Overwegingen bij COM(2023)227 - Wijziging van Richtlijn 2014/59/EU wat betreft vroegtijdige-interventiemaatregelen, de voorwaarden voor afwikkeling en de financiering van afwikkelingsmaatregelen - Hoofdinhoud
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| dossier | COM(2023)227 - Wijziging van Richtlijn 2014/59/EU wat betreft vroegtijdige-interventiemaatregelen, de voorwaarden voor afwikkeling en de ... |
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| document | COM(2023)227  |
| datum | 18 april 2023 |
(2)Several years into its implementation, the Union resolution framework as currently applicable does not deliver as intended with respect of some of those objectives. In particular, while institutions and entities have made significant progress towards resolvability and have dedicated significant resources to that end, in particular through the build-up of the loss absorption and recapitalisation capacity and the filling-up of resolution financing arrangements, the Union resolution framework is seldom resorted to. Failures of certain smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities are instead mostly addressed through unharmonised national measures. Taxpayer money is used rather than resolution financing arrangements. That situation appears to arise from inadequate incentives. Those inadequate incentives result from the interplay of the Union resolution framework with national rules, whereby the broad discretion in the public interest assessment is not always exercised in a way that reflects how the Union resolution framework was intended to apply. At the same time, the Union resolution framework saw little use due to the risks for depositors of deposit-funded institutions to bear losses to ensure that those institutions can access external funding in resolution, in particular in the absence of other bail-inable liabilities. Finally, the fact that there are less stringent rules on access to funding outside resolution than in resolution has discouraged the application of the Union resolution framework in favour of other solutions, which often entail the use of taxpayers’ money instead of the own resources of the institution and entity or industry-funded safety nets. That situation, in turn, generates risks of fragmentation, risks of suboptimal outcomes in managing institutions and entities’ failures, in particular in the case of smaller and medium-sized institutions and entities, and opportunity costs from unused financial resources. It is therefore necessary to ensure a more effective and coherent application of the Union resolution framework and to ensure that it can be applied whenever that is in the public interest, including for certain smaller and medium-sized institutions primarily funded through deposits and without sufficient other bail-inable liabilities.
(3)The intensity, and level of detail, of the resolution planning work needed with respect to subsidiaries that have not been identified as resolution entities varies depending on the size and risk profile of the institutions and entities concerned, the presence of critical functions, and the group resolution strategy. Resolution authorities should therefore be able to consider those factors when identifying the measures to be taken in respect of such subsidiaries and follow a simplified approach where appropriate.
(4)An institution or entity that is being wound up under national law, following a determination that the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail and a conclusion by the resolution authority that its resolution is not in the public interest, is ultimately heading towards market exit. That implies that a plan for actions to be taken in case of failure is not needed, irrespective of whether the competent authority has already withdrawn the authorisation of the institution or entity concerned. The same applies for a residual institution under resolution after the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities in the context of a transfer strategy. It is therefore appropriate to specify that in those situations, the adoption of resolution plans is not required.
(5)Resolution authorities may currently prohibit certain distributions where an institution or entity fails to meet the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (‘MREL’). However, in certain situations, an institution or entity might be required to comply with the MREL on a different basis than the basis on which that institution or entity is required to comply with the combined buffer requirement. That situation creates uncertainties as to the conditions for the exercise of the powers of resolution authorities to prohibit distributions and for the calculation of the Maximum Distributable Amount related to MREL. It should therefore be laid down that, in those cases, resolution authorities should exercise the power to prohibit certain distributions based on the estimate of the combined buffer requirement resulting from Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/1118 28 . To ensure transparency and legal certainty, resolution authorities should communicate the estimated combined buffer requirement to the institution or entity, which should then publicly disclose that estimated combined buffer requirement.
(6)Early intervention measures were created to enable competent authorities to remedy the deterioration of the financial and economic situation of an institution or entity and to reduce, to the extent possible, the risk and impact of a possible resolution. However, due to a lack of certainty regarding the triggers for application of those early intervention measures and partial overlaps with supervisory measures, early intervention measures have seldom been used. The conditions for the application of those early intervention measures should therefore be simplified and further specified. To dispel uncertainties concerning the conditions and timing for the removal of the management body and the appointment of temporary administrators, those measures should be explicitly identified as early intervention measures and their application should be subject to the same triggers. At the same time, competent authorities should be required to select the appropriate measures to address a specific situation in compliance with the principle of proportionality. To enable competent authorities to take into account reputational risks or risks related to money laundering or information and communication technology, competent authorities should assess the conditions for application of early intervention measures not only on the basis of quantitative indicators, such as capital or liquidity requirements, level of leverage, non-performing loans or concentration of exposures, but also on the basis of qualitative triggers.
