetric termination rates based on the costs of an efficient operator (DK/2008/0785) Need for coherent European approach (DK/2008/0785, DK/2008/0765, DK/2008/0752, DK/2009/1014, DK/2009/0945) Need to phase out asymmetry for the MNVO Barablu (DK/2009/1013) Asymmetry allowed for HI3G Need to carry out a new market review (DK/2009/0945) |
EE | EE/2006/0342 EE/2009/0883 | YES (incl. MVNO) | 4 | YES | YES | YES | Benchmarking against ERG MTR Snapshot | NO | Imposition of current price control mechanism and the need to set new glide-paths based on cost-oriented mobile termination rates. Need for a notification of the final draft access prices to the Commission. |
FI | FI/2003/0031 FI/2006/0403 FI/2008/0778 | YES (incl. MVNO) | 5 | YES | YES | YES | Rates commercially negotiated. Cost orientation and non-discrimination as ex post control. (Ålands Mobiltelefon and TDC subject to non-discriminatory pricing only). | YES (not for Ålands Mobiltelefon and TDC) | Asymmetrical application of certain remedies. (FI/2003/0031) Price differentiation of termination rates according to the origin of the call. (Absence of remedies for calls originating in a fixed network in Finland without CS or CPS) (FI/2008/0778/ FI/2006/0403) Termination rates proportioned to costs. (Not clear that commercial negotiations would lead to termination rates proportionate to costs) (FI/2008/0778/ FI/2006/0403) Need for coherent European approach. (FI/2008/0778) |
FR | FR/2004/0120 FR/2005/0275 FR/2006/0461 FR/2007/0104 FR/2007/0592 FR/2007/0596 FR/2007/0669 FR/2007/0708 FR/2008/0812 FR/2009/0927 | YES* | 3 in mainland France. 8 in French overseas territories | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation towards LRIC for 3 mainland MNOs. Cost-orientation on 2 overseas operators (Orange Caraïbe and SRR). Obligation not to charge excessive prices for 6 other overseas operators. | YES | Asymmetry in MTRs and need for a coherent European approach. (FR/2009/0927, FR/2008/0812) |
DE | DE/2005/0249 DE/2006/0421 DE/2008/0813 DE/2009/0939 DE/2009/0947 | YES (incl. MVNOs) | 6 | YES for 4 MNOs – T-Mobile, Vodafone D2, E-Plus and O2 | YES | YES | Cost orientation for 4 MNOs (ex-ante tariff authorization procedure). Ex-post price control for 2 MVNOs (Vistream and Ring). | NO | Need for coherent European approach. (DE/2008/0813) Need for transparency and coherence in notification of MTRs to the Commission. (DE/2008/0813, DE/2009/0947) Need to impose a cost orientation obligation (on MVNOs). (DE/2009/0947) Non-imposition of an access obligation (on MVNOs). (DE/2009/0947) |
EL | EL/2004/0078 EL/2005/0178 EL/2006/0392 EL/2008/0786 | YES | 3 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation BU LRIC model based on average efficient operator | YES | Cost model of an efficient operator and need for a coherent European approach. (Importance of LRIC models using current costs of an efficient operator and not historical costs. Relevant costs are those additional (traffic-related) costs involved in providing the service). |
HU | HU/2004/0101 HU/2006/0478 HU/2008/0829 | YES | 3 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation based on BU-LRIC model which considers an all-traffic increment and includes both coverage and capacity costs. | YES | Appropriateness of the proposed costing methodology and need for a coherent European approach (Importance of LRIC models using current costs of an efficient operator and not historical costs. Relevant costs are those additional (traffic-related) costs involved in providing the service). |
IE | IE/2004/0073 IE/2005/0216 IE/2008/0746 | YES | 4 | YES (for Vodafone, O2 and Meteor) | YES | YES | Cost-oriented prices for Vodafone and O2 and benchmarking for Meteor and H3G. To be consulted on at time of notification. Indicated that MTRs may be established through combination of BU LRIC model and benchmarking. | YES (for Vodafone and O2) | Price control obligation to be imposed on H3G (glide path to be introduced without delay). Price control set up (clarify benchmarking approach). Need for coherent European approach. |
IT | IT/2005/0316 IT/2007/0659 IT/2008/0779 IT/2008/0802 | YES | 4 | YES | YES | YES | TD FL-LRIC approach | NO | Appropriateness of the proposed costing methodology (Importance of LRIC models using current costs; bring MTRs to cost of an efficient operator as soon as possible). Asymmetry in MTRs of the Italian MNOs Need for coherent European approach. |
LV | LV/2006/0464 LV/2007/0574 | YES | 4 | YES (for Latvijas Mobiliais Telefons and Tele2) | YES | YES | Cost-orientation (for Latvijas Mobiliais Telefons and Tele2) NO (for Telekom Baltija and BITE Latvija) | YES (for Latvijas Mobiliais Telefons and Tele2) | Effective cost accounting methodology. (Take into account costs of an efficient operator e.g. FL-LRIC). (LV/2006/0464) Asymmetry in mobile termination rates. (Take into account necessity to become efficient over time and need for coherent European approach). (LV/2007/0574) |
LT | LT/2005/0189 LT/2009/0990 | YES | 3 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation FL-LRAIC model from 2007. (During transitional period: requirement not to apply worse conditions). BU-LRAIC as from 2009; glide path towards LRIC (CCA) | NO | Adjust the access obligation Transparency in the notification of remedies Set LRIC/CCA based prices before 31/12/2012 (LT/2009/0990) |
LU | LU/2005/0321 | YES | 3 | YES | YES | YES | Price control based on international benchmarks. Ultimate target reference prices to be consulted upon. Transitionally apply a 6% reduction every six months. | NO | Timely implementation of price control obligation. Price control based on comparison with other countries (appropriate basis for comparison only if reflect cost orientation). Level of reductions (achieve a cost oriented level as quickly as possible). |
MT | MT/2006/0214 MT/2008/0790 MT/2009/0926 | YES | 3 | YES | YES | YES | Price control based on international benchmarks Pegged to the change in the average MTRs in the 27 EU Member States. Change to Maltese MTRs limited to 10% per annum. | YES | Imposition of the price control mechanism and the need for efficient cost-oriented MTRs (benchmark countries using cost methodologies designed to set efficient MTRs) Need for notification of the proposed access prices to the Commission. |
NL | NL/2005/0215 NL/2006/0420 NL/2007/0634 | YES (incl. MVNO) | 5 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on BU LRIC. OPTA considers welfare analysis justifies imposition of maximum MTRs above BU LRIC level. | NO | Determination of maximum MTR on the basis of a welfare analysis (depends largely on parameters chosen; need for coherent European approach). |
PL | PL/2006/0379 PL/2008/0794 PL/2008/0855 PL/2009/0904 PL/2009/0991 PL/2009/0996 PL/2009/1021 | YES (incl. MVNO) | 5 | YES | YES | YES | Charges based on costs incurred for Polkomtel, PT Cyfrowa and PTK potentially verified with benchmarking or other methods. Obligation not to charge excessive prices for Cyfrowy Polsat (CP) and P4. Obliged to decrease existing MTRs in proportion to glide-path set for 3 other MNOs in 2007. | NO | Need for regulating termination rates reflecting efficient costs. (PL/2009/0991) Need for transparency and coherence in the notification of remedies under the EU consultation procedure. (PL/2009/0904) Price control to be imposed on CP and P4 (transition to cost orientation must not be unreasonably long); Asymmetry in MTRs of CP and P4 and need for a coherent European approach (PL/2009/0996) Avoid amendment of remedies through a dispute settlement procedure and impose price control on P4 (PL/2009/0996) |
PT | PT/2004/0129 PT/2007/0707 | YES | 3 | YES | YES | YES | Price control based on benchmarking. Cost methodologies and cost-oriented prices to be defined following further consultation. | YES | Further consultations planned by Anacom. (PT/2004/0129) Imposition of different price control methodology without a new market analysis. (Anacom invited to re-consider reintroduction of asymmetry). Need for a coherent European approach. (PT/2007/0707) |
RO | RO/2009/0878 | YES | 5 | YES | YES | YES (RCS & RDS exempt from obligation to publish reference offer) | Cost-oriented tariffs to be defined in future by BU LRIC model reflecting costs of efficient operator. Sets interim glide path based on LRIC plus common and joint costs for Vodafone and Orange Romania. Delayed reciprocity for other 3 operators. | NO | Asymmetry of mobile termination rates and the cost of an efficient operator. (Importance of introducing cost orientation for all operators as soon as possible). Further consultations planned by ANC. |
SK | SK/2005/0136 SK/2009/0902 SK/2009/0955 | YES | 3 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on a FAHC model supplemented by international benchmarking in transition from system of no cost orientation to implementation of a LRIC model. | YES | Urgent need for price regulation. Appropriateness of the proposed costing methodology and need for a coherent European approach. (Importance of LRIC models using current costs of an efficient operator. Asymmetries should not remain in force for too long). (SK/2009/0902) Need for efficient cost-based termination rates for all operators (SK/2009/0955) |
