Considerations on COM(2018)447 - Space programme of the Union and the EU Agency for the Space Programme

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dossier COM(2018)447 - Space programme of the Union and the EU Agency for the Space Programme.
document COM(2018)447 EN
date April 28, 2021
 
table>(1)Space technology, data and services have become indispensable in the daily lives of Europeans and play an essential role in preserving many strategic interests. The Union’s space industry is already one of the most competitive in the world. However, the emergence of new players and the development of new technologies are revolutionising traditional industrial models. Therefore, for the Union to remain a leading international player with extensive freedom of action in the space domain, it is crucial that it encourages scientific and technical progress and supports the competitiveness and innovation capacity of space sector industries within the Union, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), start-ups and innovative businesses.
(2)The possibilities that space offers for the security of the Union and its Member States should be exploited, as referred to in particular in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016, while retaining the civil nature of the Union Space Programme (‘the Programme’) and respecting the possible neutrality or non-alignment provisions stipulated in the constitutional law of Member States. Historically, the space sector’s development has been linked to security. In many cases, the equipment, components and instruments used in the space sector, as well as space data and services, are dual-use. However, the Union’s security and defence policy is determined within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in accordance with Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

(3)The Union has been developing its own space initiatives and programmes since the end of the 1990s, namely the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) and then Galileo and Copernicus, which respond to the needs of Union citizens and the requirements of public policies. The continuity of those initiatives and programmes should be ensured and the services they provide should be improved, so that they meet the new needs of users, remain at the forefront in view of new technology development and the transformations in the digital and information and communications technology domains, and are able to meet political priorities such as climate change, including monitoring changes in the polar region, transport, security and defence.

(4)It is necessary to exploit synergies between the transport, space and digital sectors in order to foster the broader use of new technologies, such as e-call, digital tachograph, traffic supervision and management, autonomous driving and unmanned vehicles and drones, and to respond to the need of secure and seamless connectivity, robust positioning, inter modality and interoperability. Such exploitation of synergies would enhance the competitiveness of transport services and industry.

(5)To reap the maximum benefits of the Programme, in all Member States and by all their citizens, it is also essential to promote the use and the uptake of the data, information and services provided, as well as to support the development of downstream applications based on those data, information and services. To that end, the Member States, the Commission and the entities responsible could, in particular, periodically run information campaigns regarding the benefits of the Programme.

(6)To achieve the objectives of freedom of action, independence and security, it is essential that the Union benefits from an autonomous access to space and is able to use it safely. It is therefore essential that the Union supports autonomous, reliable and cost-effective access to space, especially as regards critical infrastructure and technology, public security and the security of the Union and its Member States. The Commission should therefore have the possibility to aggregate launch services at European level, both for its own needs and, at their request, for those of other entities, including Member States, in accordance with Article 189(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). To remain competitive in a rapidly evolving market, it is also crucial that the Union continues to have access to modern, efficient and flexible launch infrastructure facilities and benefits from appropriate launch systems. Therefore, without prejudice to measures taken by Member States or the European Space Agency (ESA), it should be possible for the Programme to support adaptations to the space ground infrastructure, including new developments, which are necessary for the implementation of the Programme and adaptations, including technology development, to space launch systems which are necessary for launching satellites, including alternative technologies and innovative systems, for the implementation of the Programme’s components. Those activities should be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) (the ‘Financial Regulation’), and with a view to achieving better cost-efficiency for the Programme. Since there will be no dedicated budget, the actions in support of access to space should be without prejudice to the implementation of the Programme’s components.

(7)To strengthen the competitiveness of the Union space industry and increase capacity in designing, building and operating its own systems, the Union should support the creation, growth, and development of the entire space industry. The emergence of a business- and innovation-friendly model should be supported at European, regional and national levels by initiatives such as space hubs that bring together the space, digital and other sectors, as well as users. Those space hubs should aim to foster entrepreneurship and skills while pursuing synergies with the digital innovation hubs. The Union should foster the creation and expansion of Union-based space companies to help them succeed, including by supporting them in accessing risk finance in view of the lack of appropriate access within the Union to private equity for space start-ups and by fostering demand, known as the first contract approach.

(8)The space value chain is generally segmented between upstream activities and downstream activities. Upstream activities comprise those leading to an operational space system, including development, manufacturing and launch activities and the operations of such a system. Downstream activities comprise those covering the provision of space-related services, and products to users. Digital platforms are also an important element supporting the development of the space sector. They allow access to data and products as well as toolboxes, storage and computing facilities.

(9)In the area of space, the Union exercises its competences in accordance with Article 4(3) TFEU. The Commission should ensure the coherence of activities performed in the context of the Programme.

(10)Whilst a number of Member States have a tradition of active space-related industries, the need to develop and mature space industries in Member States with emerging capabilities and the need to respond to the challenges faced by the traditional space industries posed by New Space should be recognised. Actions to develop space industry capacity across the Union and facilitate collaboration across space industry active in all Member States should be promoted.

(11)Actions under the Programme should build on and benefit from national and European capacities, which exist at the time the action is being carried out.

(12)Owing to the Programme’s coverage and its potential to help resolve global challenges, space activities have a strong international dimension. In close coordination with the Member States, and with their agreement, the relevant bodies of the Programme might participate in matters pertaining to the Programme, in international cooperation and to collaborate in relevant sectoral bodies of the United Nations (UN). For matters relating to the Programme, the Commission might coordinate, on behalf of the Union and in its field of competence, the activities on the international scene, in particular to defend the interests of the Union and its Member States in international fora, including in the area of frequencies as regards the Programme, without prejudice to Member States’ competence in that area. It is particularly important for the Union, represented by the Commission, to collaborate in the bodies of the International Cospas-Sarsat Programme.

(13)International cooperation is paramount in promoting the role of the Union as a global actor in the space sector and the Union’s technology and industry, fostering fair competition at international level, bearing in mind the need to ensure the reciprocity of the rights and obligations of the parties, and to encourage cooperation in the field of training. International cooperation is a key element of the Space Strategy for Europe, as set out by the Commission in its Communication of 26 October 2016. The Commission should use the Programme to contribute to and benefit from international efforts through initiatives, to promote European technology and industry internationally, for example bi-lateral dialogues, industry workshops and support for SME internationalisation, and to facilitate access to international markets and foster fair competition, also leveraging economic diplomacy initiatives. European space diplomacy initiatives should be in full coherence and complementarity with the existing Union policies, priorities and instruments, while the Union has a key role to play, together with Member States, in remaining at the forefront of the international scene.

(14)Without prejudice to the competence of Member States, the Commission should promote, alongside the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) and in close coordination with Member States, responsible behaviour in space when implementing the Programme including reducing space debris proliferation. The Commission should also explore the possibility of the Union’s acceptance of the rights and obligations provided for in the relevant UN Treaties and Conventions and make, if necessary, appropriate proposals.

(15)The Programme shares similar objectives with other Union programmes, particularly Horizon Europe established by Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), the InvestEU Programme established by Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), the European Defence Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and Funds under a Regulation laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (the ‘Common Provisions Regulation’). Therefore, cumulative funding from those programmes should be provided for, provided that they do not cover the same cost items, in particular through arrangements for complementary funding from Union programmes where management modalities permit - either in sequence, in an alternating way, or through the combination of funds including for the joint funding of actions, allowing, where possible, innovation partnerships and blending operations. During the implementation of the Programme, the Commission should therefore promote synergies with other related Union programmes and financial instruments, which would allow, where possible, use of access to risk finance, innovation partnerships, and cumulative or blended funding. The Commission should also ensure synergies and coherence between the solutions developed under those programmes, particularly Horizon Europe, and the solutions developed under the Programme.