(7)To improve legal certainty, the early intervention measures laid down in Directive 2014/59/EU that overlap with already existing powers under the prudential framework laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 29 and in Directive (EU) 2019/2034 of the European Parliament and of the Council 30 should be removed. In addition, it is necessary to ensure that resolution authorities are able to prepare for the possible resolution of an institution or entity. The competent authority should therefore inform the resolution authorities of the deterioration of the financial condition of an institution or entity sufficiently early, and resolution authorities should have the necessary powers for the implementation of preparatory measures. Importantly, to enable the resolution authorities to react as swiftly as possible to a deterioration of the situation of an institution or an entity, the prior application of early intervention measures should not be a condition for the resolution authority to make arrangements for the marketing of the institution or entity or to request information to update the resolution plan and prepare the valuation. To ensure a consistent, coordinated, effective and timely reaction to the deterioration of the financial situation of an institution or entity and to prepare properly for a possible resolution, it is necessary to enhance the interaction and coordination between competent authorities and resolution authorities. As soon as an institution or entity meets the conditions for application of early intervention measures, competent authorities and resolution authorities should increase their exchanges of information, including provisional information, and monitor the financial situation of the institution or entity jointly.
(8)It is necessary to ensure timely action and early coordination between the competent authority and the resolution authority, when an institution or entity is still a going concern, but where there is a material risk that the institution or entity may fail. The competent authority should therefore notify the resolution authority as early as possible of such risk. That notification should contain the reasons for the competent authority’s assessment and an overview of the alternative private sector measures, supervisory action or early intervention measures that are available to prevent the failure of the institution or entity within a reasonable timeframe. Such early notification should not prejudice the procedures to determine whether the conditions for resolution are met. The prior notification by the competent authority to the resolution authority of a material risk that an institution or entity is failing or likely to fail should not be a condition for a subsequent determination that an institution or entity is actually failing or likely to fail. Moreover, if at a later stage the institution or entity is assessed to be failing or likely to fail and there are no alternative solutions to prevent such failure within a reasonable timeframe, the resolution authority has to take a decision whether to take resolution action. In such a case, the timeliness of the decision to apply resolution action to an institution or entity can be fundamental to the successful implementation of the resolution strategy, in particular because an earlier intervention in the institution or entity can contribute to ensuring sufficient levels of loss absorption capacity and liquidity to execute that strategy. It is therefore appropriate to enable the resolution authority to assess, in close cooperation with the competent authority, what constitutes a reasonable timeframe to implement alternative measures to avoid the failure of the institution or entity. To ensure a timely outcome and to enable the resolution authority to prepare properly for the potential resolution of the institution or entity, the resolution authority and the competent authority should meet regularly, and the resolution authority should decide on frequency of those meetings considering the circumstances of the case.
(9)The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional level.
(10)The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should reflect the consideration that depositors are better protected when deposit guarantee scheme (‘DGS’) funds are used more efficiently and the losses for those funds are minimised. Therefore, in the public interest assessment, the resolution objective of protecting depositors should be considered better achieved in resolution if opting for insolvency would be more costly for the DGS.
(11)The assessment of whether the resolution of an institution or entity is in the public interest should also reflect, to the extent possible, the difference between, on the one hand, funding provided through industry-funded safety nets (resolution financing arrangements or DGSs) and, on the other hand, funding provided by Member States from taxpayers’ money. Funding provided by Member States bears a higher risk of moral hazard and a lower incentive for market discipline. Therefore, when assessing the objective of minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support, resolution authorities should find funding through the resolution financing arrangements or the DGS preferable to funding through an equal amount of resources from the budget of Member States.
(12)To ensure that the resolution objectives are attained in the most effective way, the outcome of the public interest assessment should be negative only where the winding up of the failing institution or entity under normal insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives more effectively and not only to the same extent as resolution.
(13)When a failing institution or entity is not put in resolution, it should be wound down in accordance with the procedures available under national law. Such procedures may vary substantially from one Member State to the other. While it is appropriate to allow sufficient flexibility to use the existing national procedures, certain aspects should be clarified to ensure that the institutions or entities concerned exit the market.