SI | SI/2005/0276 SI/2007/0591 SI/2009/0946 | YES | 4 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation BU FL-LRIC approach (reconciled with TD data) which calculates the avoidable cost of off-net call termination services BU-LRIC level to be reached by all operators in 2013. | NO | Proposed non-discrimination obligation. Cost of an efficient operator. |
ES | ES/2005/0251 ES/2006/0471 ES/2007/0654 ES/2007/0654 ES/2007/0706 ES/2008/0819 ES/2009/0937 | YES (incl. MVNOs) | 4 MNOs 9 full MVNOs | YES | YES | NO | Cost-orientation for TME, Vodafone and Orange based on TD FAC model using CCA. Started work on BU LRIC. Xfera required to set reasonable prices. Existing margin of 48.82% (above MTRs of the larger operators) to be reduced by 50% over next 2 years. Full MVNOs required to set reasonable prices, equal to MTRs of the host MNOs. | YES (for TME, Vodafone and Orange) | Cost orientation obligation and cost accounting methodology for calculating MTRs Asymmetry allowed for Xfera (ES/2009/0937) Need for a coherent European approach. (ES/2008/0819). |
SE | SE/2004/0052 SE/2009/0941 | YES | 4 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation for TeliaSonera, Tele2 and Vodafone based on LRIC (incl. common costs due to requirement in law) of highest cost operator. Obligation of fair and reasonable prices for H3G but set at symmetric level to other 3 MNOs. | YES | Notification of amendments to price control obligations. Need for coherent European approach. Need to carry out a new market review. (SE/2009/0941) |
UK | UK/2003/0040 UK/2004/0087 UK/2005/0199 UK/2006/0348 UK/2006/0498 UK/2006/0499 UK/2007/0617 UK/2008/0759 | YES | 5 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation based on BU-LRIC | NO | 3G spectrum costs. (Important that LRIC models use current costs and not historical costs which risk overestimating the appropriate costs considerably). (UK/2006/0498) Monitoring of MNOs’ compliance with SMP conditions by Ofcom. (UK/2008/0759) |
GI | GI/2007/0723 GI/2009/0977 | YES* | 1 | NO | YES | NO | Price control based on benchmarking and estimation of reasonable prices | NO | Non-imposition of an access obligation on the market for wholesale call termination. (GI/2007/0723,GI/2009/0977) Need for price-control obligation and for a coherent European approach. (GI/2007/0723,GI/2009/0977) Need for efficient rates for all operators GI/2009/0977 |
* Identification of separate relevant markets for wholesale SMS termination on an individual mobile network (not listed in the Recommendation on relevant markets) |
Table overview Other markets (outside the Recommendation on relevant markets)
Former markets 3-6209 (Recommendation 2003): Fixed retail calls markets | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with 2003 Recom-mendation | 3 Criteria test/ Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
CS CPS | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT | AT/2004/0124; AT/2004/0125; AT/2004/0126; AT/2006/0127; AT/2007/0581; AT/2007/0582; AT/2007/0583; AT/2007/0584; AT/2009/0880; AT/2009/0881 | YES | Former market 3: 3 criteria test not fulfilled | YES (in retail access market) | NO | NO | Cost orientation (in former market 5 and 6) | YES | 3 criteria test and efficiency of wholesale regulation in former market 5 and 6 |
Former market 4: no SMP | |||||||||
Former market 5 and 6: 1 SMP |
Former markets 4 and 6: no SMP | |||||||||
BE | BE/2006/0435, BE/2006/0436, BE/2006/0437; BE/2006/0438; BE/2007/0640; BE/2008/0798; BE/2008/0799 | YES | Former market 3 and 5: 1 SMP | YES (in retail access market) | NO | YES (in markets 3 and 5) | Prohibition of excessive pricing and predatory pricing (in markets 3 and 5) | NO | 3 Criteria test and efficiency of wholesale regulation in former markets 3 and 5; hand-over of mobile termination reductions |
BG | BG/2009/0812 | YES | 1 SMP in former markets 3-6 | YES (in retail access market) | YES | YES | Cost orientation FDC CC | YES | 3 Criteria test and efficiency of wholesale regulation |
CY | CY/2006/0487; CY/2006/0488; CY/2006/0489; CY/2006/0490 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation based on FDC | YES | No comment |
CZ | CZ/2006/0350; CZ/2006/0444; CZ/2006/445; CZ/2006/0446; CZ/2008/0796; CZ/2008/0840; CZ/2008/0857 | YES | 3 Criteria not fulfilled | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comment |
DE | DE/2005/0308; DE/2005/0309; DE/2005/0310; DE/2006/0311; DE/2006/0402; DE/2007/0628; DE/2007/0709; DE/2008/0846; DE/2007/0847; DE/2009/0895 | YES | Former markets 3 and 5: 3 Criteria not fulfilled | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comment |
Former markets 4 and 6: No SMP | |||||||||
DK | DK/2005/0208; DK/2005/0194; DK/2005/0268; DK/2006/0269 | Exclusion of IP telephony | 1 SMP in former markets 3 and 4; no SMP in markets 5 and 6 | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | Exclusion of IP telephony; monitoring of markets |
EE | EE/2007/0615; EE/2007/0616; EE/2007/0635; EE/2007/0636 | YES | No SMP | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | Efficiency of wholesale regulation; availability of CS CPS |
FI | FI/2003/0022; FI/2003/0025; FI/2003/0024; FI/2003/0027 ; FI/2005/0201; FI/2005/0202 | YES | Former markets 3 and 5: SMP | YES | NO | YES (in markets 3 and 5) | NO | NO | Efficiency of wholesale regulation (related to former markets 3 and 5) |
Former markets 4 and 6: No SMP | |||||||||
FR | FR/2005/0223; FR/2005/0224; FR/2005/0225; FR/2005/0226; FR/2007/0648 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | No comment |
EL | EL/2006/0503; EL/2006/0505; EL/2006/0556; EL/2006/0557; EL/2008/0751 | YES | Former markets 3 and 5: 1 SMP | YES | YES (in former markets 3 and 5) | YES (in former markets 3 and 5) | Price cap and regulation of retention fee, based on FDC CCA( in former markets 3 and 5) | YES (in former markets 3 and 5) | No comments |
Former market 4 and 6: No SMP | |||||||||
HU | HU/2004/0132; HU/2004/0133; HU/2004/0134; HU/2004/0135; HU/2007/0602; HU/2007/0603; HU/2007/0604; HU/2007/0605 | YES | 4 (related to network coverage) | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | Efficiency of wholesale regulation |
IE | IE/2005/0160; IE/2005/0161; IE/2005/0162; IE/2005/0163; IE/2007/0697; IE/2007/0698; IE/2007/0699; IE/2007/0700 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
IT | IT/2006/0398; IT/2006/0399; IT/2006/0407; IT/2006/0408; IT/2009/0951; IT/2009/952 | YES | Former markets 3 and 5: 1 SMP | YES | YES (in former markets 3 and 5) | YES (in former markets 3 and 5) | Price cap (in former markets 3 and 5) | YES (in former markets 3 and 5) | Prohibition of retail price differentiation according to the destination of calls |
Former markets 4 nd 6: 3 criteria not fulfilled | |||||||||
LV | LV/2006/0567; LV/2006/0568; LV/2006/0569; LV/2006/0570 | YES | 1 | YES | NO | NO | YES | NO | Lack of details concerning price regulation; Lack of imposition of accounting separation |
LT | LT/2006/0425; LT/2006/0426; LT/2006/0427; LT/2006/0428; LT/2008/0763; LT/2008/0764 | YES | 1 | YES | NO | NO | YES | YES | Efficiency of wholesale regulation |
LU | LU/2006/0532; LU/2006/0533; LU/2006/0534; LU/2006/0535 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Reasonable prices | YES | No comments |
MT | MT/2006/0396; MT/2006/0397; MT/2006/0514; MT/2006/0515; MT/2009/0884 | YES | 3 Criteria test not fulfilled | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
NL | NL/2005/0287; NL/2005/0288; NL/2005/0289; NL/2005/0290; NL/2005/0291; NL/2005/0292; NL/2005/0293; NL/2005/0294; NL/2005/0295; NL/2005/0296; NL/2008/0821 | Combined retail access and calls markets | Combined access and calls market for residential: No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Market definition; fulfilment of the second criterion of the 3 criteria test |
Combined access and calls market for non-residential: 3 criteria not fulfilled | |||||||||
PL | PL/2006/0528; PL/2006/0529; PL/2006/0530; PL/2006/531 | Exclusion of certain calls from the market | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | Second Phase: Exclusion of calls over certain numbers (Case PL/2006/0528); monitoring; motivation |
PT | PT/2004/0055; PT/2004/0056; PT/2004/0057; PT/2004/0058; PT/2004/0059; PT/2004/0091 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES (in market 3 and 4 only); cost orientation for retention for fixed-to-mobile calls | YES | No comment |
RO | RO/2009/1004 | Yes | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comment |
ES | ES/2005/0326; ES/2005/0327; ES/2005/0328; ES/2005/0329; ES/2008/0817 | YES | No SMP | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
