Considerations on COM(2013)534 - Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office - Main contents
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| dossier | COM(2013)534 - Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office. |
|---|---|
| document | COM(2013)534  |
| date | October 12, 2017 |
| (2) | The possibility of setting up the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) is foreseen by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in the Title concerning the area of freedom, security and justice. |
| (3) | Both the Union and the Member States of the European Union have an obligation to protect the Union’s financial interests against criminal offences, which generate significant financial damages every year. Yet, these offences are currently not always sufficiently investigated and prosecuted by the national criminal justice authorities. |
| (4) | On 17 July 2013, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the EPPO. |
| (5) | At its meeting of 7 February 2017, the Council registered the absence of unanimity on the draft Regulation. |
| (6) | In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 86(1) TFEU, a group of seventeen Member States requested, by a letter of 14 February 2017, that the draft Regulation be referred to the European Council. |
| (7) | On 9 March 2017, the European Council discussed the draft Regulation and noted that there was disagreement within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 86(1) TFEU. |
| (8) | On 3 April 2017, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain notified the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission that they wished to establish enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO. Therefore, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 86(1) TFEU, the authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation referred to in Article 20(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 329(1) TFEU is deemed to be granted and the provisions on enhanced cooperation apply as from 3 April 2017. In addition, respectively by letters of 19 April 2017, 1 June 2017, 9 June 2017 and 22 June 2017, Latvia, Estonia, Austria and Italy indicated their wish to participate in the establishment of the enhanced cooperation. |
| (9) | In accordance with Article 328(1) TFEU, when enhanced cooperation is being established it is to be open to all Member States of the European Union. It is also to be open to them at any other time, including with regard to an enhanced cooperation in progress subject to compliance with the acts already adopted within that framework. The Commission and the Member States which participate in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO (the ‘Member States’) should ensure that they promote participation by as many Member States of the European Union as possible. This Regulation should be binding in its entirety and directly applicable only in the Member States which participate in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO, or by virtue of a decision adopted in accordance with the second or third subparagraph of Article 331(1) TFEU. |
| (10) | In accordance with Article 86 TFEU, the EPPO should be established from Eurojust. This implies that this Regulation should establish a close relationship between them based on mutual cooperation. |
| (11) | The TFEU provides that the material scope of competence of the EPPO is limited to criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union in accordance with this Regulation. The tasks of the EPPO should thus be to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment the perpetrators of offences against the Union’s financial interests under Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and offences which are inextricably linked to them. Any extension of this competence to include serious crimes having a cross-border dimension requires a unanimous decision of the European Council. |
| (12) | In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, combatting crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union can be better achieved at Union level by reason of its scale and effects. The present situation, in which the criminal prosecution of offences against the Union’s financial interests is exclusively in the hands of the authorities of the Member States of the European Union, does not always sufficiently achieve that objective. Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely, to enhance the fight against offences affecting the financial interests of the Union by setting up the EPPO, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States of the European Union, given the fragmentation of national prosecutions in the area of offences committed against the Union’s financial interests but can rather, by reason of the fact that the EPPO is to have competence to prosecute such offences, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives and ensures that its impact on the legal orders and the institutional structures of the Member States is the least intrusive possible. |
| (13) | This Regulation provides for a system of shared competence between the EPPO and national authorities in combating crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, based on the right of evocation of the EPPO. |
| (14) | In the light of the principle of sincere cooperation, both the EPPO and the competent national authorities should support and inform each other with the aim of efficiently combatting the crimes falling under the competence of the EPPO. |
| (15) | This Regulation is without prejudice to Member States’ national systems concerning the way in which criminal investigations are organised. |
| (16) | Since the EPPO is to be granted powers of investigation and prosecution, institutional safeguards should be put in place to ensure its independence as well as its accountability towards the institutions of the Union. |
| (17) | The EPPO should act in the interest of the Union as a whole and neither seek nor take instructions from any person external to the EPPO. |
| (18) | Strict accountability is a complement to the independence and the powers granted to the EPPO under this Regulation. The European Chief Prosecutor is fully accountable for the performance of his/her duties as the head of the EPPO and as such he/she bears an overall institutional accountability for its general activities to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. As a result, any of these institutions can apply to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’), with a view to his/her removal under certain circumstances, including in cases of serious misconduct. The same procedure should apply for the dismissal of European Prosecutors. |
| (19) | The EPPO should issue a public Annual Report on its general activities, which at a minimum should contain statistical data on the work of the EPPO. |