(16)In accordance with Article 191(3) of the Financial Regulation, in no circumstances are the same costs to be financed twice by the Union budget.

(17)The policy objectives of the Programme would also be addressed as eligible areas for financing and investment operations through financial instruments and budgetary guarantee of the InvestEU Programme, in particular under its sustainable infrastructure and research, innovation and digitisation policy windows. Financial support should be used to address market failures or sub-optimal investment situations in a proportionate manner, and actions should not duplicate or crowd out private financing or distort competition in the internal market. Actions should have a clear European added value.

(18)Coherence and synergies between Horizon Europe and the Programme should foster a competitive and innovative European space sector, reinforce Europe’s autonomy in accessing and using space in a secure and safe environment and strengthen Europe’s role as a global actor. Breakthrough solutions in Horizon Europe would be supported by data and services made available by the Programme to the research and innovation community.

(19)To maximise the socio-economic return from the Programme, it is essential to maintain state-of-the-art systems, to upgrade them to meet evolving users’ needs and that new developments occur in the space-enabled downstream applications sector. The Union should support activities relating to research and technology development, or the early phases of evolution relating to the infrastructures established under the Programme, as well as the research and development activities relating to applications and services based on the systems established under the programme, thereby stimulating upstream and downstream economic activities. The appropriate instrument at Union level to finance those research and innovation activities is Horizon Europe. However, a very specific part of development activities should be financed from the budget allocated to the Galileo and EGNOS components under this Regulation, in particular where such activities concern fundamental elements such as Galileo-enabled chipsets and receivers, which would facilitate the development of applications across different sectors of the economy. Such financing should nevertheless not jeopardise the deployment or exploitation of the infrastructures established under the Programme.

(20)To ensure the competitiveness of the European space industry in the future, the Programme should support the development of advanced skills in space-related fields and support education and training activities, promoting equal opportunities, including gender equality, in order to realise the full potential of Union citizens in that area.

(21)Infrastructure dedicated to the Programme could require additional research and innovation, which could be supported under Horizon Europe, aiming for coherence with activities in this domain by ESA. Synergies with Horizon Europe should ensure that the research and innovation needs of the space sector are identified and established as part of the strategic research and innovation planning process. Space data and services made freely available by the Programme would be used to develop breakthrough solutions through research and innovation, including in Horizon Europe, in support of the Union’s policy priorities. The strategic planning process under Horizon Europe would identify research and innovation activities that should make use of Union-owned infrastructure such as Galileo, EGNOS and Copernicus. Research infrastructures, in particular in-situ observing networks would constitute essential elements of the in-situ observation infrastructure enabling the Copernicus Services.

(22)It is important that the Union own all tangible and intangible assets created or developed through public procurement that it finances as part of the Programme. In order to ensure full compliance with any fundamental rights relating to ownership, the necessary arrangements should be made with any existing owners. Such ownership by the Union should be without prejudice to the possibility for the Union, in accordance with this Regulation and where it is deemed appropriate on the basis of a case-by-case assessment, to make those assets available to third parties or to dispose of them.

(23)To encourage the widest possible use of the services offered by the Programme, it would be useful to stress that data, information and services are provided without warranty, without prejudice to obligations imposed by legally binding provisions.

(24)The Commission, in performing certain of its tasks of a non-regulatory nature, should be able to have recourse, as required and insofar as necessary, to the technical assistance of certain external parties. Other entities involved in the public governance of the Programme should also be able to make use of the same technical assistance in performing tasks entrusted to them under this Regulation.

(25)This Regulation lays down a financial envelope for the entire duration of the Programme, which is to constitute the prime reference amount, within the meaning of point 18 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (6), for the European Parliament and the Council during the annual budgetary procedure.

(26)Reflecting the importance of tackling climate change in accordance with the Union’s commitments to implement the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (7), and the commitment to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the actions under this Regulation should contribute to mainstream climate actions and to the achievement of an overall target of at least 30 % of the Union budget expenditure supporting climate objectives. Relevant actions should be identified during the Programme’s preparation and implementation, and reassessed in the context of the relevant evaluations and review processes. The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission will cooperate on an effective, transparent and comprehensive methodology, to be set out by the Commission, in order to assess the spending under all multiannual financial framework programmes to biodiversity objectives, while considering the existing overlaps between climate and biodiversity objectives.

(27)Revenue generated by the Programme’s components should accrue to the Union in order to partially offset the investments that it has already made, and that revenue should be used to support the achievement of the objectives of the Programme. For the same reason, it should be possible to provide for a revenue-sharing mechanism in contracts concluded with private sector entities.

(28)The Financial Regulation applies to the Programme. The Financial Regulation lays down rules on the implementation of the Union budget, including the rules on grants, prizes, procurement, indirect management, financial instruments, budgetary guarantees, financial assistance and the reimbursement of external experts.

(29)As the Programme is, in principle, financed by the Union, procurement contracts concluded under the Programme for activities financed by the Programme should comply with Union rules. In that context, the Union should also be responsible for defining the objectives to be pursued as regards public procurement. The Financial Regulation provides that, on the basis of the results of an ex ante assessment, the Commission is to be able to rely on the systems and the procedures of the persons or entities implementing Union funds. Specific adjustments necessary to those systems and procedures, as well as the arrangements for the prolongation of the existing contracts, should be defined in the corresponding financial framework partnership agreement (FFPA) or contribution agreement.

(30)The Programme relies on complex and constantly changing technologies. The reliance on such technologies results in uncertainty and risk for public contracts concluded under the Programme, insofar as those contracts involve long-term commitments to equipment or services. Specific measures concerning public contracts are therefore required in addition to the rules laid down in the Financial Regulation. It should thus be possible to award a contract in the form of a conditional stage-payment contract, introduce an amendment, under certain conditions, in the context of its performance, or impose a minimum level of subcontracting, particularly in order to enable SMEs and start-ups to participate. Finally, given the technological uncertainties that characterise the Programme’s components, contract prices cannot always be forecast accurately and it should therefore be possible to conclude contracts without stipulating a firm fixed price and to include clauses to safeguard the financial interests of the Union.

(31)To foster public demand and public sector innovation, the Programme should promote the use of its data, information and services to support the development of customised solutions by industry and SMEs at regional and local levels through space-related innovation partnerships, as referred to in point 7 of Annex I to the Financial Regulation, allowing all stages, from development up to deployment and procurement of customised interoperable space solutions for public services, to be covered.

(32)In order to meet the objectives of the Programme, it is important to be able to call, where appropriate, on capacities offered by Union public and private entities active in the space domain and also to be able to work at international level with third countries or international organisations. For that reason, provision should be made for the possibility of using all the relevant tools and management methods provided for by the TFEU and the Financial Regulation and joint procurement procedures.