SI | SI/2005/0264; SI/2005/0265; SI/2005/0298; SI/2005/0299; SI/2009/0893 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
SK | SK/2006/0344; SK/2006/0345; SK/2006/0347; SK/2006/0349 | YES | 1 SMP | YES | YES | NO | YES (prohibition of unreasonably low pricing and bundling) | NO | No comments |
SE | SE/2005/0195; SE/2005/0196; SE/2005/0197; SE/2005/0198 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled; no SMP | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
UK | UK/2003/0007; UK/2003/0008; UK/2003/0045; UK/2007/0585; UK/2007/0649; UK/2008/0769; UK/2009/0899 | YES | No SMP (with the exception of Hull area) | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
Former market 7 (Recommendation 2003): Minimum set of leased lines | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with 2003 Recom-mendation | 3 Criteria test/ Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Supply of minimum set | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT | AT/2004/0079; AT/2006/0507; AT/2008/0836 | inclusion of n* 64 kbit/s to n*2048 kbit/s) | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | Prospective market analysis and efficiency of wholesale regulation |
BE | BE/2006/0551; BE/2007/0640 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | Efficiency of wholesale regulation |
BG | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
CY | CY/2006/0484 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on LRIC | YES | No comments |
CZ | CZ/2006/0447; CZ/2009/0872 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
DK | DK/2005/0177; | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | No comments |
EE | EE/2007/0642 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled and no SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
EL | EL/2006/0491; EL/2008/0751 | YES | 1 | NO | YES | YES | Transition from FDC CCA to LRIC-CCA | YES | No comments |
FI | FI/2004/0079; FI/2009/0985 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
FR | FR/2006/0415 | Inclusion of higher bandwidth and separate market for alternative interfaces | 1 | NO | YES | YES for minimum set | Cost-orientation for minimum set cost orientation;: cost accounting to be defined later on; | YES | Inclusion of higher bandwidth in market |
NO for higher bandwidth | Other than minimum set: prohibition of predatory pricing; | ||||||||
DE | DE/2006/479; DE/2007/619 DE/2009/1009 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
HU | HU/2005/0167; HU/2007/0737 | YES | 1 | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | Efficiency of wholesale regulation |
IE | IE/2005/0137; IE/2008/0791 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
IT | IT/2005/0315 (withdrawn); IT/2006/0371 IT/2009/0988 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
LV | LV/2007/0571 | YES | 1 | YES | NO | YES | Cost-orientation | NO | No comments |
LT | LT/2006/0429 | YES | 1 | NO | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on FDC | YES | No comments |
LU | LU/2006/0559 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on FDC | NO | No comments |
MT | MT/2006/0373 | Inclusion of international retail leased lines | 1 | NO | YES | YES | Cost orientation based on FDC-HC | YES | No comments |
NL | NL/2005/0279; NL/2009/0824 | YES | 3 criteria test not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
PL | PL/2006/0550 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Prohibition of excessive high and excessive low prices based on FL-FDC | YES | Efficiency of wholesale regulation |
PT | PT/2005/0155 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | No comments |
RO | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
SK | SK/2006/0463 SK/2009/1008 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
SI | SI/2005/0240; SI/208/0768 | YES | 3 criteria test not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
ES | ES/2006/0352; ES/2009/0931 | YES | 3 criteria test not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
SE | SE/2004/0048 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | No comments |
UK | UK/2003/0035; UK/2004/0045; UK/2004/0077; UK/2004/0123; UK/2005/0217; UK/2005/0218; UK/2007/0649; UK/2008/0749; UK/2009/0938 | Including higher bandwidth | 2 | YES (on BT only) | YES (on BT only) | YES (on BT only); Obligation for Standard offer withdrawn | YES, (on BT only) conditional to breach of voluntary price undertaking | YES (on BT only) | Need to carry out new market analysis |
Former market 10 (Recommendation 2003): Transit services in the fixed pubic telephone network | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with Recommendation 2003 | Three criteria test/ Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT | AT/2004/0090 AT/2006/0590 AT/2009/0936 | YES | 3 criteria test not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments (/AT/2009/0936) |
BE | BE/2006/0441 BE/2008/0750 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | No comments |
BG | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
CY | CY/2006/0475 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on LRIC | YES | No comments |
CZ | CZ/2006/0448 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Additional information to be included |
DK | DK/2005/0525 DK/2007/0692 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
EE | EE/2007/0599 (withdrawn); EE/2007/0670 | YES | NO SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
FI | FI/2004/0075 FI/2007/0705 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
FR | FR/2005/0229 FR/2007/0652 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation except for intra-territorial transit | YES | No comments |
DE | DE/2005/0145 DE/2005/0255 DE/2008/0845 DE/2009/0887 DE/2009/888 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
EL | EL/2006/0495 EL/2008/0751 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on LRAIC- CC | YES | No comments |
HU | HU/2005/0153 HU/2007/0728 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
IE | IE/2005/0192 IE/2007/0673 IE/2007/0674 IE/2009/0921 | Definition of an additional market for international transit | 1 SMP in national transit market; No SMP in international transit market | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on LRIC | YES | Need to monitor replicability |
IT | IT/2006/0385 IT/2007/0695 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
LV | LV/2006/0367 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | No comments |
LT | LT/2006/0319 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on FL-LRAIC | YES | No comments |
LU | LU/2006/0542 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
MT | MT/2006/0389 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
NL | NL/2005/0285; NL/2007/0744; NL/2008/0793; NL/2008/0800 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
PL | PL/2007/0686; PL/2008/0766 (withdrawn); PL/2008/0788; PL/2007/0745; PL/2008/0831 | Yes | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
PT | PT/2005/0154 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Arguments for 3 criteria to be further developped |
RO | RO/2009/1005 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | LRAIC | YES | Monitoring SMP |
SK | SK/2006/0470; SK/2009/0954 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
SI | SI/2005/0274; SI/2007/0691 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on LRIC | YES | No comments |
ES | ES/2006/0404 ES/2009/'0962 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comment |
SE | SE/2004/0051 SE/2009/0968 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
UK | UK/2003/0006; UK/2003/0015s; UK/2004/0045; UK/2004/0064; UK/2004/0071s; UK/2004/0088; UK/2004/0122; UK/2005/0164s UK/2005/0166; UK/2005/0170s; UK/2005/0180; UK/2005/300; UK/2007/0585; UK/2007/0649 UK/2008/0769; UK/2009/0898 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled; no SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comment |
Former market 14 (Recommendation 2003): Trunk leased lines | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with 2003 Recom-mendation | 3 Criteria test/ Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT | AT/2004/074; AT/2006/0467 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
BE | BE/2006/0553 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
BG | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
CY | CY/2006/0483 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on LRIC; transitionally retail minus | YES | No comments |
CZ | CZ/2006/0451 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
DK | DK/2007/0586; DK/2007/0725 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
EE | EE/2007/0644 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Price cap; accounting system to be developed by SMP operator | YES | NRA to develop cost accounting |
EL | EL/2006/0423; EL/2008/0751 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation based on LRIC CCA | YES | No comments |
FI | FI/2004/0081 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