| (20) | The organisational structure of the EPPO should allow quick and efficient decision-making in the conduct of criminal investigations and prosecutions, whether they involve one or several Member States. The structure should also ensure that all national legal systems and traditions of the Member States are represented in the EPPO, and that prosecutors with knowledge of the individual legal systems will in principle handle investigations and prosecutions in their respective Member States. |
| (21) | To that end, the EPPO should be an indivisible Union body operating as a single office. The central level consists of a European Chief Prosecutor, who is the head of the EPPO as a whole and the head of the College of European Prosecutors, Permanent Chambers and European Prosecutors. The decentralised level consists of European Delegated Prosecutors located in the Member States. |
| (22) | In addition, to ensure consistency in its action and thus an equivalent protection of the Union’s financial interests, the organisational structure and the internal decision-making process of the EPPO should enable the Central Office to monitor, direct and supervise all investigations and prosecutions undertaken by European Delegated Prosecutors. |
| (23) | In this Regulation, the terms ‘general oversight’, ‘monitoring and directing’ and ‘supervision’ are used to describe different control activities exercised by the EPPO. ‘General oversight’ should be understood as referring to the general administration of the activities of the EPPO, in which instructions are only given on issues which have a horizontal importance for the EPPO. ‘Monitoring and directing’ should be understood as referring to the powers to monitor and direct individual investigations and prosecutions. ‘Supervision’ should be understood as referring to a closer and continuous oversight of investigations and prosecutions, including, whenever necessary, intervention and instruction-giving on investigations and prosecution matters. |
| (24) | The College should take decisions on strategic matters, including determining the priorities and the investigation and prosecution policy of the EPPO, as well as on general issues arising from individual cases, for example regarding the application of this Regulation, the correct implementation of the investigation and prosecution policy of the EPPO or questions of principle or of significant importance for the development of a coherent investigation and prosecution policy of the EPPO. The decisions of the College on general issues should not affect the duty to investigate and prosecute in accordance with this Regulation and national law. The College should use its best efforts to take decisions by consensus. If such a consensus cannot be reached, decisions should be taken by voting. |
| (25) | The Permanent Chambers should monitor and direct investigations and ensure the coherence of the activities of the EPPO. The composition of Permanent Chambers should be determined in accordance with the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO, which should allow, among other things, for a European Prosecutor to be a member of more than one Permanent Chamber where this is appropriate to ensure, to the extent possible, an even workload between individual European Prosecutors. |
| (26) | Permanent Chambers should be chaired by the European Chief Prosecutor, one of the deputy European Chief Prosecutors or a European Prosecutor, in accordance with principles laid down in the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO. |
| (27) | The allocation of cases between the Permanent Chambers should be based on a system of a random distribution so as to ensure, to the extent possible, an equal division of workload. Deviations from this principle should be possible to ensure the proper and efficient functioning of the EPPO on a decision by the European Chief Prosecutor. |
| (28) | A European Prosecutor from each Member State should be appointed to the College. The European Prosecutors should in principle supervise, on behalf of the competent Permanent Chamber, the investigations and prosecutions handled by the European Delegated Prosecutors in their Member State of origin. They should act as liaison between the central office and the decentralised level in their Member States, facilitating the functioning of the EPPO as a single office. The supervising European Prosecutor should also check any instruction’s compliance with national law and inform the Permanent Chamber if the instructions do not do so. |
| (29) | For reasons of workload linked to the high number of investigations and prosecutions in a given Member State, a European Prosecutor should be able to request that, exceptionally, the supervision of certain investigations and prosecutions in his/her Member State of origin may be assigned to other European Prosecutors. The decision should be taken by the European Chief Prosecutor with the agreement of the European Prosecutor who would take over the cases concerned. The criteria for such decisions should be laid down in the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO, and should include the requirement that the European Prosecutor taking over the cases has sufficient knowledge of the language and legal system of the Member State concerned. |
| (30) | The investigations of the EPPO should as a rule be carried out by European Delegated Prosecutors in the Member States. They should do so in accordance with this Regulation and, as regards matters not covered by this Regulation, in accordance with national law. European Delegated Prosecutors should carry out their tasks under the supervision of the supervising European Prosecutor and under the direction and instruction of the competent Permanent Chamber. Where the national law of a Member State provides for the internal review of certain acts within the structure of the national prosecutor’s office, the review of such decisions taken by the European Delegated Prosecutor should fall under the supervision powers of the supervising European Prosecutor in accordance with the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO. In such cases, Member States should not be obliged to provide for review by national courts, without prejudice to Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). |
| (31) | The functions of prosecutor in competent courts apply until the conclusion of the proceedings, which is understood to mean the final determination of the question whether the suspect or accused person has committed the offence, including, where applicable, sentencing and the resolution of any legal action or remedies available until that decision has become definitive. |