(33)On grants more specifically, experience has shown that user and market uptake and general outreach work better in a decentralised manner than top-down by the Commission. Vouchers, which are a form of financial support from a grant beneficiary to third parties, have been among the actions with the highest success rate to new entrants and SMEs. However, they have been hindered by the ceiling on financial support imposed by the Financial Regulation. That ceiling should therefore be raised for the Programme in order to keep pace with the growing potential of market applications in the space sector.

(34)The forms of funding and the methods of implementation under this Regulation should be chosen on the basis of their ability to achieve the specific objectives of the actions and to deliver results, taking into account, in particular, the costs of controls, the administrative burden, and the expected risk of non-compliance. This should include consideration of the use of lump sums, flat rates and unit costs, as well as financing not linked to costs as referred to in Article 125(1) of the Financial Regulation.

(35)Pursuant to Council Decision 2013/755/EU (8), persons and entities established in overseas countries or territories are eligible for funding subject to the rules and objectives of the Programme and possible arrangements applicable to the Member State to which the relevant overseas country or territory is linked.

(36)Horizontal financial rules adopted by the European Parliament and by the Council on the basis of Article 322 TFEU apply to this Regulation. Those rules are laid down in the Financial Regulation and determine in particular the procedure for establishing and implementing the budget through grants, procurement, prizes and indirect implementation, and provide for checks on the responsibility of financial actors. Rules adopted on the basis of Article 322 TFEU also include a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget.

(37)In accordance with the Financial Regulation, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9) and Council Regulations (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 (10), (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (11) and (EU) 2017/1939 (12), the financial interests of the Union are to be protected by means of proportionate measures, including measures relating to the prevention, detection, correction and investigation of irregularities including fraud, to the recovery of funds lost, wrongly paid or incorrectly used, and, where appropriate, to the imposition of administrative penalties. In particular, in accordance with Regulations (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 and (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has the power to carry out administrative investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is empowered, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, to investigate and prosecute criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union as provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13).In accordance with the Financial Regulation, any person or entity receiving Union funds is to fully cooperate in the protection of the financial interests of the Union, grant the necessary rights and access to the Commission, OLAF, the Court of Auditors and, in respect of those Member States participating in enhanced cooperation pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the EPPO, and ensure that any third parties involved in the implementation of Union funds grant equivalent rights.

(38)Members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which are members of the European Economic Area (EEA), acceding countries, candidate countries and potential candidates as well as the European Neighbourhood Policy countries may participate in the Programme, with the exception of Galileo, EGNOS, GOVSATCOM and the SST sub-component, in accordance with their respective agreements. Other third countries may also participate in the Programme, with the exception of Galileo, EGNOS, GOVSATCOM and the SST sub-component, on the basis of an agreement to be concluded in accordance with Article 218 TFEU. Galileo and EGNOS should be open to the participation of the members of EFTA which are members of the EEA, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Agreement on the European Economic Area (14). Other third countries may participate in Galileo and EGNOS on the basis of an agreement to be concluded in accordance with Article 218 TFEU. GOVSATCOM should be open to any third country only on the basis of an agreement to be concluded in accordance with Article 218 TFEU.

(39)A specific provision should be introduced in this Regulation requiring third countries to grant the necessary rights and access required for the authorising officer responsible, OLAF and the Court of Auditors to comprehensively exercise their respective competences.

(40)International organisations which do not have their headquarters in the Union and which wish to access the SST services which are not publicly available should be required to conclude an agreement in accordance with Article 218 TFEU. International organisations which have their headquarters in the Union and are public spacecraft owners and operators should be considered SST core users.

(41)Publicly available information for SST services should be understood to mean any information that a user has a reasonable basis for finding lawfully accessible. Collision avoidance, re-entry and fragmentation SST services are based on external publicly accessible SST information which is available after a request for access. Consequently, collision avoidance, re-entry and fragmentation SST services should be understood as being publicly available services and should not require conclusion of an agreement in accordance with Article 218 TFEU. Access to them should be available at the request of the potential user.

(42)Sound public governance of the Programme requires the clear distribution of responsibilities and tasks among the different entities involved to avoid unnecessary overlap and reduce cost overruns and delays. All the actors of the governance should support, in their field of competence and in accordance with their responsibilities, the achievement of the objectives of the Programme.

(43)Member States have long been active in the field of space. They have systems, infrastructure, national agencies and bodies linked to space. They can therefore make a major contribution to the Programme, especially its implementation. They might cooperate with the Union to promote the Programme’s services and applications. The Commission might be able to mobilise the means at Member States’ disposal, benefit from their assistance and, subject to mutually agreed conditions, entrust the Member States with non-regulatory tasks in the implementation of the Programme. Moreover, the Member States concerned should take all necessary measures to ensure the protection of the ground stations established on their territories. In addition, Member States and the Commission should work together and with appropriate international bodies and regulatory authorities to ensure that the frequencies necessary for the Programme are available and protected at the adequate level to allow for the full development and implementation of applications based on the services offered, in compliance with Decision No 243/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (15).

(44)As promoter of the Union’s general interest, it is the Commission’s responsibility to implement the Programme, assume overall responsibility and promote its use. In order to optimise the resources and competences of the various stakeholders, the Commission should be able to entrust certain tasks to other entities under justifiable circumstances. Having the overall responsibility for the Programme, the Commission should determine the main technical and operational requirements necessary to implement systems and services evolution. It should do so after having consulted Member States’ experts, users and other relevant stakeholders. Finally, noting that in the area of space, in accordance with Article 4(3) TFEU, the exercise of competence by the Union does not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs, the Commission should ensure the coherence of activities performed in the context of the Programme.

(45)The mission of the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (‘the Agency’), which replaces and succeeds the European GNSS Agency established by Regulation (EU) No 912/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (16), is to contribute to the Programme, particularly as regards security accreditation as well as market and downstream applications development. Certain tasks linked to those areas should therefore be assigned to the Agency. In relation to security in particular, and given its experience in this area, the Agency should be responsible for the security accreditation tasks for all the Union actions in the space sector. Building on its positive track-record in promoting the user and market uptake of Galileo and EGNOS, the Agency should also be entrusted with user-uptake activities relating to the Programme’s components other than Galileo and EGNOS, as well as downstream application development activities for all the Programme’s components. This would allow the Agency to benefit from economies of scale and provide an opportunity for the development of applications based on several Programme’s components (integrated applications). However, those activities should not prejudice the service and the user-uptake activities entrusted by the Commission to Copernicus entrusted entities. The entrustment of downstream applications development to the Agency should not prevent other entrusted entities from developing downstream applications. Furthermore, the Agency should perform the tasks which the Commission confers on it by means of one or more contribution agreements under an FFPA covering other specific tasks associated with the Programme. When entrusting tasks to the Agency, adequate human, administrative and financial resources should be made available.

(46)In certain duly justified circumstances, the Agency should be able to entrust specific tasks to Member States or groups of Member States. That entrustment should be limited to activities the Agency does not have the capacity to execute itself and should not prejudice the governance of the Programme and the allocation of tasks as defined in this Regulation.

(47)Galileo and EGNOS are complex systems that require intensive coordination. Since they are the Programme’s components, that coordination should be performed by a Union institution or body. Building on the expertise developed in the past years, the Agency is the most appropriate body to coordinate all the operational tasks relating to the exploitation of those systems, except for the international cooperation. The Agency should therefore be entrusted with the management of the exploitation of EGNOS and Galileo. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Agency should perform alone all the tasks relating to the exploitation of those systems. It could rely on the expertise of other entities, in particular ESA. This should include the activities on systems evolution, design and development of parts of the ground segment and satellites which should be entrusted to ESA. The allocation of tasks to other entities builds on the competences of such entities and should avoid duplication of work.