FR | FR/2006/0417 | Inclusion of inter-territorial trunk leased lines | 1 | YES | YES | YES | prohibition of excessive and predatory pricing; cost orientation for specific lines | YES | No comments |
DE | DE/2006/0481 (withdrawn); DE/2007/0678; DE/2007/0688 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
HU | HU/2005/0169; HU/2007/0739 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
IE | IE/2005/0140; IE/2008/0791 | YES | 3 criteria not fulfilled and no SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
IT | IT/2005/0273 IT/2009/999 | YES | E criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
LV | LV/2007/0573 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
LT | LT/2006/0431 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation based on FDC checked against EU benchmark | YES | No comments |
LU | LU/2006/0562 | Trunk and terminating in same market | 1 | YES | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on FDC | YES | Need to justify lack of separation of trunk and terminating segment |
MT | MT/2006/0375 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | No comments |
NL | NL/2005/0283 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
PL | PL/2007/0668; (withdraw in Phase II); PL/2008/0772 (withdrawn in Phase II); PL/2008/0856 PL/2009/0971 | Market defined line per line | 3 criteria and SMP on part of lines | YES for SMP lines | YES for SMP lines | YES for SMP lines | Cost orientation based on costs incurred for SMP lines | YES for SMP lines | Market delineation route per route; need for geographic market delineation; lack of evidence from market share based analysis; need to withdraw regulation on competitive routes |
No for other lines | No for other lines | No for other lines | No for other lines | No for other lines | |||||
PT | PT/2005/0157 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | No comments |
RO | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
SK | SK/2006/0414 (withdrawn); SK/2007/0675 (withdrawn); SK/2009/0879 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
SI | SI/2005/0220 (withdrawn); SI/2005/0362 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
ES | ES/2006/0459; ES/2009/922 | Inclusion of undersea cables | 3 Criteria fulfilled and SMP only for 10 undersea cable | NO for trunk leased lines in general | NO for trunk leased lines in general | NO for trunk leased lines in general | NO for trunk leased lines in general | NO for trunk leased lines in general | Need to detail price control; need to monitor each of the undersea cable routes |
YES (for 10 undersea cables) | YES (for 10 undersea cables) | YES (for 10 undersea cables) | Reasonable prices for 10 undersea cables | NO | |||||
SE | SE/2005/0341 | YES | No SMP | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
UK | UK/2003/0039; UK/2008/0748; UK/2008/0859; UK/2009/0901 | YES (no market defined for Hull area) | 1 | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | Need to carry out the 3 criteria test; Low market share and time-frame of charge control |
Former Market 15 (Recommendation 2003) : Mobile access and call origination | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with 2003 Recommendation | 3 Criteria test/ Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Trans-parency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT | AT/2004/0063 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Need to monitor the market |
BE | BE/2007/0610 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
BG | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
CY | CY/2006/0333CY/2009/0877 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | No comments |
CZ | CZ/2006/0405 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
DK | DK/2005/0243DK/2008/0863 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
EE | EE/2007/0651 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
EL | EL/2006/0492 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
FI | FI/2004/0082 | YES | 1 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Veto: Need to consider market dynamics |
FR | FR/2005/0179 (withdrawn) | NOT NOTIFIED | |||||||
DE | DE/2007/0627 | Splitting the market; exclusion of VAS | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Splitting of market; exclusion of conveyance to VAS; proportionality of licence obligations |
HU | HU/2004/0108 HU/2007/0594 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | |
IE | IE/2004/0121 | YES | 2 (joint SMP), annulled by Panel | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Analysis based on retail market; fringe competitors; need to notify implementing measures |
IT | IT/2005/0259; IT/2007/0575 (withdrawn); IT/2008/0861 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Second Phase: Definition of markets per network for call origination to value added services (IT/2007/0575) |
No comments (IT/2008/0861) | |||||||||
LV | LV/2006/0545 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
LT | LT/2006/0406 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
LU | LU/2005/0320 (withdrawn); LU/2006/0369 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
GI | GI/2007/0722 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES | Need to monitor the market |
MT | MT/2006/0443 | YES | 2 (joint SMP) | YES | YES | YES | Cost orientation on request | YES | Competitive conditions at retail level; existence of pent-up demand; retaliation mechanism; market entry of a third MNO; Need to review the market. |
NL | NL/2005/0242 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
PL | PL/2006/0378 (withdrawn); PL/2008/0756 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
PT | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
RO | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
SK | SK/2005/0248 (withdrawn); SK/2006/0442 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Need to monitor the market; absence of analysis of wholesale market |
SI | SI/2005/0230; SI/2008/0806 (withdrawn in phase II); SI/2009/913 | YES | 1 | YES | YES | NO | reasonable prices | NO | Second phase: Insufficient evidence for joint dominance (SI/2008/0806); Comment: Three criteria test and SMP; Monitoring market developments; need to notify price control (SI/2009/0913) |
ES | ES/2005/0330 | YES | 3 (joint SMP) | YES | NO | NO | Yes | NO | Competitive conditions at retail level |
SE | SE/2005/0203 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
UK | UK/2003/0001 | YES | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Comment on reliance on retail market and market shares; on international benchmark for concentration |
Former market 18 (Recommendation 2003): Broadcasting transmission services to deliver broadcast content to end users | |||||||||
Member State | Related cases | Market definition in line with 2003 Recommendation | Three criteria test/ Number of SMP operators | Remedies imposed | Comments / no comment | ||||
Access | Non-discrimination | Transparency | Price control / cost accounting | Accounting separation | |||||
AT | AT/2003/0002; AT/2003/0018; AT/2005/0318; AT/2006/0360; AT/2009/0896 | Market split | 1 SMP for terrestrial transmission | Terrestrial | YES | YES | FDC HC based on costs of operator | y | Need to delineate market at the time of market analysis |
BE | BE/2006/0578 (withdrawn) | NOT NOTIFIED | |||||||
BG | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
CY | CY/2006/0497 | Market split | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
CZ | CZ/2006/0453; CZ/2009/0907 | Market split | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
DK | DK/2007/0618 | Market split | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | Market delineation |
EE | EE/2007/0666 | Market split | 1 SMP for terrestrial transmission | Terrestrial: access to masts and signal transmission | YES | YES | Prohibition of excessive pricing based on cost accounting system decided by operator | YES | Scope of the access obligation; need to monitor cost accounting |
FI | FI/2004/0076; FI/2008/0789 | Market split | 1 SMP | TV: Access to antenna and capacity sharing for terrestrial digital | NO | YES (for access to antenna only) | YES (for access to digital TV only) | YES (for access to digital TV only) | Lack of further obligations for access to antenna sites |
Radio: Access to antenna and capacity sharing for terrestrial analogue | NO (for other than digital TV) | NO (for other than digital TV) |
FR | FR/2006/0335; FR/2008/0758; FR/2009/0914 | Market split | three criteria only fulfilled for transmission of digital television; 1 SMP | Digital TV only: access to buildings, masts and broadcasting channel multiplexes210 | YES | YES | Cost orientation for access to the 78 non-replicable sites; HCA CC | YES | Need to monitor the list of sites; need to notified withdrawal/adding of antenna sites of one of the lists |
Prohibition of excessive pricing for access to the other than the non-replicable sites | |||||||||