(14)It should be ensured that the relevant national administrative or judicial authority swiftly initiates a procedure under national law when an institution or entity is considered failing or likely to fail and is not put in resolution. Where voluntary liquidation of the institution or entity upon a decision of shareholders is available under national law, such option should remain available. However, it should be ensured that, in absence of swift action from the shareholders, the relevant national administrative or judicial authority takes action.
(15)It should also be laid down that the final outcome of such procedures is the exit of the failing institution or entity from the market or the termination of its banking activities. Depending on the national law, that objective can be achieved in different ways, which may include the sale of the institution or entity or parts of it, sale of specific assets or liabilities, a gradual wind down or the termination of its banking activities, including payments and deposit-taking, with a view to selling its assets gradually to repay the affected creditors. However, to enhance the predictability of the procedures, that outcome should be reached within a reasonable timeframe.
(16)Competent authorities should be empowered to withdraw the authorisation of an institution or entity solely on the basis of the fact that the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail and is not put in resolution. Competent authorities should be able to withdraw the authorisation to support the objective of winding up the institution or entity in accordance with national law, particularly in cases where the available procedures under national law cannot be initiated at the moment the institution or entity is determined to be failing or likely to fail, including the cases where the institution or entity is not yet balance sheet insolvent. To further ensure that the objective of winding up the institution or entity can be achieved, Member States should ensure that the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority is also included among the possible conditions to initiate at least one of the procedures available under national law and applicable to institutions or entities that are failing or likely to fail but are not put in resolution.
(17)In light of the experience acquired in the implementation of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 31 , it is necessary to specify further the conditions under which measures of a preventive precautionary nature that qualify as extraordinary public financial support may exceptionally be granted. To minimise distortions of competition arising from differences in nature of DGSs in the Union, interventions of DGSs in the context of preventive measures complying with Directive 2014/49/EU that qualify as extraordinary public financial support should exceptionally be allowed where the beneficiary institution or entity does not meet any of the conditions for being deemed as failing or likely to fail. It should be ensured that precautionary measures are taken sufficiently early. The European Central Bank (ECB) currently bases its consideration that an institution or entity is solvent, for the purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, on a forward-looking assessment for following 12 months of whether the institution or entity can comply with the own funds requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 32 or in Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 of the European Parliament and of the Council 33 , and the additional own funds requirement laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive (EU) 2019/2034. That practice should be laid down in Directive 2014/59/EU. Moreover, measures to provide relief for impaired assets, including asset management vehicles or asset guarantee schemes, can prove effective and efficient in addressing causes of possible financial distresses faced by institutions and entities and preventing their failure and could therefore constitute relevant precautionary measures. It should be therefore specified that such precautionary measures can take the form of impaired asset measures.
(18)To preserve market discipline, protect public funds and avoid distortions of competition, precautionary measures should remain the exception and only be applied to address situations of serious disturbance in the market or to preserve financial stability. Moreover, precautionary measures should not be used to address incurred or likely losses. The most reliable instrument to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses is an asset quality review by the ECB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 34 or national competent authorities. Competent authorities should use such a review to identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses where such review can be carried out within a reasonable timeframe. Where that is not possible, competent authorities should identify incurred or likely to be incurred losses in the most reliable way possible under the prevailing circumstances, based on on-site inspections where appropriate.
(19)Precautionary recapitalisation is aimed at supporting viable institutions and entities identified as likely to encounter temporary difficulties in the near future and to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. To avoid that public subsidies are granted to businesses that are already unprofitable when the support is granted, precautionary measures granted in the form of acquisition of own funds instruments or other capital instruments or through impaired asset measures should not exceed the amount necessary to cover capital shortfalls as identified in the adverse scenario of a stress test or equivalent exercise. To ensure that public financing is ultimately discontinued, those precautionary measures should also be limited in time and contain a clear timeline for their termination (exit strategy). Perpetual instruments, including Common Equity Tier 1 capital, should only be used in exceptional circumstances and be subject to certain quantitative limits because by their nature they are not well suited for compliance with the condition of temporariness.