(48)ESA is an international organisation with extensive expertise in the space domain and which concluded a Framework Agreement with the European Community in 2004 (‘2004 Framework Agreement’) (17). It is therefore an important partner in the implementation of the Programme, with which appropriate relations should be established. In that regard, and in compliance with the Financial Regulation, the Commission should conclude a FFPA with ESA and the Agency that governs all financial relations between the Commission, the Agency and ESA, ensures their consistency and conforms to the 2004 Framework Agreement, in particular with Articles 2 and 5 thereof. However, as ESA is not a Union body and is not subject to Union law, it is essential that such an agreement provides that ESA takes appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the interests of the Union and its Member States and, as regards budget implementation, that tasks entrusted to it comply with the decisions taken by the Commission. The agreement should also contain all the clauses necessary to safeguard the Union’s financial interests.

(49)The functioning of the European Union Satellite Centre (SATCEN) as a European autonomous capability providing access to information and services resulting from exploitation of relevant space assets and collateral data was already acknowledged in the implementation of Decision No 541/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (18).

(50)To structurally embed the user representation in the governance of GOVSATCOM and to aggregate user needs and requirements across national and civil-military boundaries, the relevant Union entities with close user-ties, such as the European Defence Agency, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the European Maritime Safety Agency, the European Fisheries Control Agency, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability/Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre may have coordinating roles for specific user groups. At an aggregated level the Agency should coordinate user-related aspects for the civilian user communities and may monitor operational use, demand, conformity with requirements and evolving needs and requirements.

(51)Owing to the importance of space-related activities for the Union economy and the lives of Union citizens, the dual-use nature of the systems and of the applications based on those systems, achieving and maintaining a high degree of security should be a key priority for the Programme, particularly in order to safeguard the interests of the Union and of its Member States, including in relation to classified and other sensitive non-classified information.

(52)Without prejudice to Member States’ prerogatives in the area of national security, the Commission and the High Representative, each within their respective area of competence, should ensure the security of the Programme in accordance with this Regulation and, where relevant, Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/698 (19).

(53)Given the specific expertise of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its regular contact with authorities of third countries and international organisations, the EEAS may assist the Commission in performing certain of its tasks relating to the security of the Programme in the field of external relations, in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU (20).

(54)Without prejudice to the sole responsibility of the Member States in the area of national security, as provided for in Article 4(2) TEU, and to the right of the Member States to protect their essential security interests in accordance with Article 346 TFEU, a specific governance of security should be established to ensure a smooth implementation of the Programme. That governance should be based on three key principles. Firstly, it is imperative that Member States’ extensive, unique experience in security matters be taken into consideration to the greatest possible extent. Secondly, in order to prevent conflicts of interest and any shortcomings in applying security rules, operational functions should be segregated from security accreditation functions. Thirdly, the entity in charge of managing all or part of the Programme’s components is also the best placed to manage the security of the tasks entrusted to it. The security of the Programme would build upon the experience gained in the implementation of Galileo, EGNOS and Copernicus over the past years. Sound security governance also requires that roles be appropriately distributed among the various players. As it is responsible for the Programme, the Commission, without prejudice to Member States prerogatives in the area of national security, should determine the general security requirements applicable to each of the Programme’s components.

(55)The cybersecurity of European space infrastructures, both ground and space, is key to ensuring the continuity of the operations of the systems and service continuity. The need to protect the systems and their services against cyber-attacks, including by making use of new technologies, should therefore be duly taken into account when establishing security requirements.

(56)A security monitoring structure should be identified by the Commission when appropriate after the risk and threat analysis. That security monitoring structure should be the entity responding to instructions developed under the scope of Decision (CFSP) 2021/698. For Galileo, that body should be the Galileo Security Monitoring Centre. With regard to the implementation of Decision (CFSP) 2021/698, the role of the Security Accreditation Board should be limited to providing the Council or the High Representative with inputs linked to the security accreditation of the system.

(57)In view of the uniqueness and complexity of the Programme and its link to security, recognised and well-established principles should be followed for security accreditation. It is thus indispensable that security accreditation activities be carried out on the basis of collective responsibility for the security of the Union and its Member States, by endeavouring to build consensus and involving all those concerned with the issue of security, and that a procedure for permanent risk monitoring be put in place. It is also imperative that technical security accreditation activities be entrusted to professionals who are duly qualified in the field of accrediting complex systems and who have an adequate level of security clearance.

(58)EU classified information (EUCI) is to be handled in accordance with the security rules as set out in Council Decision 2013/488/EU (21) and Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 (22). In accordance with Decision 2013/488/EU, the Member States are to respect the principles and minimum standards laid down therein, in order to ensure that an equivalent level of protection is afforded to EUCI.

(59)To ensure the secure exchange of information, appropriate agreements should be established to ensure the protection of EUCI provided to third countries and international organisations in the context of the Programme.

(60)An important objective of the Programme is to ensure its security and to strengthen strategic autonomy across key technologies and value chains, while preserving an open economy including free and fair trade, and taking advantage of the possibilities that space offers for the security of the Union and its Member States. In specific cases, that objective requires the requisite conditions for eligibility and participation to be set, to ensure the protection of the integrity, security and resilience of the operational systems of the Union. That should not undermine the need for competitiveness and cost-effectiveness. In the evaluation of legal entities subject to control by a third country or third country entity, the Commission should take into account the principles and criteria provided for in Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council (23).

(61)In the context of the Programme, there is some information which, although not classified, is to be handled in accordance with Union legal acts already in force or with national laws, rules and regulations, including through distribution limitations.

(62)A growing number of key economic sectors, in particular transport, telecommunications, agriculture and energy, increasingly use satellite navigation and Earth observation systems. The Programme should exploit the synergies between those sectors, taking into consideration the benefits that space technologies bring to those sectors, support the development of compatible equipment and promote the development of relevant standards and certifications. Synergies between space activities and activities linked to the security and defence of the Union and its Member States are also increasing. Having full control of satellite navigation should therefore guarantee the Union’s technological independence, including in the longer term for the components of infrastructure equipment, and ensure its strategic autonomy.

(63)The aim of Galileo is to establish and operate the first global satellite navigation and positioning infrastructure specifically designed for civilian purposes, which can be used by a variety of public and private actors in Europe and worldwide. Galileo functions independently of other existing or potential systems, thus contributing amongst other things to the strategic autonomy of the Union. The second generation of Galileo should be progressively rolled out before 2030, initially with reduced operational capacity.

(64)The aim of EGNOS is to improve the quality of open signals from existing global navigation satellite systems, in particular those emitted by Galileo. The services provided by EGNOS should cover, as a priority, the Member States’ territories geographically located in Europe, including for that purpose Cyprus, the Azores, the Canary Islands and Madeira, by the end of 2026. In the aviation domain, all those territories should benefit from EGNOS for air navigation services for all the performance levels supported by EGNOS. Subject to technical feasibility and, for the safety of life, on the basis of international agreements, the geographical coverage of the services provided by EGNOS could be extended to other regions of the world. Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council (24) and the necessary monitoring of Galileo service quality for aviation purposes, it should be noted that while the signals emitted by Galileo may effectively be used to facilitate the positioning of aircraft, in all phases of flight, through the necessary augmentation system, including regional, local and on-board avionics, only regional or local augmentation systems such as EGNOS in Europe may constitute air-traffic management (ATM) services and air navigation services (ANS). The EGNOS safety-of-life service should be provided in compliance with applicable standards of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (‘ICAO standards’).