| (32) | The European Delegated Prosecutors should be an integral part of the EPPO and as such, when investigating and prosecuting offences within the competence of the EPPO, they should act exclusively on behalf and in the name of the EPPO on the territory of their respective Member State. This should entail granting them under this Regulation a functionally and legally independent status which is different from any status under national law. |
| (33) | Notwithstanding their special status under this Regulation, the European Delegated Prosecutors should, during their term of office, also be members of the prosecution service of their Member State, namely a prosecutor or member of the judiciary, and should be granted by their Member State at least the same powers as national prosecutors. |
| (34) | The European Delegated Prosecutors should be bound to follow instructions coming from the Permanent Chambers and the European Prosecutors. Where a European Delegated Prosecutor considers that an instruction would require him/her to undertake any measure that would not be in compliance with national law, he/she should ask for a review of that instruction by the European Chief Prosecutor. |
| (35) | The European Delegated Prosecutor handling a case should report any significant developments in a case, such as the performance of investigative measures or changes to the list of suspected persons, to the supervising European Prosecutor and to the competent Permanent Chamber. |
| (36) | The Permanent Chambers should exercise their decision-making power at specific steps of the proceedings of the EPPO with a view to ensuring a common investigation and prosecution policy. They should adopt decisions on the basis of a draft decision proposed by the handling European Delegated Prosecutor. However, in exceptional cases, a Permanent Chamber should be able to adopt a decision without a draft decision of the handling European Delegated Prosecutor. In such cases, the European Prosecutor supervising the case may present such a draft decision. |
| (37) | A Permanent Chamber should be able to delegate its decision-making power to the supervising European Prosecutor in specific cases where an offence is not serious or the proceedings are not complex. When assessing the degree of seriousness of an offence, account should be taken of its repercussions at Union level. |
| (38) | A substitution mechanism between European Prosecutors should be provided for in the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO. The substitution mechanism should be used in cases where a European Prosecutor is briefly unable to fulfil his/her duties, for example, due to absence. |
| (39) | In addition, a European Prosecutor should be substituted by one of the European Delegated Prosecutors of his/her Member State when the European Prosecutor resigns, is dismissed or leaves his/her position for any other reason or in cases, for example, of prolonged illness. The substitution should be limited to a period of up to 3 months. The possibility to prolong this time limit should be left to the discretion of the College, where deemed to be necessary, taking into account the workload of the EPPO and the duration of the absence, pending replacement or return of the European Prosecutor. The European Delegated Prosecutor substituting the European Prosecutor should, for the period of the substitution, no longer be in charge of investigations and prosecutions handled by him/her as a European Delegated Prosecutor or as national prosecutor. With regard to proceedings of the EPPO which were handled by the European Delegated Prosecutor substituting a European Prosecutor, the EPPO’s rules on reallocation should apply. |
| (40) | The procedure for the appointment of the European Chief Prosecutor and the European Prosecutors should guarantee their independence. Their legitimacy should be drawn from the institutions of the Union involved in the appointment procedure. The Deputies to the European Chief Prosecutor should be appointed by the College from among its members. |
| (41) | A selection panel should establish a short list of candidates for the position of European Chief Prosecutor. The power to establish the panel’s operating rules and to appoint its members should be conferred on the Council, based on a proposal from the Commission. Such an implementing power would mirror the specific powers conferred on the Council under Article 86 TFEU, and reflects the specific nature of the EPPO, which will remain firmly embedded in national legal structures while at the same time being a Union body. The EPPO will be acting in proceedings where most other actors will be national, such as courts, police and other law enforcement authorities, and therefore the Council has a specific interest in being closely involved in the appointment procedure. Conferring those powers on the Council also adequately takes into account the potential sensitive nature of any decision-making powers with direct implications for the national judicial and prosecution structures. The European Parliament and the Council should appoint, by common accord, one of the shortlisted candidates as Chief Prosecutor. |
| (42) | Each Member State should nominate three candidates for the position of European Prosecutor to be selected and appointed by the Council. With a view to ensuring the continuity of the work of the College, there should be a partial replacement of one third of the European Prosecutors every 3 years. The power to adopt transitional rules for the appointment of European Prosecutors for and during the first mandate period should be conferred on the Council. That implementing power mirrors the power of the Council to select and appoint the European Prosecutors. This is also justified by the specific nature of the European Prosecutors as being linked to their respective Member States while at the same time being Members of the College and more generally, by the specific nature of the EPPO following the same logic underlying the implementing power conferred on the Council to establish the panel’s operating rules and to appoint its members. The Council should take into account the geographical range of the Member States when deciding on the partial replacement of one third of the European Prosecutors during their first mandate period. |
| (43) | The procedure for the appointment of the European Delegated Prosecutors should ensure that they are an integral part of the EPPO while they remain integrated at an operational level in their national legal systems and judicial and prosecution structures. Member States should nominate candidates for the position of European Delegated Prosecutors, who should be appointed by the College on a proposal by the European Chief Prosecutor. |