(20)Precautionary measures should be limited to the amount that the institution or entity would need to maintain its solvency in the case of an adverse scenario event as determined in a stress test or equivalent exercise. In the case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures, the receiving institution or entity should be able to use that amount to cover losses on the transferred assets or in combination with an acquisition of capital instruments, provided that the overall amount of the shortfall identified is not exceeded. It is also necessary to ensure that such precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures comply with existing State aid rules and best practices, that they restore the institution or entity's long-term viability, that State aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that distortions of competition are avoided. For those reasons, the authorities concerned should in case of precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures take into account the specific guidance, including the AMC Blueprint 35 and the Communication on Tackling Non-Performing Loans 36 . Those precautionary measures in the form of impaired asset measures should always be subject to the overriding condition of temporariness. Public guarantees granted for a specified period in relation to the impaired assets of the institution or entity concerned are expected to ensure better compliance with the temporariness condition than transfers of such assets to a publicly supported entity. To ensure the market exit of institutions and entities that prove not to be viable, despite the support received, it is necessary to lay down that non-compliance by the institution or entity concerned with the terms of the support measures specified at the time such measures were granted is to result in the institution or entity concerned being considered failing or likely to fail.
(21)To cover material infringements of prudential requirements, it is necessary to further specify the conditions for determining that holding companies are failing or likely to fail. An infringement of those requirements by a holding company should be material where the type and extent of such infringement is comparable with an infringement that, if committed by a credit institution, would have justified the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority in accordance with Article 18 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
(22)Member States may have, under their national laws, powers to suspend payment or delivery obligations that may include eligible deposits. Where the suspension of payment or delivery obligations is not directly related to the financial circumstances of the credit institution, deposits may not be unavailable for the purposes of Directive 2014/49/EU. As a consequence, depositors may not be able to access their deposits for an extended period. To maintain depositor trust and confidence in the banking sector and maintain financial stability, Member States should ensure that depositors have access to an appropriate daily amount from their deposits, to cover, in particular, the cost of living, should their deposits be made inaccessible due to a suspension of payments for reasons other than leading to depositor payout. Such a procedure should remain exceptional, and Member States should ensure that depositors have access to appropriate daily amounts.
(23)To increase legal certainty, and in view of the potential relevance of liabilities which may arise from future uncertain events, including the outcome of litigations pending at the time of resolution, it is necessary to lay down which treatment those liabilities should receive for the purposes of the application of the bail-in tool. The guiding principles in that respect should be those provided in the accounting rules, and particularly the accounting rules laid down in the International Accounting Standard 37 as adopted by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 37 . On that basis, resolution authorities should draw a distinction between provisions and contingent liabilities. Provisions are liabilities that relate to a probable outflow of funds and which can be reliably estimated. Contingent liabilities are not recognised as accounting liabilities as they relate to an obligation which cannot be considered probable at the time of the estimate or cannot be reliably estimated.
(24)Since provisions are accounting liabilities, it should be specified that such provisions are to be treated the same way as other liabilities. Such provisions should be bail-inable, unless they meet one of the specific criteria for being excluded from the scope of the bail-in tool. Given the potential relevance of those provisions in resolution and to ensure certainty in the application of the bail-in tool, it should be specified that provisions are part of the bail-inable liabilities and that, as a result, the bail-in tool applies to them. It should also be ensured that, after the application of the bail-in tool, those liabilities and any obligations or claims arising in relation to them are treated as discharged for all purposes. That is particularly relevant for liabilities and obligations arising from judicial claims against the institution under resolution.
(25)According to accounting principles, contingent liabilities cannot be recognised as liabilities and should therefore not be bail-inable. It is however necessary to ensure that a contingent liability that would arise from an event which is improbable or cannot be reliably estimated at the time of resolution does not impair the effectiveness of the resolution strategy and in particular of the bail-in tool. To achieve that objective, the valuer should, as part of the valuation for the purposes of resolution, assess contingent liabilities that are included in the balance sheet of the institution under resolution and quantify the potential value of those liabilities to the valuer’s best abilities. To ensure that, after the resolution process, the institution or entity can sustain sufficient market confidence for an appropriate amount of time, the valuer should take into account that potential value when establishing the amount by which bail-inable liabilities need to be written down or converted to restore the capital ratios of the institution under resolution. In particular, the resolution authority should apply its conversion powers to bail-inable liabilities to the extent necessary to ensure that the recapitalisation of the institution under resolution is sufficient to cover potential losses which may be caused by a liability that may arise because of an improbable event. When assessing the amount to be written down or converted, the resolution authority should carefully consider the impact of the potential loss on the institution under resolution based on a number of factors, including the likelihood of the event materialising, the time frame for its materialisation and the amount of the contingent liability.