DE | DE/2006/0469, DE/2007/0606; DE/2009/0940 | Market split | 3 SMP (cable) | Signal delivery - only if downstream operator connects less than 500 homes | YES | YES | Ex post price control: prohibition of abusive pricing | YES | No comments |
feeding content into platform | NO | NO | |||||||
EL | EL/2007/0684 | Market split | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
HU | HU/2007/0734 | Market split | 1 | To terrestrial transmission | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on choice of operator between ceiling plus glide path or FDC | NO | Constraints on SMP from emerging markets211 |
IE | IE/2004/0042, IE/2004/0114 | Market split | 1 SMP terrestrial trans-mission | NO | YES | YES | NO | YES | No comments |
IT | IT/2006/0424; IT/2007/0729 | Market split | 2 SMP terrestrial trans-mission | To terrestrial television transmission | YES | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
LV | LV/2007/0694 | Market split | 3 criteria not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
LT | LT/2006/0376, LT/2006/0468 LT/2009/1022 | Terrestrial analogue and digital/radio/broadcasting = 7 markets | 3 Criteria test and SMP fulfilled for 7 defined markets; 2 SMP operators | YES | YES | YES | Restricted to certain terrestrial analogue radio and TV transmission: Cost-orientation with glide path, based on FDC | YES | monitor market developments; intra-platform competition; exclusive rights for LRTC and TEO |
LU | NOT NOTIFIED | ||||||||
MT | MT/2006/0564 (withdrawn); MT/2008/0810 | Market split | 3 criteria test not fulfilled | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | No comments |
NL | NL/2005/0246 (cable); NL/2005/0270, NL/2005/0277, NL/2006/0410 (terrestrial); NL/2008/0849 (terrestrial); NL/2009/0873 (cable); NL/2009/1007; NL/2009/1015 | Market split | 3 criteria test not fulfilled for terrestrial;4 SMP operators for cable transmission | Analogue and digital cable transmission | YES (for cable) | YES (for cable) | Cost-orientation (for cable) based on cost accounting, and in the absence of cost-accounting, based on retail minus | NO | Market delineation for access/transmission; three criteria test for cable; outhpasing of analogue |
PL | PL/2006/0455 | Market split | 1 SMP terrestrial | Analogue and digital, TV and radio212 | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on FL-LRIC | YES | Exclusion of cable from analysis; too narrow remedies; possibility to differentiate remedies between national and local transmission services; absence of timing for cost accounting |
PT | PT/2007/0655 | Market split | 1 | Digital TV | YES | YES | YES | YES | monitoring competition from emerging platforms |
RO | RO/2009/0876 | Market split | 1 | YES | NO | NO | Cost-orientation based on FDC -HC | NO | examination of infringements due to exclusive rights |
SK | SK/2006/0456 | Market split | 1 | Analogue terrestrial TV and Radio | YES | YES | Cost-orientation based on FDC-HC | YES | Exclusion of other than analogue terrestrial from the market |
SI | SI/2006/0476; SI/2007/0730 | Market split | 1 | Digital and analogue terrestrial TV and Radio | YES | YES | For digital: Cost orientation based on FAC HCA; until implementation: reasonable prices | YES for digital | Consider competitive constraints from emerging platforms; clarification of reasonable pricing |
For analogue: NO | NO for analogue | ||||||||
ES | ES/2006/0252; ES/2009/0905 | Market split | 1 | Terrestrial | YES | YES | Cost-orientation; prohibition of price squeeze, predatory pricing | NO | monitoring effectiveness of access obligation (collocation); monitoring 2nd criteria due to market entry at regional level |
SE | SE/2005/0188, SE/2005/0266, SE/2009/0975 | Market split | Three criteria test fulfilled for free to air terrestrial TV; 1 SMP | Analogue and digital terrestrial free to air TV; | NO | NO | Cost-orientation based on FDC-HC | YES | No comments |
UK | UK/2004/0111 | Market split | 2 | To masts and antennas for terrestrial | YES | YES | Cost-orientation | NO | Exclusion of satellite |
1 Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (SMP Guidelines), OJ C 165, 11.7.2002, p. 6.
2 Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with the Framework Directive, OJ L 344, 28.12.2007, p.65.
3 See footnote 15 chapter 3.3.1 of the present Communication.
4 Overview of notifications assessed between October 2005 and December 2009. Details concerning notifications prior to this date can be found in the "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on Market Reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework - Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications", (COM(2006) 28 final) of 6.2.2006.
5 Case NL/2008/0821explain market is effectively competitive.
6 Case UK/2009/0899.explain market is partially competitive.
7 Austria, Bulgaria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Latvia and the UK.
8 Cases CY/2006/0485-486, EL/2006/0500-501, IE/2007/0632 and UK/2009/0899 respectively.
9 E.g. cases ES/2008/0815, HU/2007/0662-663, PL/2007/0593, PL/2007/0647, EE/2007/0637-638, BG/2009/0911and LV/2009/0994.
10 E.g. cases AT/2008/0832 and IT/2009/0890.
11 E.g. cases HU/2007/0662-663, EE/2007/0637-638, IT/2009/0890 and BG/2009/0911.
12 Services which do not allow for mobility and that have been assigned fixed geographical numbering.
13 Cases PL/2006/0518, PL/2006/0524.
14Cases PL/2007/0593, PL/2007/0647.
15 Voice over Broadband (VoB) services (cases AT/2007/0579-580 and AT/2008/0832).
16 Services offered via Wireless Broadband Access technologies like CDMA and WiMax (case BG/2009/0911).
17 Broadband access services enabling VoIP services (case IT/2009/0890).
18 i.e. DSL or broadband cable connections that are bundled with telephone service and are not simultaneously coupled with a narrowband connection (Case DE/2009/0897).
19 i.e. complete connections should offer the functionalities which the end user of traditional connections is used to, for example both types of connections are offered with local exchange telephone numbers.
20 Cases RO/2009/1001 and SE/2009/0965 respectively.
21 In the Netherlands end-users would opt increasingly, and more often than in the rest of Europe, for purchasing so-called bundles of fixed telephony access and voice calls. Nevertheless, around a third of Dutch customers still choose unbundled services (i.e. access and calls provided separately). (Case NL/2008/0821)
22 Cases FI/2003/0020-21, HU/2007/0662-663 and UK/2009/0899 respectively.
23 E.g.: Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania as well as Austria and the Czech Republic.
24 E.g. cases EE/2007/0637-638, HU/2007/0662-663, LV/2009/0994, RO/2009/1001 and DE/2009/1006.
In Germany the NRA did not impose WLR, instead, it took note of the voluntary commitment of the incumbent to offer access lines to wholesale customers under retail conditions (i.e. as offered by the incumbent to end users). The NRA in its regulatory measure only reserved the right to impose a WLR remedy at a later stage should the voluntary commitment fail to fulfil its regulatory function. The Commission stressed that the incumbent's voluntary commitment can under no circumstances be used as a reason not to adopt a regulatory measure necessary to redress the competition problem identified in the relevant market.
25 Cases ES/2008/0815, LU/2006/0526-527, BE/2007/0640, IE/2007/0632.
26 Cases PL/2006/0380, LV/2009/0994, RO/2009/1001 and DE/2009/1006.
27 Cases EE/2007/0637-638 and SK/2007/0696.
28 Cases ES/2008/0815 and CZ/2008/0755.
29 CasesGI/2007/0710-711, EE/2007/0637-638, IE/2007/0632 and LV/2009/0994.
30 Case IT/2009/0890.
31 Case ES/2008/0815.
32 Customized offers are defined as offers to customers whose billing exceeds 12.000 euros per year and that comprise not only access but also other electronic communications services.
33 Cases LV/2009/0994 and SK/2007/0696.
34 Cases DK/2005/0141 and NL/2008/0822.
35 The NRA stated that residential and business products are not substitutable on the demand and also not on the supply side because of the different type of lines used and the different price features. (Case NL/2008/0822).
36 Cases FI/2007/0703, HU/2007/0726 and UK/2009/0898 respectively.
37 Cases LV/2009/0960 and MT/2009/0979.
38 CS/CPS is imposed in market 2 in Greece, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands and the UK. WLR is imposed in market 2 in Poland, Spain, Malta, the Netherlands and the UK.
39 Case SK/2007/0740.
40 Cases AT/2006/0543, CZ/2006/0351and SK/2007/0740.
41 Cases PL/2006/0380 and GI/2007/0716.
42 Case DE/2009/0887 and SE/2009/1016.
43 Case DE/2008/0843.
44 Case IE/2007/0672.
45 Calling Party Pays (CPP) principle.
46 A different rationale applies to numbers used by service providers. A called service provider is generally sensitive to the level of termination charges — which directly affect its revenues — and may therefore switch between providers of termination services.