| (44) | There should be two or more European Delegated Prosecutors in each Member State to ensure the proper handling of the caseload of the EPPO. The European Chief Prosecutor should approve the number of European Delegated Prosecutors per Member State, as well as the functional and territorial division of tasks among them, in consultation with each Member State. In such consultations, due account should be taken of the organisation of the national prosecution systems. The notion of functional division of competences between European Delegated Prosecutors could allow for a division of tasks. |
| (45) | The total number of European Delegated Prosecutors in a Member State may be modified with the approval of the European Chief Prosecutor, subject to the limits of the annual budget line of the EPPO. |
| (46) | The College should be responsible for disciplinary procedures concerning European Delegated Prosecutors acting under this Regulation. Since European Delegated Prosecutors remain active members of the public prosecution or the judiciary of the Member States, and may also exercise functions as national prosecutors, national disciplinary provisions may apply for reasons not connected with this Regulation. However, in such cases the European Chief Prosecutor should be informed of the dismissal or of any disciplinary action, given his responsibilities for the management of the EPPO and in order to protect its integrity and independence. |
| (47) | The work of the EPPO should, in principle, be carried out in electronic form. A case management system should be established, owned and managed by the EPPO. The information in the case management system should include information received about possible offences that fall under the EPPO’s competence, as well as information from the case files, also when those have been closed. The EPPO should, when establishing the case management system, ensure that the system allows the EPPO to operate as a single office, where the case files administered by European Delegated Prosecutors are available to the Central Office for the exercise of its decision-making, monitoring and direction, and supervision tasks. |
| (48) | National authorities should inform the EPPO without delay of any conduct that could constitute an offence within the competence of the EPPO. In cases which fall outside its scope of competence, the EPPO should inform the competent national authorities of any facts of which it becomes aware, and which might constitute a criminal offence, for example false testimony. |
| (49) | Institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, as well as national authorities, should provide without delay any information to the EPPO about offences in respect of which it could exercise its competence. The EPPO may also receive or gather information from other sources, such as private parties. A verification mechanism in the EPPO should aim to assess whether, on the basis of the information received, the conditions for material, territorial and personal competence of the EPPO are fulfilled. |
| (50) | Whistle-blowers may bring new information to the attention of the EPPO thereby assisting it in its work to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment perpetrators of offences affecting the Union’s financial interests. However, whistleblowing may be deterred by fear of retaliation. With a view to facilitating the detection of offences that fall within the competence of the EPPO, Member States are encouraged to provide, in accordance with their national law, effective procedures to enable reporting of possible offences that fall within the competence of the EPPO and to ensure protection of the persons who report such offences from retaliation, and in particular from adverse or discriminatory employment actions. The EPPO should develop its own internal rules if necessary. |
| (51) | In order to comply fully with their obligation to inform the EPPO where a suspicion of an offence within its competence is identified, the national authorities of the Member States as well as all institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union should follow the existing reporting procedures and have in place efficient mechanisms for a preliminary evaluation of allegations reported to them. The institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union may make use of the European Anti-Fraud Office (‘OLAF’) to that end. |
| (52) | Member States’ authorities should set up a system that ensures that information is reported to the EPPO as soon as possible. It is up to the Member States to decide whether to set up a direct or centralised system. |
| (53) | Compliance with that reporting obligation is essential for the EPPO’s good functioning and should be interpreted broadly to ensure that national authorities report cases where the assessment of some criteria is not immediately possible (for example the level of damage or the applicable penalty). The EPPO should also be able to request information from the Member States’ authorities on a case-by-case basis about other offences affecting the Union’s financial interests. This should not be considered as a possibility for the EPPO to request systematic or periodic information from Member States’ authorities concerning minor offences. |
| (54) | The efficient investigation of offences affecting the financial interests of the Union and the principle of ne bis in idem may require, in certain cases, an extension of the investigation to other offences under national law, where these are inextricably linked to an offence affecting the financial interests of the Union. The notion of ‘inextricably linked offences’ should be considered in light of the relevant case-law which, for the application of the ne bis in idem principle, retains as a relevant criterion the identity of the material facts (or facts which are substantially the same), understood in the sense of the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together in time and space. |
| (55) | The EPPO should have the right to exercise competence, where offences are inextricably linked and the offence affecting the Union’s financial interests is preponderant, in terms of the seriousness of the offence concerned, as reflected in the maximum sanctions that could be imposed. |
| (56) | However, the EPPO should also have the right to exercise competence in the case of inextricably linked offences where the offence affecting the financial interests of the Union is not preponderant in terms of sanctions levels, but where the inextricably linked other offence is deemed to be ancillary in nature because it is merely instrumental to the offence affecting the financial interests of the Union, in particular where such other offence has been committed for the main purpose of creating the conditions to commit the offence affecting the financial interests of the Union, such as an offence strictly aimed at ensuring the material or legal means to commit the offence affecting the financial interests of the Union, or to ensure the profit or product thereof. |