(26)In certain circumstances, after the resolution financing arrangement has provided a contribution up to the maximum of 5 % of the institution or entity’s total liabilities including own funds, resolution authorities may use additional sources of funding to further support their resolution action. It should be specified more clearly in which circumstances the resolution financing arrangement may provide further support where all liabilities with a priority ranking lower than deposits that are not mandatorily or discretionarily excluded from bail-in have been written down or converted in full.
(27)Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council 38 , Regulation (EU) 2019/877 of the European Parliament and of the Council 39 and Directive (EU) 2019/879 of the European Parliament and of the Council 40 implemented in the Union the international ‘Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet’, published by the Financial Stability Board on 9 November 2015 (the ‘TLAC standard’), for global systemically important banks, referred to in Union law as global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs). Regulation (EU) 2019/877 and Directive (EU) 2019/879 also amended the MREL set out in Directive 2014/59/EU and in Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. It is necessary to align the provisions in Directive 2014/59/EU on the MREL with the implementation of the TLAC standard for G-SIIs with respect to certain liabilities that could be used to meet the part of the MREL that should be met with own funds and other subordinated liabilities. In particular, liabilities that rank pari passu with certain excluded liabilities should be included in the own funds and subordinated eligible instruments of resolution entities where the amount of those excluded liabilities on the balance sheet of the resolution entity does not exceed 5 % of the amount of the own funds and eligible liabilities of the resolution entity and no risks related to the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle arise from that inclusion.
(28)The rules for determining the MREL are mostly focused on setting the appropriate level of the MREL with the assumption of the bail-in tool as the preferred resolution strategy. However, Directive 2014/59/EU allows resolution authorities to use other resolution tools, namely those relying on the transfer of the business of the institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution. It should therefore be specified that, in case the resolution plan envisages the use of the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool and the resolution entity’s exit from the market, resolution authorities should determine the level of the MREL for the resolution entity concerned on the basis of the specificities of those resolution tools and of the different loss-absorbing and recapitalisation needs those tools entail.
(29)The level of the MREL for resolution entities is the sum of the amount of the losses expected in resolution and the recapitalisation amount that enable the resolution entity to continue to comply with its conditions for authorisation and enabling it to pursue its activities for the appropriate period. Certain preferred resolution strategies entail the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities to a recipient and market exit, in particular the sale of business tool. In those cases, the objectives pursued by the recapitalisation component might not apply to the same extent, because the resolution authority will not be required to ensure that the resolution entity restores compliance with its own funds requirements after resolution action. Nevertheless, the losses in such cases are expected to exceed the resolution entity’s own funds requirements. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that the level of the MREL of those resolution entities continues to include a recapitalisation amount that is adjusted in a way that is proportionate to the resolution strategy.
(30)Where the resolution strategy envisages the use of resolution tools other than bail-in, the recapitalisation needs of the entity concerned will generally be smaller after resolution than in case of open bank bail-in. The calibration of the MREL in such a case should take that aspect into account when estimating the recapitalisation requirement. Therefore, when adjusting the level of the MREL for resolution entities the resolution plan of which envisages the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, resolution authorities should take into account the features of those tools, including the expected perimeter of the transfer to the private purchaser or to the bridge institution, the types of instruments to be transferred, the expected value and marketability of those instruments and the design of the preferred resolution strategy, including the complementary use of the asset separation tool. Since the resolution authority has to decide on a case by case basis on any possible use in resolution of funds from DGS and since such decision cannot be assumed with certainty ex ante, the resolution authorities should not consider the potential contribution of the DGS in resolution when calibrating the level of the MREL.
(31)It is necessary to ensure equal incentives to build sufficient amounts of MREL for institutions and entities that would be subject to transfer strategies both in and outside resolution. The setting of level of the MREL for institutions or entities that may be subject to of measures in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU should therefore follow the same rules as those applicable to the setting of the MREL for resolution entities whose preferred resolution strategy provides for the sale of business or transfer to a bridge institution leading to its exit from the market.