(65)It is imperative to ensure the sustainability of the Galileo and EGNOS and the continuity, availability, accuracy, reliability and security of their services. In a changing environment and rapidly developing market, their development should also continue and new generations of those systems, including associated space and ground segment evolution, should be prepared.

(66)The term ‘commercial service’ used in Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (25) is no longer suitable in the light of the evolution of that service. Instead, two separate services have been identified in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/224 (26), namely the high-accuracy service and the authentication service.

(67)In order to optimise the use of the services provided, the services provided by Galileo and EGNOS should be compatible and interoperable with one another, including at user level, and, insofar as possible, with other satellite navigation systems and with conventional means of radio navigation where such compatibility and interoperability is laid down in an international agreement, without prejudice to the objective of strategic autonomy of the Union.

(68)Considering the importance for Galileo and EGNOS of their ground-based infrastructure and the impact thereof on their security, the determination of the location of the infrastructure should be made by the Commission. The deployment of the ground-based infrastructure of the systems should continue to follow an open and transparent process, which could involve the Agency where appropriate based on its field of competence.

(69)To maximise the socio-economic benefits of Galileo and EGNOS, while contributing to Union’s strategic autonomy, particularly in sensitive sectors and in the area of safety and security, the use of the services provided by EGNOS and Galileo in other Union policies should be promoted also by regulatory means where that is justified and beneficial. Measures to encourage the use of those services in all Member States are also an important part of the process.

(70)The Programme’s components should stimulate the application of digital technology in space systems, data and service distribution, downstream development. In that context the particular attention should be given to the initiatives and actions proposed by the Commission in its Communications of 14 September 2016 entitled ‘Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit Society’ and Communication of 14 September 2016 entitled ‘5G for Europe: An Action Plan’.

(71)Copernicus should ensure an autonomous access to environmental knowledge and key technologies for Earth observation and geo-information services, thereby supporting the Union to achieve independent decision-making and actions in the fields of, inter alia, the environment, climate change, marine, maritime, agriculture and rural development, preservation of cultural heritage, civil protection, land and infrastructure monitoring, security, as well as the digital economy.

(72)Copernicus should build on, ensure continuity with and enhance the activities and achievements under Regulation (EU) No 377/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (27) establishing the Union Earth observation and monitoring programme (Copernicus) as well as Regulation (EU) No 911/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (28) establishing the predecessor Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programme and the rules for implementation of its initial operations, taking into account recent trends in research, technological advances and innovations impacting the Earth observation domain, as well as developments in big data analytics and artificial intelligence and related strategies and initiatives at Union level as outlined by the Commission in its White Paper On Artificial Intelligence of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘A European approach to excellence and trust’ and its Communication of 19 February 2020 entitled ‘A European strategy for data’. For the development of new assets, the Commission should work closely with Member States, ESA, the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) and, where appropriate, other entities owning relevant space and in-situ assets. To the greatest extent possible, Copernicus should make use of capacities for space-based Earth observations of the Member States, ESA, EUMETSAT, as well as other entities, including commercial initiatives in the Union, thereby also contributing to the development of a viable commercial space sector in Europe. Where feasible and appropriate, Copernicus should also make use of the available in-situ and ancillary data provided mainly by the Member States in accordance with Directive 2007/2/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (29). The Commission should work together with the Member States and the European Environment Agency to ensure an efficient access and use of the in-situ data sets for Copernicus.

(73)Copernicus should be implemented in accordance with the objectives of Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (30), in particular transparency, the creation of conditions conducive to the development of services, and contributing to economic growth and job creation in the Union. Copernicus data and Copernicus information should be available freely and openly.

(74)The full potential of Copernicus for the Union’s society and economy should be fully unleashed beyond direct beneficiaries by means of an intensification of user uptake measures, which requires further action to render the data usable by non-specialists and thereby stimulate growth, job creation and knowledge transfers.

(75)Copernicus is a user-driven programme. Its evolution should therefore be based on the evolving requirements of the Copernicus core users, while also recognising the emergence of new user communities, whether public or private. Copernicus should base itself on an analysis of options to meet evolving user needs, including those related to implementation, and monitoring of Union policies which require the continuous, effective involvement of users, particularly regarding the definition and validation of requirements.

(76)Copernicus is already operational. It is therefore important to ensure the continuity of the infrastructure and services already in place, whilst adapting to the changing user needs, market environment, particularly the emergence of private actors in space and socio-political developments for which a rapid response is needed. That requires an evolution of the functional structure of Copernicus to better reflect the shift from the first stage of operational services to the provision of advanced and more targeted services to new user communities and the fostering of added-value downstream markets. To that end, its further implementation should adopt an approach following the data value chain, i.e. data acquisition, data and information processing, distribution and exploitation, user, market uptake and capacity building activities, while the strategic planning process under Horizon Europe would identify research and innovation activities that should make use of Copernicus.

(77)With regard to data acquisition, the activities under Copernicus should aim at completing and maintaining the existing space infrastructure, preparing the long-term replacement of the satellites at the end of their lifetime, as well as initiating new missions addressing in particular new observation systems to support meeting the challenge of global climate change, such as anthropogenic CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions monitoring. Activities under Copernicus should expand their global monitoring coverage over the polar regions and support environmental compliance assurance, statutory environmental monitoring and reporting and innovative environmental applications in agriculture, forest, water and marine resources management and cultural heritage, such as for crops monitoring, water management and enhanced fire monitoring. In doing so, Copernicus should leverage and take maximum advantage of the investments made under the previous funding period (2014-2020), including those made by Member States, ESA and EUMETSAT, while exploring new operational and business models to further complement the Copernicus capacities. Copernicus might also build on successful partnerships with Member States to further develop its security dimension under appropriate governance mechanisms, in order to respond to evolving user needs in the security domain.

(78)As part of the data and information processing function, Copernicus should ensure the long-term sustainability and further development of Copernicus Services, providing information in order to satisfy public sector needs and those arising from the Union’s international commitments, and to maximise opportunities for commercial exploitation. In particular, Copernicus should deliver, at the European, national, local and global scale, information on the composition of the atmosphere and air quality; information on the state and dynamics of the oceans; information in support of land and ice monitoring supporting the implementation of Union, national and local policies; information in support of climate change adaptation and mitigation; geospatial information in support of emergency management, including through prevention activities, environmental compliance assurance, as well as civil security including support for the Union’s external action. The Commission should identify appropriate contractual arrangements fostering the sustainability of service provision.

(79)In the implementation of the Copernicus Services, the Commission should rely on competent entities, relevant Union agencies, groupings or consortia of national bodies, or any relevant body potentially eligible for conclusion of a contribution agreement. In the selection of those entities, the Commission should ensure that there is no disruption in the operations and provision of services and that, as regards security-sensitive data, the entities concerned have early warning and crisis monitoring capabilities within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and, in particular, of the Common Security and Defence Policy. In accordance with Article 154(2) of the Financial Regulation, persons and entities entrusted with the implementation of Union funds are obliged to comply with the principle of non-discrimination towards all Member States. Compliance with that principle should be ensured through the relevant contribution agreements relating to the provision of the Copernicus Services.