| (57) | The notion of offences relating to participation in a criminal organisation should be subject to the definition provided for in national law in accordance with Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA (3), and may cover, for example, membership in, or the organisation and leadership of, such a criminal organisation. |
| (58) | The competence of the EPPO regarding offences affecting the financial interests of the Union should, as a general rule, take priority over national claims of competence so that it can ensure consistency and provide steering of investigations and prosecutions at Union level. With regard to those offences the authorities of Member States should refrain from acting, unless urgent measures are required, until the EPPO has decided whether to conduct an investigation. |
| (59) | A particular case should be considered to have repercussions at Union level, inter alia, where a criminal offence has a transnational nature and scale, where such an offence involves a criminal organisation, or where the specific type of offence could pose a serious threat to the Union’s financial interests or the Union institutions’ credit and Union citizens’ confidence. |
| (60) | Where the EPPO cannot exercise its competence in a particular case because there is reason to assume that the damage caused, or likely to be caused, to the Union’s financial interests does not exceed the damage caused, or likely to be caused, to another victim, the EPPO should nevertheless be able to exercise its competence provided that it would be better placed to investigate or prosecute than the authorities of the respective Member State(s). The EPPO could appear to be better placed, inter alia, where it would be more effective to let the EPPO investigate and prosecute the respective criminal offence due to its transnational nature and scale, where the offence involves a criminal organisation, or where a specific type of offence could be a serious threat to the Union’s financial interests or the Union institutions’ credit and Union citizens’ confidence. In such a case the EPPO should be able to exercise its competence with the consent given by the competent national authorities of the Member State(s) where damage to such other victim(s) occurred. |
| (61) | When a judicial or law enforcement authority of a Member State initiates an investigation in respect of a criminal offence and considers that the EPPO could not exercise its competence, it should inform the EPPO thereof, in order to allow the latter to assess whether it should exercise competence. |
| (62) | In the case of disagreement over the questions of exercise of competence, the competent national authorities should decide on the attribution of competence. The notion of competent national authorities should be understood as any judicial authorities which have competence to decide on the attribution of competence in accordance with national law. |
| (63) | As the EPPO should bring prosecutions before national courts, its competence should be defined by reference to the criminal law of the Member States that criminalises acts or omissions affecting the Union’s financial interests and determines the applicable penalties by implementing the relevant Union legislation, in particular Directive (EU) 2017/1371, in national legal systems. |
| (64) | The EPPO should exercise its competence as broadly as possible so that its investigations and prosecutions may extend to offences committed outside the territory of the Member States. |
| (65) | The investigations and prosecutions of the EPPO should be guided by the principles of proportionality, impartiality and fairness towards the suspect or accused person. This includes the obligation to seek all types of evidence, inculpatory as well as exculpatory, either motu proprio or at the request of the defence. |
| (66) | In order to ensure legal certainty and to effectively combat offences affecting the Union’s financial interests, the investigation and prosecution activities of the EPPO should be guided by the legality principle, whereby the EPPO applies strictly the rules laid down in this Regulation relating in particular to competence and its exercise, the initiation of investigations, the termination of investigations, the referral of a case, the dismissal of the case and simplified prosecution procedures. |
| (67) | In order to best safeguard the rights of the defendant, in principle a suspect or accused person should only face one investigation or prosecution by the EPPO. Where an offence has been committed by several persons, the EPPO should in principle initiate only one case and conduct investigations in respect of all suspect or accused persons jointly. |
| (68) | Where several European Delegated Prosecutors have opened investigations in respect of the same criminal offence, the Permanent Chamber should where appropriate merge such investigations. The Permanent Chamber may decide not to merge such proceedings or decide to subsequently split such proceedings if this is in the interest of the efficiency of investigations, for example if proceedings against one suspect or accused person could be terminated at an earlier stage, whereas proceedings against other suspect or accused persons would still have to be continued, or if splitting the case could shorten the period of pre-trial detention of one of the suspects. Where different Permanent Chambers are in charge of the cases to be merged, the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO should determine the appropriate competence and procedure. Where the Permanent Chamber decides to split a case, its competence for the resulting cases should be maintained. |
| (69) | The EPPO should rely on national authorities, including police authorities, in particular for the execution of coercive measures. Under the principle of sincere cooperation, all national authorities and the relevant bodies of the Union, including Eurojust, Europol and OLAF, should actively support the investigations and prosecutions of the EPPO, as well as cooperate with it, from the moment a suspected offence is reported to the EPPO until the moment it determines whether to prosecute or otherwise dispose of the case. |
| (70) | It is essential for the effective investigation and prosecution of offences affecting the Union’s financial interests that the EPPO be able to gather evidence by using at least a minimum set of investigation measures, while respecting the principle of proportionality. Those measures should be available with regard to the offences that are within the mandate of the EPPO, at least where they are punishable by a maximum penalty of at least 4 years of imprisonment, for the purpose of its investigations and prosecutions, but may be subject to limitations in accordance with national law. |