(32)There are interactions between the resolution framework and the market abuse framework. In particular, while actions taken in preparation for resolution are susceptible of qualifying as inside information under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 41 , their premature disclosure risks jeopardising the resolution process. Institutions under resolution are able to take steps to address that issue by requesting a delay in the disclosure of inside information under Article 17(5) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. However, the right incentives might not always be present at the time of preparing for resolution in order for the institution under resolution to take the initiative to make such a request. To avoid such situations, resolution authorities should have the power to directly request a delay in the disclosure of inside information pursuant to Article 17(5) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 on behalf of an institution under resolution.
(33)To facilitate resolution planning, the assessment of resolvability and the exercise of the power to address or remove impediments to resolvability as well as to foster information exchange, the resolution authority of an institution with significant branches in other Member States should establish and chair a resolution college.
(34)After the initial build-up period of the resolution financing arrangements referred to in Article 102(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, their respective available financial means may face slight decreases below their target level, in particular resulting from an increase in covered deposits. The amount of the ex ante contributions likely to be called in those circumstances is thus likely to be small. It may therefore be possible that, in some years, the amount of such ex ante contributions is no longer commensurate to the cost of the collection of those contributions. Resolution authorities should therefore be able to defer the collection of the ex ante contributions for 1 or more years until the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the cost of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of resolution authorities to use resolution financing arrangements.
(35)Irrevocable payment commitments are one of the components of the available financial means of resolution financing arrangements. It is therefore necessary to specify the circumstances in which those payment commitments may be called and the applicable procedure when terminating the commitments in case an institution or entity ceases to be subject to the obligation to pay contributions to a resolution financing arrangement. In addition, to provide more transparency and certainty with respect to the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of ex ante contributions to be raised, resolution authorities should determine such share on an annual basis, subject to the applicable limits.
(36)The maximum annual amount of extraordinary ex post contributions to resolution financing arrangements that are allowed to be called, is currently limited to three times the amount of the ex ante contributions. After the initial build-up period referred to in Article 102(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU, such ex ante contributions will depend only, in circumstances other than the use of the resolution financing arrangements, on variations in the level of covered deposits and are therefore likely to become small. Basing the maximum amount of extraordinary ex post contributions on ex ante contributions could then have the effect of drastically limiting the possibility for resolution financing arrangements to raise ex post contributions, thereby reducing their capacity for action. To avoid such an outcome, a different limit should be laid down and the maximum amount of extraordinary ex post contributions allowed to be called should be set at three times one-eighth of the target level of the resolution financing arrangement concerned.
(37)Directive 2014/59/EU partially harmonised the ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings. Those rules provided for a three-tier ranking of deposits, whereby covered deposits had the highest priority ranking, followed by eligible deposits of natural persons and micro, smaller and medium-sized enterprises above the coverage level. The remaining deposits, i.e. deposits of large corporates exceeding the coverage level and deposits that are not eligible for repayment by the DGS, were required to have a lower priority ranking, but their position was not otherwise harmonised. Finally, the claims of DGSs benefitted from the same higher priority ranking as covered deposits. Nevertheless, this has not proved to be the optimal solution for depositor protection. Partial harmonisation created differences in the treatment of those remaining depositors across Member States, in particular as an increasing number of Member States have decided to also grant a legal preference to the remaining deposits. Those differences also created difficulties when determining the insolvency counterfactual for cross-border groups during the resolution valuations. Furthermore, the lack of general depositor preference along with the three-tiered ranking of depositors’ claims had the potential to create problems regarding compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, particularly when the deposits the priority of which had not been harmonised by Directive 2014/59/EU ranked at the same level as senior claims. Lastly, the high priority ranking given to the claims of DGSs had not made it possible for the available financing means of those schemes to be used in a more efficient and effective way in interventions other than the payout of covered deposits in insolvency, namely in the context of resolution, alternative measures in insolvency or preventive measures. The protection of covered deposits does not rely on the priority ranking of the claims of the DGS but is instead ensured through the mandatory exclusions from bail-in in resolution and the prompt repayment from the DGS in case of unavailability of deposits. Therefore, the ranking of deposits in the current hierarchy of claims should be amended.
(38)The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a general depositor preference with a single-tiered approach, whereby all deposits benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims, without any differentiation between different types of deposits. At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.