(80)The implementation of the Copernicus Services should facilitate the public uptake of services as users would be able to anticipate the availability and evolution of services as well as cooperation with Member States and other parties. To that end, the Commission and its entrusted entities providing services should engage closely with Copernicus core users’ communities across Europe in further developing the Copernicus Services and information portfolio to ensure that evolving public sector and policy needs are met and thus the uptake of Earth observation data can be maximised. The Commission and Member States should work together to develop the in-situ component of Copernicus and to facilitate the integration of Copernicus in-situ data with space datasets for upgraded Copernicus Services.

(81)Copernicus’ free, full and open data policy has been evaluated as one of the most successful elements of Copernicus’ implementation and has been instrumental in driving strong demand for its data and information, establishing Copernicus as one of the largest Earth observation data providers in the world. There is a clear need to guarantee the long-term and secure continuity of the free, full and open data provision and access should be safeguarded in order to realise the ambitious goals as set out in the Space Strategy for Europe. Copernicus data is created primarily for the benefit of the Europeans, and by making that data freely available worldwide collaboration opportunities are maximised for Union businesses and academics and contribute to an effective European space ecosystem. Should any limitation be placed on the access to Copernicus data and Copernicus information, it should be in line with the Copernicus data policy as laid down in this Regulation and in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1159/2013 (31).

(82)The data and information produced in the framework of Copernicus should be made available on a full, open and free-of-charge basis subject to appropriate conditions and limitations, in order to promote their use and sharing, and to strengthen the European Earth observation markets, in particular the downstream sector, thereby enabling growth and job creation in the Union. Such provision should continue to provide data and information with high levels of consistency, continuity, reliability, and quality. This calls for large-scale and user-friendly access to, processing and exploitation of Copernicus data and Copernicus information, at various timeliness levels, for which the Commission should continue to follow an integrated approach, both at Union and Member States level, enabling also integration with other sources of data and information. Therefore the Commission should take the necessary measures to ensure that Copernicus data and Copernicus information is easily and efficiently accessible and usable, particularly by promoting the Data and Information Access Services (DIAS) within Member States and when possible fostering interoperability between the existing European Earth observation data infrastructures to establish synergies with those assets in order to maximise and strengthen market uptake of Copernicus data and Copernicus information.

(83)The Commission should work with data providers to agree licensing conditions for third-party data to facilitate their use within Copernicus, in compliance with this Regulation and applicable third-party rights. As some Copernicus data and Copernicus information, including high-resolution images, may have an impact on the security of the Union or Member States, in duly justified cases, measures in order to deal with risks and threats to the security of the Union or Member States may be adopted.

(84)To promote and facilitate the use of Earth observation data and technologies by national, regional and local authorities, SMEs, scientists and researchers, dedicated networks for Copernicus data distribution, including national and regional bodies such as Copernicus Relays and Copernicus Academies, should be promoted through user uptake activities. To that end, the Commission and the Member States should strive to establish closer links between Copernicus and Union and national policies in order to drive the demand for commercial applications and services and enable enterprises, in particular SMEs and start-ups, to develop applications based on Copernicus data and Copernicus information aiming at developing a competitive Earth observation data eco-system in Europe.

(85)In the international domain, Copernicus should provide accurate and reliable information for cooperation with third countries and international organisations, and in support of the Union’s external and development cooperation policies. Copernicus should be considered as a European contribution to the Global Earth Observation System of Systems, the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, the Conference of the Parties to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The Commission should establish or maintain appropriate cooperation with relevant sectoral UN bodies and the World Meteorological Organisation.

(86)In the implementation of Copernicus, the Commission should rely, where appropriate, on European international organisations with which it has already established partnerships, in particular ESA, for the development, coordination, implementation and evolution of the space components, access to third party data where appropriate and, when not undertaken by other entities, the operation of dedicated missions. In addition, the Commission should rely on EUMETSAT for the operation of dedicated missions or parts thereof and, where appropriate, access to contributing mission data in accordance with its expertise and mandate.

(87)In the domain of services, the Commission should benefit appropriately from the specific capacities provided by Union agencies, such as the European Environment Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, Frontex, SATCEN, as well as the intergovernmental European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts and the European investments already made in marine environment monitoring services through Mercator Ocean. On security, a comprehensive approach at Union level would be sought with the High Representative. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the Commission has been actively involved from the start of the GMES initiative and has supported developments for Galileo and the SWE sub-component. Under Regulation (EU) No 377/2014, the JRC is managing the Copernicus emergency management service and the global component of the Copernicus land monitoring service, it is contributing to the review of the quality and fitness for purpose of data and information, and to the future evolution. The Commission should continue relying on JRC’s scientific and technical advice for the implementation of the Programme.

(88)Following the requests of the European Parliament and of the Council, the Union established a support framework for space surveillance and tracking (SST) by means of Decision No 541/2014/EU. Space debris has become a serious threat to the security, safety and sustainability of space activities. The SST sub-component is therefore essential to preserving the continuity of the Programme’s components and their contributions to Union policies. By seeking to prevent the proliferation of space debris, the SST sub-component contributes to ensuring the sustainable and guaranteed access to and use of space, which is a global common objective. In that context, it could support the preparation of European Earth orbit ‘clean-up’ projects.

(89)The performance and autonomy of capabilities under the SST sub-component should be further developed. To that end, the SST sub-component should lead to the establishment of an autonomous European catalogue of space objects, building on data from the network of SST sensors. Where appropriate, the Union could consider making some of its data available for commercial, non-commercial and research purposes. The SST sub-component should also continue to support the operation and provision of SST services. As SST services are user-driven, appropriate mechanisms should be put in place to collect user requirements, including those relating to security and the transmission of relevant information to and from public institutions to improve the effectiveness of the system, while respecting national safety and security policies.

(90)The provision of SST services should be based on cooperation between the Union and the Member States and on the use of existing as well as future national expertise and assets, including those developed through ESA or by the Union. It should be possible to provide financial support for the development of new SST sensors. In view of the sensitive nature of the SST, the control over national sensors and their operations, maintenance and renewal and the processing of data leading to the provision of SST services should remain with the Member States participating in the SST sub-component.

(91)Member States with ownership or access to adequate capabilities available for the SST sub-component should be able to participate in the provision of SST services. Participating Member States in the Consortium established under Decision No 541/2014/EU should be deemed to have ownership or access to adequate capabilities available for the SST sub-component. Member States wishing to participate in the provision of SST services should submit a single joint proposal and demonstrate compliance with further elements related to the operational set up. Appropriate rules should be established for the selection and organisation of those Member States.

(92)In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission relating to adoption of the detailed procedures and elements for establishing the participation of Member States in the provision of SST services. Where no joint proposal of the Member States wishing to participate in the provision of SST services has been submitted or where the Commission considers that such proposal does not comply with the criteria set, the Commission should be able to initiate a second step for establishing the participation of Member States in the provision of SST services. The procedures and elements for that second step should define the orbits to be covered, and take into account the need to maximise the participation of Member States in the provision of SST services. Where those procedures and elements provide for the possibility for the Commission to select several proposals to cover all the orbits, appropriate coordination mechanisms between the groups of Member States and an efficient solution to cover all the SST services should also be provided. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (32).