47 In its first round review of the fixed termination markets (case DE/2005/0144) the German regulator considered that 53 alternative network operators did not have SMP for call termination on their respective networks, despite their 100% market share. In RegTP’s view, the fixed incumbent Deutsche Telekom AG had countervailing buyer power which did not allow the alternative operators to behave independently to an appreciable extent. The Commission concluded, however, that the evidence provided by the German regulator did not support its finding of an absence of SMP for each ANO and therefore required RegTP to withdraw the notified draft measures to the extent that they related to the 53 alternative network operators. In a subsequent notification (case DE/2005/0239) the German regulator BNetzA designated all alternative network operators with SMP on the market for call termination on their individual networks. This SMP finding has been confirmed again in a recent notification (case DE/2008/0843).
48 See, for example, cases DE/2008/0843, RO/2008/0774, FR/2005/0228, AT/2008/0834 (TKK proposed to include VoB but not VoIP), IT/2008/0777, LV/2009/0889, MT/2006/0388, SI/2007/0690 (APEK excluded calls that are terminated at customers of unmanaged VoIP services from the market definition), and ES/2008/0818.
49See, for example, case RO/2008/0774.
50 See footnote Error: Reference source not found above.
51 UKE's first-round review registered under case number PL/2006/0381 was concluded by the Commission withdrawing its serious doubts after UKE withdrew from the scope of the market definition call termination to numbers of information networks (NDSI), non-geographic numbers and numbers for special subscriber services (AUS). UKE indicates that the relevant product market does not include call termination to such numbers, apart from termination of calls to emergency numbers (99X, 98X and 112 - allocated to services officially required to provide assistance).
52 For example, TKK (case AT/2009/0909) includes calls to certain non-geographic numbers in Austria provided they are converted into geographic numbers before termination and terminated in the same way as a standard geographic number. The operators terminating this specific type of call are not aware that their subscriber, to which the call is addressed, is a service provider and charge the same rates as for termination to standard geographic numbers. ANRCTI noted further (case RO/2008/0774) that in the case of calls to public interest services in Romania, the service providers in question behave like end-users and do not have an incentive to switch supplier in case of a 5-10% increase in termination rates. Other examples may also be found in cases FR/2008/0784, NL/2008/0830, DE/2008/0843, CZ/2007/0660-0661, DK/2009/0984.
53 Cases IT/2008/0777 (in this case this Commission commented on the fact that although AGCOM included voice call termination services to integrated fixed/mobile offers in the fixed call termination, it proposed to defer the definition of obligations for these services until its assessment of the market for voice call termination on individual mobile networks), PL/2008/0762 and RO/2008/0774.
54 Case DE/2008/0813.
55 Cases MT/2006/0388, FI/2007/0704, BG/2009/0865.
56 Cases AT/2006/0544, DE/2009/0948, IE/2007/0701, PL/2006/0502, PL/2007/0633, PL/2007/0641, PL/2007/0685, PL/2008/0760-0762, PL/2008/-0776, PL/2008/0814, LV/2009/0889, EE/2007/0598, HU/2007/0727, LT/2009/0983, GI/2009/0976.
57 Case MT/2006/0388.
58 Cases NL/2008/0830, LV/2009/0889, PL/2009/0903.
59 Cases AT/2009/0909, IT/2008/0753.
60 Case AT/2009/0909.
61 Cases DK/2005/0207, AT/2006/0504, IT/2008/0753, ES/2008/0818.
62 Case DE/2009/0948, IE/2007/0701, EE/2007/0598, GI/2009/0976, CZ/2009/0964, IE/2009/0917. Furthermore, the Commission has underlined in case LT/2009/0983 that an access obligation is unilateral and unconditional in its nature, and should in principle not be made subject to conditions offered on markets other than the relevant market, i.e. another termination market.
63 Case BG/2009/0865.
64 Cases DE/2009/0948, PL/2009/0903.
65 Commission Recommendation 2009/396/EC of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, OJ L 124, 20.5.2009, p. 67.
66The Commission has emphasized the need for a coherent European approach in a number of cases: FI/2007/0704, SI/2007/0690, GI/2007/0717, HU/2007/0727, RO/2008/0774, UK/2009/0898, ES/2008/0818, IT/2008/0753, IT/2008/0777, NL/2008/0830, NL/2009/0978, PL/2008/0903, PL/2008/0760, PL/2008/0762, PL/2008/0776, PL/2008/0814, BG/2009/0865, FR/2008/0784, IE/2009/0917, EL/2008/0751, EL/2008/0754.
67 In exceptional circumstances set out in section 12 of the Termination Rates Recommendation the NRA may delay its implementation until 1 July 2014.
68 Commission Staff Working Document, Explanatory Note accompanying document to the Commission Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Second edition), SEC (2007) 1483 final.
69 Bulgaria and Romania have not yet notified this market.
70 Fibre to the Node or Fibre to the Cabinet.
71 Fibre to the Home.
72 E.g. cases EE/2009/0942, ES/2008/0804 (FTTH point to multipoint technology is excluded), FI/2008/0839, FR/2008/0780, IE/2009/0875, NL/2008/827 and PT/20080850.
73 E.g. cases CY/2009/0869 and CZ/2009/0933 (withdrawn by the NRA), DK/2008/0860, EL/2009/0934, and SK/2009/0929 (withdrawn by the NRA).
74 E.g. cases CY/2009/0869, DK/2008/0860 and ES/2008/0804.
75 E.g. cases CY/2009/0869, DK/2008/0860 and EL/2009/0934.
76 Case EE/2009/0942.
77 Case FR/2008/0780. The Commission pointed out that access to civil works infrastructure is indeed considered as an appropriate remedy in relation to this market, which can be imposed without the inclusion of civil works infrastructure in the relevant market. The Commission invited ARCEP to provide further justification in its final decision as to the inclusion of civil works infrastructure in the relevant market.
78 E.g. cases BE/2008/0801, CY/2009/0869, DK/2008/0860, EE/2009/0942, EL/2009/0934, ES/2008/0804 FR/2008/0780, IT/2009/0891 and PT/2008/0850.
79 Case ES/2009/0961.
80 E.g. IT/2009/0987 and ES 2008/0805.
81 E.g. SI/2009/0957, DE/2007/0646, BE/2008/0801.
82 Cases FI/2008/0839, NL/2008/0826 and SI/2009/0981.
83 OPTA implemented a multi-annual price cap based on a discounted cash flow model. It applied an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) methodology to set the price cap instead of the Embedded Direct Costs (EDC) methodology it uses to regulate the pricing of access to copper unbundling since it considers that FTTH represents a completely new investment undertaken by a company, Reggefibre Group, structurally separated from the SMP operator, which provides copper unbundling.
84 Fibre to the Office.
85 Case NL/2009/0868 (price control obligation for FttH unbundled ODF-access) and case NL/2009/0906 (price control obligation for FttO unbundled ODF-access).
86 Case FI/2008/0839.
87 SI/2009/0981.
88 In particular with regard to access to physical network infrastructure,, to the migration process and to the development of the new generation access network. E.g. cases BE/2008/0801, EE/2009/0942, EL/2009/0934, ES/2008/0804, FR/2008/0780 and PT/2008/0850.
89 E.g. cases BE/2008/0801, DK/2008/0860, NL/2008/0826 and ES/2008/0804.
90 E.g. cases FI/2008/0839 and IT/2009/0988.
91 E.g. cases EE/2009/0942 (absence of non-discrimination and cost orientation obligations on fibre products), FI/2008/0839 (absence of a cost-orientation obligation on fibre products), FR/2008/0780 (regulation of fibre products limited to access to civil infrastructure and in-house wiring) and IT/2009/0890 (lack of a fibre unbundling access obligation).
92 Imposed on all operators, irrespective of whether these have SMP in the relevant market.
93 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33.
94FR/2008/0780, FR/2009/0993, ES/2008/0804. Portugal adopted as well on May 2009 a Decree-Law containing specific provisions related to the sharing of in-house wiring.
95 FR/2009/0993. A regulatory decision and a recommendation are implementing the provisions regarding in-house wiring regulation under the Law on the Modernisation of the Economy. In-building operators must meet reasonable requests for access to their passive lines at a local connection point (at reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions) and give access to a dedicated fibre line or to a shared fibre line to the requesting operators.