| (71) | In addition to the minimum set of investigation measures listed in this Regulation, European Delegated Prosecutors should be entitled to request or to order any measures which are available to prosecutors under national law in similar national cases. Availability should be ensured in all situations where the indicated investigative measure exists but may be subject to limitations in accordance with national law. |
| (72) | In cross-border cases, the handling European Delegated Prosecutor should be able to rely on assisting European Delegated Prosecutors when measures need to be undertaken in other Member States. Where judicial authorisation is required for such a measure, it should be clearly specified in which Member State the authorisation should be obtained, but in any case there should be only one authorisation. If an investigation measure is finally refused by the judicial authorities, namely after all legal remedies have been exhausted, the handling European Delegated Prosecutor should withdraw the request or the order. |
| (73) | The possibility foreseen in this Regulation to have recourse to legal instruments on mutual recognition or cross-border cooperation should not replace the specific rules on cross-border investigations under this Regulation. It should rather supplement them to ensure that, where a measure is necessary in a cross-border investigation but is not available in national law for a purely domestic situation, it can be used in accordance with national law implementing the relevant instrument, when conducting the investigation or prosecution. |
| (74) | The provisions of this Regulation on cross-border cooperation should be without prejudice to existing legal instruments that facilitate cross-border cooperation between national authorities, other than prosecution or judicial authorities. The same should apply to national authorities cooperating on the basis of administrative law. |
| (75) | The provisions of this Regulation relating to pre-trial arrest and cross-border surrender should be without prejudice to the specific procedures in Member States where judicial authorisation is not required for the initial arrest of a suspect or accused person. |
| (76) | The handling European Delegated Prosecutor should be entitled to issue or request European Arrest Warrants within the area of competence of the EPPO. |
| (77) | The EPPO should be entitled to refer a case to national authorities, where the investigation reveals that the offence is outside the competence of the EPPO. In such a referral, national authorities should preserve their full prerogatives under national law to open, continue or dismiss the investigation. |
| (78) | This Regulation requires the EPPO to exercise the functions of a prosecutor, which includes taking decisions on a suspect or accused person’s indictment and the choice of the Member State whose courts will be competent to hear the prosecution. The decision whether to indict the suspect or accused person should in principle be made by the competent Permanent Chamber on the basis of a draft decision by the European Delegated Prosecutor, so that there is a common prosecution policy. The Permanent Chamber should be entitled to take any decision within 21 days of receiving the draft decision, including requesting further evidence, before deciding to bring a case to judgment, except a decision to dismiss a case where the European Delegated Prosecutor has proposed to bring the case to judgment. |
| (79) | The Member State whose courts will be competent to hear the prosecution should be chosen by the competent Permanent Chamber on the basis of a set of criteria laid down in this Regulation. The Permanent Chamber should take its decision on the basis of a report and a draft decision by the handling European Delegated Prosecutor, which should be transmitted to the Permanent Chamber by the supervising European Prosecutor with, if necessary, his/her own assessment. The supervising European Prosecutor should retain all the powers to give specific instructions to the European Delegated Prosecutor provided for in this Regulation. |
| (80) | The evidence presented by the EPPO in court should not be denied admission on the mere ground that the evidence was gathered in another Member State or in accordance with the law of another Member State, provided that the trial court considers its admission to respect the fairness of the procedure and the suspect or accused person’s rights of defence under the Charter. This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by Article 6 TEU and in the Charter, in particular Title VI thereof, by international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by Member States’ constitutions in their respective fields of application. In line with those principles, and in respecting the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States as provided for in Article 67(1) TFEU, nothing in this Regulation may be interpreted as prohibiting the courts from applying the fundamental principles of national law on fairness of the procedure that they apply in their national systems, including in common law systems. |
| (81) | Taking into account the legality principle, the investigations of the EPPO should as a rule lead to prosecution in the competent national courts in cases where there is sufficient evidence and no legal ground bars prosecution, or where no simplified prosecution procedure has been applied. The grounds for dismissal of a case are exhaustively laid down in this Regulation. |
| (82) | National legal systems provide for various types of simplified prosecution procedures, which may or may not include involvement of a court, for example in the form of transactions with the suspect or accused person. If such procedures exist, the European Delegated Prosecutor should have the power to apply them under the conditions provided for in national law and in the situations provided for by this Regulation. Those situations should include cases where the final damage of the offence, after possible recovery of an amount corresponding to such damage, is not significant. Considering the interest of a coherent and effective prosecution policy of the EPPO, the competent Permanent Chamber should always be called upon to give its consent to the use of such procedures. When the simplified procedure has been successfully applied, the case should be finally disposed of. |
| (83) | This Regulation requires the EPPO to respect, in particular, the right to a fair trial, the rights of the defence and the presumption of innocence, as enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter. Article 50 of the Charter, which protects the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same offence (ne bis in idem), ensures that there will be no double jeopardy as a result of the prosecutions brought by the EPPO. The activities of the EPPO should thus be exercised in full compliance with those rights and this Regulation should be applied and interpreted accordingly. |