(93)Once the SST sub-component is set up, it should respect the principles of complementarity of activities and continuity of high quality user-driven SST services, and be based on the best expertise. The SST sub-component should therefore avoid unnecessary duplication. Redundant capabilities should ensure SST services’ continuity, quality and robustness. The activities of the Expert Teams should help to avoid such unnecessary duplication.

(94)In addition, the SST sub-component should be conducive to existing mitigation measures, such as the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, or other initiatives to ensure the safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities. With a view to reducing risks of collision, the SST sub-component would also seek synergies with initiatives of active removal and passivation measures of space debris. The SST sub-component should contribute to ensuring the peaceful use and exploration of outer space. The increase in space activities may have implication on the international initiatives in the area of the space traffic management. The Union should monitor those developments and may take them into consideration in the context of the mid-term review of the current multiannual financial framework.

(95)The activities under the SST, SWE and NEO sub-components should have regard to cooperation with international partners, in particular the United States, international organisations and other third parties, particularly to avoid collisions in space, to prevent the proliferation of space debris and to increase preparedness for the effects of extreme space weather events and near-Earth objects.

(96)The Security Committee of the Council recommended the creation of a risk management structure to ensure that data security issues are duly taken into account in the implementation of Decision No 541/2014/EU. For that purpose and taking account of the work already performed, the appropriate risk management structures and procedures should be established by the Member States participating in the SST sub-component.

(97)Extreme and major space weather events may threaten the safety of citizens and disrupt the operations of space-based and ground-based infrastructure. A SWE sub-component should therefore be established as part the Programme with an aim of assessing the space weather risks and corresponding user needs, raising the awareness of space weather risks, ensuring the provision of user-driven SWE services, and improving Member States’ capabilities to provide the SWE services. The Commission should prioritise the sectors to which the operational SWE services are to be provided taking into account the user needs, risks and technological readiness. In the long term, the needs of other sectors may be addressed. The provision of services at Union level according to the users’ needs would require targeted, coordinated and continued research and development activities to support SWE services evolution. The provision of the SWE services should build on the existing national and Union capabilities and enable a broad participation of Member States, European and international organisations, and involvement of the private sector.

(98)The Commission White Paper of 1 March 2017 on the future of Europe, the Rome Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of 27 EU Member States of 25 March 2017, and several European Parliament resolutions, recall that the Union has a major role to play in ensuring a safe, secure and resilient Europe that is capable of addressing challenges such as regional conflicts, terrorism, cyber threats, and growing migration pressures. Secure and guaranteed access to satellite communications is an indispensable tool for security actors, and pooling and sharing of that key security resource at Union level strengthens a Union that protects its citizens.

(99)The conclusions of the European Council of 19-20 December 2013 welcomed the preparations for the next generation of Governmental Satellite Communication (GOVSATCOM) through close cooperation between the Member States, the Commission and ESA. GOVSATCOM has also been identified as one of the elements of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016. GOVSATCOM should contribute to the EU response to Hybrid Threats and provide support to the EU Maritime Security Strategy and to the EU Arctic policy.

(100)GOVSATCOM is a user-centric programme with a strong security dimension. The GOVSATCOM use-cases should be able to be analysed by the relevant actors for three main families: crisis management, which may include civilian and military Common Security and Defence missions and operations, natural and man-made disasters, humanitarian crises, and maritime emergencies; surveillance, which may include border surveillance, pre-frontier surveillance, sea-border surveillance, maritime surveillance and surveillance of illegal trafficking; and key infrastructures, which may include diplomatic network, police communications, digital infrastructure, such as data centres and servers, critical infrastructures, such as energy, transport and water barriers, such as dams, and space infrastructures.

(101)GOVSATCOM capacity and services should be used in security and safety critical missions and operations by Union and Member State actors. Therefore an appropriate level of non-dependence from third parties (third countries and entities from third countries) is needed, covering all GOVSATCOM elements, such as space and ground technologies at component, subsystem and system level, manufacturing industries, owners and operators of space systems, and physical location of ground system components.

(102)Satellite communications is a finite resource limited by the satellite capacity, frequency and geographical coverage. Therefore, in order to be cost-effective and to capitalise on economies of scale, GOVSATCOM needs to optimise the match between the demand from GOVSATCOM users, and the supply provided under contracts for GOVSATCOM capacities and services. Since the demand and the potential supply both change with time, this requires constant monitoring and flexibility to adjust GOVSATCOM services.

(103)Operational requirements should be based on the use-case analysis. From those operational requirements, in combination with security requirements, the service portfolio should be developed. The service portfolio should establish the applicable baseline for the GOVSATCOM services. In order to maintain the best possible match between the demand and supplied services, the service portfolio for GOVSATCOM services should be able to be regularly updated.

(104)In the first phase of GOVSATCOM, approximately until 2025, existing capacity would be used. In that context, the Commission should procure GOVSATCOM capacities from Member States with national systems and space capacities and from commercial satellite communication or service providers, taking into account the essential security interests of the Union. In that first phase GOVSATCOM services would be introduced in a stepped approach. If in the course of the first phase a detailed analysis of future supply and demand reveals that this approach is insufficient to cover the evolving demand, it should be possible to take a decision to move to a second phase and develop additional bespoke space infrastructure or capacities through one or several public-private partnerships, e.g. with Union satellite operators.

(105)In order to optimise the available satellite communication resources, to guarantee access in unpredictable situations, such as natural disasters, and to ensure operational efficiency and short turn-around times, the necessary ground segment, such as GOVSATCOM Hubs and potential other ground elements, is required. It should be designed on the basis of operational and security requirements. In order to mitigate risks a GOVSATCOM Hub may consist of several physical sites. Other ground segment elements, such as anchoring stations, may be needed.

(106)For users of satellite communications the user equipment is the all-important operational interface. The GOVSATCOM approach should make it possible for most users to continue to use their existing user equipment for GOVSATCOM services.

(107)In the interest of operational efficiency, users have indicated that it is important to aim for interoperability of user equipment, and user equipment that can make use of different satellite systems. Research and development in this domain may be required.

(108)At implementation level the tasks and responsibilities should be distributed amongst specialised entities, such as EDA, EEAS, ESA, the Agency, and other Union agencies in such a manner as to ensure that they align with their principal role, especially for user-related aspects.

(109)The competent GOVSATCOM authority has an important role in terms of monitoring whether users, and other national entities that play a role in GOVSATCOM, comply with the sharing and prioritisation rules and security procedures as laid down in the security requirements. A Member State which has not designated a competent GOVSATCOM authority should in any event designate a point of contact for the management of any detected jamming affecting GOVSATCOM.

(110)Member States, the Council, the Commission and the EEAS should be able to become GOVSATCOM participants, insofar as they choose to authorise GOVSATCOM users or provide capacities, sites or facilities. Taking into consideration that it is for the Member States to decide whether to authorise GOVSATCOM users or provide capacities, sites or facilities, Member States could not be obliged to become GOVSATCOM participants or to host GOVSATCOM infrastructure. The GOVSATCOM component would therefore be without prejudice to the right of Member States not to participate in GOVSATCOM, including in accordance with its national law or constitutional requirements in relation to policies concerning non-alignment and non-participation in military alliances.