96 Case MT/2008/2003.
97 Cases UK/2007/0733 and PT/2008/0851.
98 See 5.1 infra.
99 See 4.1 supra.
100 E.g. cases AT/2009/0970 (FTTH excluded), CY/2009/0870, CZ/2008/0797 and EL/2009/0935. In case SI/2009/0957, the Slovenian NRA excluded from the relevant market the fibre optic infrastructure owned by the alternative operator T-2.
101 Case DE/2005/0262.
102Case ES/2008/0805.
103 Case UK/2007/0733.
104 Case AT/2008/0757.
105 On 17 December 2008 the Austrian Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) annulled the NRA's decision. A new notification was submitted to the Commission in September 2009 (Case AT/2009/0970).
106 Case PT/2008/0851.
107 Case ES/2008/0805. CMT defined a national market but proposed differentiating remedies according to the intensity of retail competition in the different parts of the country. The Commission had serious doubts as to whether the development of the Spanish broadband markets would or would not justify the application of geographically differentiated regulatory obligations. The Spanish regulator has in Phase II changed its conclusions and has inter alia abandoned its intent to apply geographically differentiated remedies.
108 See Cases FI/2008/0848 and FI/2009/0900. Ficora notified its analysis of the WBA market under case FI/2008/0848. Therein, Ficora defined 31 regionally different geographic markets, corresponding to the operating areas of 31 fixed telecoms network companies. The Finish NRA proposed to distinguish geographic sub-markets within 5 of these operating areas, where it identified 25 municipalities (typically urban centres) which exhibited differing competitive characteristics in relation to the rest of the local operating area. Ficora proposed to partially deregulate inter alia the referred 5 operating areas. The Commission raised serious doubts as to the proposed de-regulation due to the lack of sufficient evidence to substantiate the geographic market definition/partial de-regulation. Following the serious doubts raised by the Commission and the opening of phase II, Ficora withdrew the referred notification and re-notified its analysis under Case FI/2009/0900. No geographic sub-markets were then defined.
109 E.g. cases AT/2008/0757, EE/2009/0943, FI/2009/0900, FR/2008/0781, NL/2009/0827, PT/2008/0851 and UK/2007/0733.
110 Explanatory Note to the Commission Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (C(2007) 5406), pp. 34-35. See also, inter alia, Case UK/2007/0733.
111E.g. cases FI/2009/0900, NL/2008/0827 and UK/2007/0733.
112Case MT/2008/0803.
113 The joint control of the copper and cable networks would create disincentives for TDC to invest in copper network expansion (VDSL2 network) in those areas where TDC would be able to provide higher bandwidth connections to end-users based on its cable TV network.
114 Case DK/2008/0862.
115Cases AT/2008/0757, EE/2009/0943, FI/2009/0900, NL/2008/0826 and UK/2007/0733.
116 Case AT/2009/0970 (only the market definition was notified).
117 E.g. cases DK/2008/0862, FR/2008/0781, DE/2005/0262, DE/2006/0457 and DE/2007/0576, PT/2008/0850 (no WBA regulation imposed); EE/2009/0943, ES/2008/0805, NL/2008/0827 (lighter regulation imposed/no regulation of specific offers).
118 Case DK/2008/0862.
119 Case NL/2008/0827.
120 Cases DE/2005/0262, DE/2006/0457 and DE/2007/0576.
121 See 5.1 supra.
122Case ES/2008/0805.
123 See 5.1 supra.
124 Case FI/2009/0900.
125 A market for long distance dedicated capacity between two fixed points (see below).
126 The Romanian and Bulgarian regulators have not notified their draft measures related to that market.
127 See case AT/2008/0836. Area 1 covers the following 12 towns: Vienna, Linz, Graz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Wels, Feldkirch, Steyr, Klagenfurt, Dornbirn, Bregenz and Hallein. The rest of Austria is Area 2.
128 E.g. as a result of the Commission's comment regarding the lack of a clear definition of the boundary between the two wholesale leased lines markets (PL/2006/0516), UKE defined the terminating segments as leased lines between the terminal equipment and the closest, from the terminal equipment, network node of the operator providing the service to which an alternative operator purchasing the service is connected.
129 Cases LT/2006/0430, EL/2006/0422, UK/2008/0747, UK/2008/0787 and NL/2008/0823.
130 UK/2008/0747, UK/2008/0787.
131 AT/2008/0836, AT/2009/0932.
132 In the UK Ofcom identified different competitive conditions in the Central and East London Area whereas RTR defined the so called "Area 1" covering 12 towns: Vienna, Linz, Graz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Wels, Feldkirch, Steyr, Klagenfurt, Dornbirn, Bregenz and Hallein.
133 FI/2009/0986
134 The traditional operating areas are those where the relevant operators had, until 31 December 1993, unrestricted rights to operate local telecommunications.
135 IT/2009/1000.
136 e.g. cases EE/2007/0643 and DE/2007/0677.
137 Ofcom defined the so called traditional interface symmetric broadband origination ("TISBO") and alternative interface symmetric broadband origination ("AISBO"), including LLU backhaul services within the latter.
138 Case AT/2008/0836.
139 Case NL/2008/0823.
140 Case UK/2008/0859.
141 Case EE/2007/0643.
142 IT/2009/0999-1000.
143Cases ES/2007/0706, NL/2007/0634, DE/2008/0813, DK/2008/0785, FI/2008/0778, PL/2008/0855, EE/2009/0883 (three other MVNOs were however not included by the Estonian regulator in the relevant product markets as they are either service providers/resellers or do not have full control over the data of their subscribers' SIM-cards).
144 E.g. cases EL/2008/0786, EE/2009/0883, FI/2008/0778, DE/2009/0947, PL/2009/0904, ES/2008/0819, RO/2009/0878.
145 Cases FR/2006/0413, GI/2007/0724.
146 Cases FI/2006/0403, FI/2008/0778, DE/2009/0947, SK/2009/0902, PL/2008/0794, PL/2008/0855.
147Cases LU/2005/0321, FR/2007/0669, IT/2008/0802, BG/2009/0866, CZ/2008/0841, SI/2009/0946, ES/2008/0819, CZ/2009/0959, GI/2009/0977.
148 Cases LU/2005/0321, EE/2009/0883, MT/2009/0926, PL/2009/0904, IE/2008/0746.
149 Cases LV/2006/0464, BG/2009/0866.
150Case IE/2008/0746.
151 Cases EL/2008/0786, IT/2008/0802, CZ/2008/0841, SK/2009/0902, ES/2008/0819, PL/20096/0991.
152 Case UK/2006/0498, HU/2008/0829.
153 Case EL/2008/0786, HU/2008/0829, AT/2009/0910, SE/2009/0941.
154 Case IT/2008/0802.
155 Cases DK/2008/0765, DK/2008/0785, FR/2009/0927, IT/2008/0802, LV/2007/0574, PL/2008/0794, PL/2008/0855, ES/2009/0937, PT/2007/0707, RO/2009/0878, DK/2009/1013-1014, SK/2009/0902. With respect to asymmetry allowed for MNVOs, the Commission highlighted (in case DK/2010/1013-1014) that NRAs should identify any objective cost differences that would justify such asymmetry or ensure the phasing out of asymmetries in MVNOs' termination rates as soon as possible.
156 Case DE/2009/0947.
157 Case BG/2009/0966.
158 Cases DE/2008/0813, DE/2009/0947, PL/2009/0904, EE/2009/0883.
159 Cases BG/2009/0866, RO/2009/0878, AT/2009/0910. Following its notification of case IT/2008/0802, the Italian regulator, AGCOM, also committed to develop and adopt by 2010 a cost model in line with the Commission's recommended approach to termination rates.
160 Case FR/2008/0812.
161 1) there are high and non-transitory barriers to market entry, which may be of a structural, legal or regulatory nature; 2) the market structure does not tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon; and 3) competition law alone is not sufficient to adequately address the identified market failure(s).
162 Article 15(3) of the Framework Directive.
163 Cases CZ/2008/0796, CZ/2008/0840 and CZ/2008/0857; DE/2007/0628, DE/2007/0709, DE/2008/0846, DE/2007/0847 and DE/2009/0895; IE/2007/0697-0700; ES/2008/0817; MT/2009/0884; NL/2008/0821; AT/2009/0881 regarding the residential calls markets only; SI/2009/0893; UK/2009/0899 with the exception of the Hull area; RO/2009/1004.