| (84) | Article 82(2) TFEU allows the Union to establish minimum rules on rights of individuals in criminal proceedings, in order to ensure that the rights of defence and the fairness of the proceedings are respected. Those minimum rules have been gradually set out by the Union legislator in Directives on specific rights. |
| (85) | The rights of defence provided for in the relevant Union law, such as Directives 2010/64/EU (4), 2012/13/EU (5), 2013/48/EU (6), (EU) 2016/343 (7), (EU) 2016/1919 (8), of the European Parliament and of the Council as implemented by national law, should apply to the activities of the EPPO. Any suspect or accused person in respect of whom the EPPO initiates an investigation should benefit from those rights, as well as from the rights provided for in national law to request that experts are appointed or that witnesses are heard, or that evidence on behalf of the defence is otherwise produced by the EPPO. |
| (86) | Article 86(3) TFEU allows the Union legislator to determine the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by the EPPO in the performance of its functions. That competence granted to the Union legislator reflects the specific nature of the tasks and structure of the EPPO, which is different from that of all other bodies and agencies of the Union and requires special rules regarding judicial review. |
| (87) | According to Article 86(2) TFEU, the EPPO exercises its functions of prosecutor before the competent courts of the Member States. Acts undertaken by the EPPO in the course of its investigations are closely related to the prosecution which may result therefrom, and thus have effects in the legal order of the Member States. In many cases the acts will be carried out by national law enforcement authorities acting under the instructions of the EPPO, in some cases after having obtained the authorisation of a national court. It is therefore appropriate to consider that procedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties should be subject to review by the competent national courts in accordance with the requirements and procedures laid down by national law. This should ensure that the procedural acts of the EPPO that are adopted before the indictment and intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties (a category which includes the suspect, the victim, and other interested persons whose rights may be adversely affected by such acts) are subject to judicial review by national courts. Procedural acts that relate to the choice of the Member State whose courts will be competent to hear the prosecution, which is to be determined on the basis of the criteria laid down in this Regulation, are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties and should therefore be subject to judicial review by national courts, at the latest at the trial stage. Actions before competent national courts for failures of the EPPO to act are those regarding procedural acts which the EPPO is under a legal obligation to adopt and which are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. Where national law provides for judicial review concerning procedural acts which are not intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties or for legal actions concerning other failures to act, this Regulation should not be interpreted as affecting such legal provisions. In addition, Member States should not be required to provide for judicial review by the competent national courts of procedural acts which are not intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, such as the appointment of experts or the reimbursement of witness costs. Finally, this Regulation does not affect the powers of national trial courts. |
| (88) | The legality of procedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties should be subject to judicial review before national courts. In that regard, effective remedies should be ensured in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. Furthermore, as underlined by the case-law of the Court of Justice, the national procedural rules governing actions for the protection of individual rights granted by Union law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Union law (principle of effectiveness). When national courts review the legality of such acts, they may do so on the basis of Union law, including this Regulation, and also on the basis of national law, which applies to the extent that a matter is not dealt with by this Regulation. As underlined in the case-law of the Court of Justice, national courts should always refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice when they entertain doubts about the validity of those acts vis-à-vis Union law. However, national courts may not refer to the Court of Justice preliminary questions on the validity of the procedural acts of the EPPO with regard to national procedural law or to national measures transposing Directives, even if this Regulation refers to them. This is however without prejudice to preliminary references concerning the interpretation of any provision of primary law, including the Treaties and the Charter, or the interpretation and validity of any provision of Union secondary law, including this Regulation and applicable Directives. In addition, this Regulation does not exclude the possibility for national courts to review the validity of the procedural acts of the EPPO which are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties with regard to the principle of proportionality as enshrined in national law. |
| (89) | The provision of this Regulation on judicial review does not alter the powers of the Court of Justice to review the EPPO administrative decisions, which are intended to have legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, namely decisions that are not taken in the performance of its functions of investigating, prosecuting or bringing to judgement. This Regulation is also without prejudice to the possibility for a Member State of the European Union, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission to bring actions for annulment in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and to the first paragraph of Article 265 TFEU, and to infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU. |
| (90) | Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9) applies to the processing of administrative personal data performed by the EPPO. |
| (91) | Consistent and homogeneous application of the rules for the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms with regard to the processing of personal data should be ensured throughout the Union. |
