Annexes to COM(2010)83 - Rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
dossier | COM(2010)83 - Rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing ... |
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document | COM(2010)83 |
date | February 16, 2011 |
While this alignment exercise is underway, the Commission will keep the European Parliament regularly informed on draft implementing measures related to these instruments which should become, in the future, delegated acts.
As regards legislative acts in force which currently contain references to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, the Commission will review the provisions attached to this procedure in each instrument it intends to modify, in order to adapt them in due course according to the criteria laid down in the Treaty. In addition, the European Parliament and the Council will be entitled to signal basic acts they consider important to adapt as a matter of priority.
The Commission will assess the results of this process by the end of 2012 in order to estimate how many legislative acts containing references to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny remain in force. The Commission will then prepare the appropriate legislative initiatives to complete the adaptation. The overall objective of the Commission is that, by the end of the 7th term of the Parliament, all provisions referring to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny would have been removed from all legislative instruments.
The Commission notes that it has recently launched a study which will provide a complete and objective review of all aspects of the EU's trade defence policy and practice, including an evaluation of the performance, methods, utilisation and effectiveness of the present TDI scheme in achieving its trade policy objectives, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the existing and potential policy decisions of the European Union (e.g., the Union interest test, the lesser duty rule, the duty collection system) in comparison with the policy decisions made by certain trading partners and an examination of the basic anti-dumping and anti-subsidy regulations in light of the administrative practice of the EU institutions, the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the recommendations and rulings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
The Commission intends, in the light of the results of the study and of developments in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations to explore whether and how to further update and modernize the EU's trade defence instruments
The Commission also recalls the recent initiatives it has taken to improve the transparency of the operation of trade defence instruments (such as the appointment of a Hearing Officer) and its work with Member States to clarify key elements of trade defence practice. The Commission attaches substantial importance to this work, and will seek to identify, in consultation with the Member States, other initiatives which could be taken in this respect.
Under the comitology rules based on Council Decision 1999/468/EC, where a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) management committee has delivered an unfavourable opinion, the Commission must submit the draft measure in question to the Council which may take a different decision within a month. However, the Commission is not barred from acting but has the choice to either put the measure in place or defer its application. Hence, the Commission may take the measure where it considers on balance that suspending its application would for instance provoke irreversible negative market effects. When afterwards the Council decides otherwise the measure put in effect by the Commission becomes of course redundant. Thus the current rules equip the Commission with an instrument that allows protecting the common interest of the whole Union by adopting a measure at least on an interim basis.
Article 7 of this Regulation pursues the objective of maintaining this approach within the new comitology arrangements but limited to exceptional situations and on the basis of clearly defined and restrictive criteria. It would allow the Commission to adopt a draft measure despite the unfavourable opinion of the examination committee provided that its ‘non adoption within an imperative deadline would create a significant disruption of the markets (…) or for the financial interests of the Union.’ The provision refers to situations where it is not possible to wait until the committee votes again on the same or another draft measure because in the meantime the market would be significantly disrupted e.g. due to the speculative behaviour of operators. To ensure the Union's ability to act it would give Member States and the Commission the opportunity to have another informed discussion on the draft measure without leaving things undecided and open to speculation with the negative consequences for the markets and the budget.
Such situations may namely arise in the context of the day-to-day management of the CAP (e.g. fixing of export refunds, management of licences, special safeguard clause) where decisions need often to be taken quickly and can have significant economic consequences for the markets and thus farmers and operators but also for the budget of the Union.
In cases where the European Parliament or the Council indicate to the Commission that they consider a draft implementing act to exceed the implementing powers provided for in the basic act, the Commission will immediately review the draft implementing act taking into account the positions expressed by the European Parliament or the Council.
The Commission will act in a manner which takes duly into account the urgency of the matter.
Before deciding whether the draft implementing act shall be adopted, amended or withdrawn, the Commission will inform the European Parliament or the Council of the action it intends to take and of its reasons for doing so.