(39)A general depositor preference will contribute to reinforcing depositors’ confidence and to further prevent the risk of bank runs. Enhanced depositor protection is also aligned with the central role deposits play in the real economy, being the primary tool for savings and for payments, as well as in the banking activity, where the deposits represent an important source of funding and are a key driver of confidence in the banking system, which becomes of particular relevance in times of market stress. Moreover, a general depositor preference improves the resolvability of institutions and entities by increasing their ability to comply with the requirements to access the resolution financing arrangements and decreasing the amount of funding required from those arrangements, due to the lower risk of breaching the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle where bailing-in ordinary unsecured debt. In particular, the removal of deposits from the insolvency class of ordinary unsecured claims would increase the bail-inability of remaining ordinary unsecured claims by minimising the risk of breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. By reducing the likelihood of deposits being written down or converted to ensure access to the resolution financing arrangements, the general depositor preference would contribute to making the bail-in tool more effective and credible and would lead to an increase of the transparency and legal certainty of the resolution framework. The general depositor preference would also contribute to the credibility of transfer strategies in resolution, as it would facilitate the inclusion of the entire deposit contract in the perimeter of liabilities to be transferred to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, to the benefit of the customer relationship and the franchise value of the institution under resolution. Lastly, a full harmonisation of the insolvency ranking of depositors would be beneficial from the cross-border and level playing field perspective.
(40)A single-tiered approach for the priority ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings contributes to a more efficient and less costly protection of all deposits. For covered deposits, that approach facilitates the financing by the DGS of measures other than the payout of covered deposits, which can be more effective and less disruptive in protecting access to the deposited funds as they do not lead to an interruption of access to bank accounts and payment services. For the deposits that are not covered, that approach facilitates their protection where necessary for the protection of financial stability and depositor confidence. Finally, by introducing flexibility in the use of those potentially less costly mechanisms for depositor protection, that approach minimises the immediate disbursement needs of the DGSs, thereby ensuring a better preservation of their available financing means in case other crises occur and decreasing the burden on the banking sector, who are called to replenish those funds.
(41)The changes to the priority ranking of deposits, in particular the elimination of the higher ranking of covered deposits and the claims of the DGSs relative to all other deposits, would not negatively affect the protection afforded to covered deposits in the event of failure, as that protection would continue to be guaranteed through the mandatory exclusion of covered deposits from loss absorption in case of resolution and, ultimately, by the payout provided by the DGS in event of unavailability of deposits.
(42)Resolution financing arrangements can be used to support the application of the sale of business tool or of the bridge institution tool, whereby a set of assets, rights and liabilities of the institution under resolution are transferred to a recipient. In that case, the resolution financing arrangement may have a claim against the residual institution or entity in its subsequent winding up under normal insolvency proceedings. That may occur where the resolution financing arrangement is used in connection to losses that creditors would have otherwise borne, including under the form of guarantees to assets and liabilities or coverage of the difference between the transferred assets and liabilities. To ensure that the shareholders and creditors left behind in the residual institution or entity effectively absorb the losses of the institution under resolution and improve the possibility of repayments in insolvency to the resolution-specific safety net, those claims of the resolution financing arrangement against the residual institution or entity, and claims that arise from reasonable expenses properly incurred, should rank in insolvency above the claims of deposits and of the DGS. Since compensations paid to shareholders and creditors by resolution financing arrangements due to breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle aim to compensate for the results of resolution action, those compensations should not give rise to claims of those arrangements.
(43)To ensure sufficient flexibility and to facilitate DGS interventions in support of the use of the resolution tools, where they lead to the exit from the market of the institution under resolution and where necessary to prevent losses being borne by depositors, certain aspects of the use of DGS in resolution should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to specify that the DGS can be used to support transfer transactions that include deposits, including eligible deposits beyond the coverage level provided by the DGS, and also deposits excluded from repayment by a DGS, in certain cases and under clear conditions. The contribution of the DGS should be aimed at covering the shortfall in the value of the assets transferred to a buyer or bridge institution in comparison to the value of the transferred deposits. Where a contribution is required by the buyer as part of the transaction to ensure its capital neutrality and preserve compliance with the buyer’s capital requirements, the DGS should also be allowed to contribute to that effect. The support of the DGS to resolution action should take the form of cash or other forms, such as guarantees or loss sharing agreements that can minimise the impact of the support on the available financial means of the DGS while simultaneously allowing the contribution of the DGS to meet its purposes.