164 Cases BE/2008/0798 and 0799 – market shares in the national residential calls market have been declining but still stay above 65%; for national business calls they have been increasing to above 75%; BG/2009/0912 market shares stayed above 78% for the international calls market for non-residential customers and above 95% for the other calls markets; LT/2008/0763 and 0764 market shares in the national calls markets have been increasing to above 99% for business and above 93% for the residential calls market; AT/2009/0880 for the business national and international calls markets TKK considered the three criteria test to be fulfilled and the SMP analysis will be carried out subsequently.
165Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on market reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework – Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications, COM (2007) 401 final of 11.7.2007.
166Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users's rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108, 24,2,2002, p. 51.
167 Commission Decision of 24 July 2003 on the minimum set of leased lines with harmonised characteristics and associated standards referred to in Article 18 of the Universal Service Directive, OJ L 186, 25.7.2003, p.43.
168Commission Decision of 21 December 2007 amending Decision 2003/548/EC as regards the deletion of specific types of leased line from the Minimum Set of Leased Lines, OJ, L 15, 18.1.2008, p. 32.
169Cases CZ/2009/0872,; DE/2009/1009 (removal of remedies not yet notified); EE/2007/0642, EL/2008/0751,IT/2009/0998 NL/2009/0824 SI/208/0768 and SK/2009/1008.
170Cases AT/2008/0836, UK/2008/0749 and UK/2009/0938 proposing partial withdrawal of regulation.
171In addition to the 8 NRAs referred to in the last report see cases DK/2007/0693, EE/2007/0670, AT/2007/0590; one NRA (Luxembourg ILR) concluded already during the last period of reporting that the three criteria test was not fulfilled, see case LU/2006/0542 .
172See cases DE/2009/0887-888; EE/2009/0962 SE/2009/0968 and UK/2009/0898; see however cases IE/2009/0921 and RO/2009/1005.
173See Case NL/2008/0800.
174See case PL/2008/0766, PL/2008/0788 (absence of SMP without withdrawal of regulation); PL/2008/0831 (proposal to withdraw regulation).
175 See cases IE/2008/0791 and IT/2009/999 (absence of three criteria test); regarding the findings of absence of SMP see DE/2007/0678 and DK/2007/0725 (subsequent to a withdrawal containing an SMP finding in case DK/2007/586).
176 EE/2007/0644.
177UK/2009/0901. PL/2008/0882 (second phase), PL/2008/0856 (splitting the trunk market into routes, the draft measures related to the SMP finding regarding competitive routes was withdrawn); and PL/2009/971.
178With the exception of the Danish NRA, NITA, which previously had concluded on absence of SMP but did not withdraw remedies, and subsequently again concluded on absence of SMP, see case DK/2008/0863.
179See cases IT/2007/0575, IT/2008/0861.
180See cases CY/2009/0877 and SI/2009/0913 (after a proposal of joint dominance by the Slovenian NRA, APEK, in case SI/2008/0806 which was however withdrawn).
181See case SI/2009/0913.
182 I.e., the decisive parameters of the assessment of the status of competition are based on incentives to grant MVNO network access, such as excess network capacity.
183 See cases DK/2007/0618, EL/2007/0684, LV/2007/0694, MT/2008/0810 (following withdrawal in case MT/200/0564) NL/2008/0849, 2009/0873, NL/2009/1007, NL/2009/105 and SE/2009/0975 (in this case, however, for free to air digital TV the three criteria was still found to be met.
184 See cases CZ/2009/0907, EE/2007/0666, LT/2009/1022 (excluding digital terrestrial transmission) ES/2009/0905, HU/2007/0734, AT/2009/0896, RO/2009/0876.
185 See cases FI/2009/0789, FR/2009/0914, SI/2007/0730, PT/2007/0655.
186 See case NL/2008/0873.
187 Overview of notifications assessed between October 2005 and December 2009. Details concerning notifications prior to this date can be found in the "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on Market Reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework - Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications", (COM(2006) 28 final of 6.2.2006 and COM(2007)401 final of 11.7.2007.
188 In case AT/2008/0832 the Austrian NRA notified already the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission reminded the NRA that any notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon the effective delineation of the relevant market concerned at the time of that notification.
189 The NRA imposed on the SMP operator also the obligation not to unreasonably bundle retail offers and WLR.
190 Notification MT/2009/0980 has been withdrawn by the authority.
191 The NRA also imposed on the SMP operator the prohibition of unreasonably bundling access with other services.
192 In case AT/2008/0833 the Austrian NRA notified already the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission reminded the NRA that any notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon the effective delineation of the relevant market concerned at the time of that notification.
193Notification LV/2009/0925 was withdrawn by the authority.
194 In case AT/2008/0834 the Austrian NRA notified already the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission reminded the NRA that any notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon the effective delineation of the relevant market concerned at the time of that notification.
195At the time of notification, OCECPR expected that three other operators, D.Y. Worldwide, Callsat and Telepassport, which did not have direct connections to end-users at the time, would start providing wholesale call termination during the timeframe of its review and would de facto have SMP on their individual network markets.
196 Ofcom’s proposed market definition for call termination differs from market 3 as defined in the Recommendation in that it splits out local-tandem conveyance / transit. Local-tandem conveyance and transit (LTC/LTT) includes the conveyance of traffic between the local exchanges that provide call origination and termination service and the tandem layer of the network. Ofcom finds however that once BT has completed its migration to its NGN network, LTC/LTT is no longer a relevant market since the NGN network does not include separate local and tandem layers to which communications providers can interconnect for the routing of voice traffic. Ofcom considers therefore that the three-criteria test is no longer met for this market.
197In case AT/2008/0835, the Austrian NRA has already notified the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission commented on the NRA's approach which consisted in notifying the market definition including the three criteria test in advance of the full market analysis and the proposed remedies.
198 The decision of the Belgian NRA on Markets 11 and 12 (Cases BE/2007/0735 and BE/2007/0736) was annulled by the Belgian Court of Appeal on 7 May 2009 due to insufficient motivation. A new decision aiming at remedying the referred lack of motivation was adopted and notified to the Commission under Cases BE/2009/0949 and BE/2009/0950.
199 Case withdrawn by the NRA.
200 Case withdrawn by the NRA.
201 In case AT/2009/0970 the Austrian NRA has already notified the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission issued a letter of serious doubts following which the Austrian NRA revised the draft measure. The serious doubts were withdrawn.
202 On 17 December 2008, the Austrian Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) annulled the NRA's decision concerning case AT/2008/0757. The remedies currently applied are the ones notified under case AT/2005/0312, i.e. access, non-discrimination, reference offer, price-control based on “retail minus”, cost accounting, accounting separation.
203 The decision of the Belgian NRA on Markets 11 and 12 (Cases BE/2007/0735 and BE/2007/0736) was annulled by the Belgian Court of Appeal on 7 May 2009 due to insufficient motivation. A new decision aiming at remedying the referred lack of motivation was adopted and notified to the Commission under Cases BE/2009/0949 and BE/2009/0950.
204 Case withdrawn by the NRA.
205 Case withdrawn by the NRA.
206 Case withdrawn by the NRA.
207 In cases AT/2008/0836 and AT/2009/0932 the Austrian NRA notified only the market definition for its third round market review, which defines geographic submarkets.
The Commission commented on the NRA's approach of applying geographical differentiation in the market segment of leased lines with high bandwidth.
208 In case AT/2008/0837 the Austrian NRA already notified the market definition for its third round market review. The Commission reminded the NRA that any notification of a draft market analysis has to be based upon the effective delineation of the relevant market concerned at the time of that notification.
209Former market 3: Publicly available local and/or national telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers.
Former market 4: Publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers.
Former market 5: Publicly available local and/or national telephone ser vices provided at a fixed location for non-residential customers.
Former market 6: Publicly available international telephone services at a fixed location for non-residential customers.
210 I.e., access to digital television only for upstream services, i.e., services offered to other broadcasting transmission providers; no access obligation to downstream transmission services offered to broadcasters.
211 See also Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC and SEC (2007)1483 p. 17.
212 Access obligation imposed only in relation to other transmission services operators due to restrictions on scope of remedy imposed by law.
EN EN