(111)In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission relating to adoption of the operational requirements for GOVSATCOM services and of the service portfolio for GOVSATCOM services. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

(112)In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission relating to adoption of detailed rules on sharing and prioritisation for the use of pooled GOVSATCOM satellite communication capacities. When defining detailed rules on sharing and prioritisation, the Commission should take into account the operational and security requirements and an analysis of risks and expected demand by GOVSATCOM participants. Although GOVSATCOM services should in principle be provided free of charge to GOVSATCOM users, if that analysis concludes there is a shortage of capacities and in order to avoid a distortion of the market, a pricing policy might be developed as part of those detailed rules on sharing and prioritisation. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

(113)In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers relating to the location of the ground segment infrastructure for GOVSATCOM should be conferred on the Commission. For the selection of such locations, the Commission should be able to take into account the operational and security requirements, as well as the existing infrastructure. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

(114)Regulation (EU) No 912/2010 established a Union agency, called the European GNSS Agency, to manage certain aspects of the Galileo and EGNOS satellite navigation programmes. This Regulation entrusts the European GNSS Agency with new tasks, especially security accreditation, not only in respect of Galileo and EGNOS but also in respect of other Programme’s components. The name, tasks and organisational aspects of the European GNSS Agency should therefore be adapted accordingly.

(115)In accordance with Decision 2010/803/EU (33), the seat of the Agency is located in Prague. For the implementation of the Agency’s tasks, staff of the Agency might be located in one of the Galileo or EGNOS ground-based centres referred to in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/413 (34) to execute Programme activities provided for in the relevant agreement. In addition, for the Agency to operate in the most efficient and effective manner, a limited number of staff could be assigned to local offices in one or more Member States. Such assignment of staff outside the seat of the Agency or Galileo and EGNOS ground-based centres should not lead to transfer of the Agency’s core activities to such local offices.

(116)In view of its extended scope, which should no longer be limited to Galileo and EGNOS, the name of the European GNSS Agency should henceforth be changed. However, the continuity of the activities of the European GNSS Agency, including continuity as regards rights and obligations, staff and the validity of any decisions taken, should be ensured under the Agency.

(117)Given the Agency’s mandate and the role of the Commission in implementing the Programme, it is appropriate to provide that some of the decisions taken by the Administrative Board should not be adopted without the favourable vote of the representatives of the Commission.

(118)Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission, the Administrative Board, the Security Accreditation Board and the Executive Director should be independent in the performance of their duties and should act in the public interest.

(119)It is possible, and indeed probable, that some of the Programme’s components would be based on the use of sensitive or security-related national infrastructure. In such cases, for reasons of national security, it would be necessary to stipulate that meetings of the Administrative Board and Security Accreditation Board be attended by the representatives of the Member States and the representatives of the Commission, on a need-to-know basis. In the Administrative Board, only those representatives of Member States which possess such infrastructure and a representative of the Commission are to take part in voting. The rules of procedure of the Administrative Board and of the Security Accreditation Board should set out the situations in which that procedure is to apply.

(120)Pursuant to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making (35), this Programme should be evaluated on the basis of information collected in accordance with specific monitoring requirements, while avoiding administrative burden, in particular on Member States, and overregulation. Those requirements, where appropriate, should include measurable indicators as a basis for evaluating the effects of the Programme on the ground.

(121)The use of Copernicus and Galileo-based services is predicted to have a major impact in the European economy in general. However, ad hoc measurements and case studies seem to dominate the picture today. The Commission (Eurostat) should define relevant statistical measurements and indicators that would form the basis for monitoring the impact of the Union’s space activities in a systematic and authoritative way.

(122)The European Parliament and the Council should be promptly informed of the work programmes.

(123)In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission relating to the reallocation of funds between the categories of expenditure of the Programme’s budget, the adoption of contribution decisions regarding the contribution agreements, determining the technical and operational requirements needed for the implementation of and evolution of the Programme’s components and of the services they provide, deciding on the FFPA, the adoption of measures necessary for the smooth functioning of Galileo and EGNOS and their adoption by the market, the adoption of the detailed provisions concerning the access to SST services and relevant procedures, the adoption of the multiannual plan and the key performance indicators for development of Union SST services, the adoption of detailed rules on the functioning of the organisational framework of the participation of Member States in the SST sub-component, the selection of SWE services, and the adoption of the work programmes. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. The Commission should be assisted by the Programme committee, which should meet in specific configuration.

(124)Since the Programme’s components are user-driven, they require the continuous, effective involvement of users for their implementation and development, particularly regarding the definition and validation of service requirements. In order to increase the value for the users, their input should be actively sought through regular consultation with end-users from the public and private sectors of Member States and, where appropriate, with international organisations. For that purpose, a working group (‘User Forum’) should be set up to assist the Programme committee with the identification of user requirements, and the verification of service compliance, as well as the identification of gaps in services provided. The rules of procedure of the Programme committee should establish the organisation of the User Forum to take into account the specificities of each of the Programme’s components and each service within the components. Whenever possible, Member States should contribute to the User Forum based on a systematic and coordinated consultation of users at national level.

(125)As sound public governance requires uniform management of the Programme, faster decision-making and equal access to information, representatives of the entities entrusted with tasks related to the Programme might be able to take part as observers in the work of the Programme committee established in application of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. For the same reasons, representatives of third countries and international organisations who have concluded an international agreement with the Union, relating to the Programme or its components or sub-components, might be able to take part in the work of the Programme committee subject to security constraints and as provided for in the terms of such agreement. The representatives of entities entrusted with tasks related to the Programme, third countries and international organisations should not be entitled to take part in the Programme committee voting procedures. The conditions for the participation of observers and ad hoc participants should be laid down in the rules of procedure of the Programme committee.

(126)In order to ensure effective assessment of progress of the Programme towards the achievement of its objectives, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of supplementing the provisions on the Copernicus data and Copernicus information to be provided to Copernicus users as regards the specifications and conditions and procedures for the access to and use of such data and such information, of amending the Annex to this Regulation with regard to the indicators where considered necessary and of supplementing this Regulation with provisions on the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation framework. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

(127)Since the objective of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the action that go beyond the financial and technical capacities of any single Member State, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

(128)In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of the Programme’s security requirements, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Member States should be able to exert a maximum of control over the Programme’s security requirements. When adopting implementing acts in the area of security of the Programme, the Commission should be assisted by the Programme committee meeting in a dedicated security configuration. In view of the sensitivity of security matters, the chair of the Programme committee should endeavour to find solutions which command the widest possible support within the committee. The Commission should not adopt implementing acts determining the general security requirements of the Programme in cases where no opinion is delivered by the Programme committee.

(129)The Programme should be established for a period of seven years to align its duration with that of the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 laid down in Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 (36) (the ‘MFF 2021-2027’). The Agency, which carries out its own tasks, should not be subject to that time limitation.

(130)In order to ensure continuity in providing support in the relevant policy area and to allow implementation to start from the beginning of the MFF 2021-2027, this Regulation should enter into force as a matter of urgency and should apply, with retroactive effect, from 1 January 2021.

(131)Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU should therefore be repealed,