(44)The contribution of the DGS in resolution should be subject to certain limits. First, it should be ensured that any loss which the DGS may bear as a result of an intervention in resolution does not exceed the loss that the DGS would bear in insolvency if it paid out covered depositors and subrogated to their claims over the institution’s assets. That amount should be determined on the basis of the least cost test, in accordance with the criteria and methodology set out in Directive 2014/49/EU. Those criteria and methodology should also be used when determining the treatment that the DGS would have received had the institution entered normal insolvency proceedings when carrying out the ex-post valuation for the purposes of assessing compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle and determining any compensation owed to the DGS. Second, the amount of the DGS’s contribution aimed at covering the difference between the assets and liabilities to be transferred to a purchaser or to a bridge institution should not exceed the difference between the transferred assets and the transferred deposits and liabilities with the same or a higher priority ranking in insolvency than those deposits. That would ensure that the contribution of the DGS is only used for the purposes of avoiding the imposition of losses on depositors, where appropriate, and not for the protection of creditors that rank below deposits in insolvency. Nevertheless, the sum of the contribution of the DGS to cover the difference between assets and liabilities with the contribution of the DGS towards the own funds of the recipient entity should not exceed the cost of repaying covered depositors as calculated under the least cost test.
(45)It should be specified that the DGS may only contribute to a transfer of liabilities other than covered deposits in the context of a resolution if the resolution authority concludes that deposits others than covered deposits cannot be bailed-in, nor left in the residual institution under resolution which will be wound up. In particular, the resolution authority should be allowed to avoid allocating losses to those deposits where the exclusion is strictly necessary and proportionate to preserve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines or where necessary to avoid widespread contagion and financial instability, which could cause a serious disturbance to the economy of the Union or of a Member State. The same reasons should apply to the inclusion in the transfer to a buyer or to a bridge institution of bail-inable liabilities with a priority ranking lower than that of deposits. In that case, the transfer of those bail-inable liabilities should not be supported by the contribution of the DGS. If any financial support to the transfer of those bail-inable liabilities is required, that support should be provided by the resolution financing arrangement.
(46)Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write-down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts.
(47)In view of the role of EBA in furthering the convergence of authorities' practices, EBA should monitor and report on the design and implementation of the resolvability assessments of institutions and groups and on the actions and preparations of resolution authorities to ensure an effective implementation of the resolution tools and powers. In those reports, EBA should also assess the level of transparency of the measures taken by resolution authorities towards relevant external stakeholders and the extent of their contribution to resolution preparedness and institutions’ resolvability. EBA should furthermore report on the measures adopted by Member States for the protection of retail investors in what concern debt instruments that are eligible for the MREL pursuant to Directive 2014/59/EU, comparing and assessing any potential impact on cross-border operations. The scope of existing regulatory technical standards on the estimation of the additional own funds requirements and the combined buffer requirement for resolution entities should be expanded to include entities that have not been identified as resolution entities, where those requirements have not been set on the same basis as the MREL. In the annual report on MREL, EBA should also assess the policy implementation by resolution authorities of the new rules for the calibration of the MREL for transfer strategies. In the context of EBA’s tasks of contributing to ensure a coherent and coordinated crisis management and resolution regime in the Union, EBA should coordinate and oversee crisis simulation exercises. Those simulations should cover the coordination and cooperation between competent authorities, resolution authorities and DGSs during the deterioration of the financial situation of institutions and entities, testing the application of the toolbox in recovery and resolution planning, early intervention, and resolution in a holistic manner. Those exercises should consider in particular the cross-border dimension in the interaction between the relevant authorities and the application of the available tools and powers. Where relevant, the crisis simulation exercises should also capture the adoption and implementation of resolution schemes within the Banking Union, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 806/2014.
(48)High-quality impact assessment is crucial for the development of sound and evidence-based legislative proposals, while facts and evidence are key to inform the decisions taken during the legislative procedure. For that reason, resolution authorities, competent authorities, the Single Resolution Board, the ECB and other members of the European System of Central Banks and EBA, should provide the Commission, at its request, with all the information it needs for its policy development related tasks, including the preparation of impact assessments and the preparation and negotiation of legislative proposals.
(49)Directive 2014/59/EU should therefore be amended accordingly.
(50)Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery and resolution framework for institutions and entities, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States due to the risks that diverging national approaches might entail for the integrity of the single market but can rather, by amending rules that are already set at Union level, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.