| (92) | Declaration No 21 on the protection of personal data in the fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, provides that specific rules on the protection of personal data and the free movement of such data in the fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation based on Article 16 TFEU may prove to be necessary because of the specific nature of these fields. |
| (93) | The rules of this Regulation on the protection of personal data should be interpreted and applied in accordance with the interpretation and application of Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10), which will apply to the processing of personal data by competent authorities of the Member States of the European Union for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties. |
| (94) | The data protection principle of fair processing is a distinct notion from the right to a fair trial as defined in Article 47 of the Charter and in Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. |
| (95) | The data protection provisions of this Regulation are without prejudice to the applicable rules on the admissibility of personal data as evidence in criminal court proceedings. |
| (96) | All Member States of the European Union are affiliated to the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol). To fulfil its mission, Interpol receives, stores and circulates personal data to assist competent authorities in preventing and combating international crime. It is therefore appropriate to strengthen cooperation between the Union and Interpol by promoting an efficient exchange of personal data whilst ensuring respect for fundamental rights and freedoms regarding the automatic processing of personal data. Where operational personal data are transferred from the EPPO to Interpol, and to countries which have delegated members to Interpol, this Regulation, in particular the provisions on international transfers, should apply. This Regulation should be without prejudice to the specific rules laid down in Council Common Position 2005/69/JHA (11) and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA (12). |
| (97) | When the EPPO transfers operational personal data to an authority of a third country or to an international organisation or Interpol by virtue of an international agreement concluded pursuant to Article 218 TFEU, appropriate safeguards for the protection of privacy and the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals should ensure that the data protection provisions of this Regulation are complied with. |
| (98) | In order to ensure effective, reliable and consistent monitoring of compliance with and enforcement of this Regulation as regards operational personal data, as required by Article 8 of the Charter, the European Data Protection Supervisor should have the tasks laid down in this Regulation and should have effective powers, including investigative, corrective, and advisory powers which constitute the necessary means to perform those tasks. However, the powers of the European Data Protection Supervisor should not unduly interfere with specific rules for criminal proceedings, including investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, or the independence of the judiciary. |
| (99) | In order to enable the EPPO to fulfil its tasks and to take account of developments in information technology, and in light of the state of progress in the information society, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of listing and updating the list of the categories of operational personal data and the categories of data subjects listed in an Annex. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016 (13). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council should receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts should systematically have access to meetings of the Commission expert group dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. |
| (100) | The EPPO should work closely with other institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union in order to facilitate the exercise of its functions under this Regulation and establish, where necessary, formal arrangements on detailed rules relating to exchange of information and cooperation. Cooperation with Europol and OLAF should be of particular importance to avoid duplication and enable the EPPO to obtain the relevant information in their possession, as well as to draw on their analysis in specific investigations. |
| (101) | The EPPO should be able to obtain any relevant information that falls within its competence stored in databases and registers of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. |
| (102) | The EPPO and Eurojust should become partners and should cooperate in operational matters in accordance with their respective mandates. Such cooperation may involve any investigations conducted by the EPPO where an exchange of information or coordination of investigative measures in respect of cases within the competence of Eurojust is considered to be necessary or appropriate. Whenever the EPPO is requesting such cooperation of Eurojust, the EPPO should liaise with the Eurojust national member of the handling European Delegated Prosecutor’s Member State. The operational cooperation may also involve third countries that have a cooperation agreement with Eurojust. |
| (103) | The EPPO and OLAF should establish and maintain a close cooperation aimed at ensuring the complementarity of their respective mandates, and avoiding duplication. In that regard, OLAF should in principle not open any administrative investigations parallel to an investigation conducted by the EPPO into the same facts. This should, however, be without prejudice to the power of OLAF to start an administrative investigation on its own initiative, in close consultation with the EPPO. |
| (104) | In all actions in support of the EPPO, OLAF will act independently of the Commission, in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (14). |
| (105) | In cases where the EPPO is not conducting an investigation, it should be able to provide relevant information to allow OLAF to consider appropriate action in accordance with its mandate. In particular, the EPPO could consider informing OLAF of cases where there are no reasonable grounds to believe that an offence within the competence of the EPPO is being or has been committed, but an administrative investigation by OLAF may be appropriate, or where the EPPO dismisses a case and a referral to OLAF is desirable for administrative follow-up or recovery. When the EPPO provides information, it may request that OLAF considers whether to open an administrative investigation or take other administrative follow-up or monitoring action, in particular for the purposes of precautionary measures, recovery or disciplinary action, in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. |
| (106) | To the extent that recovery procedures are deferred as a result of decisions taken by the EPPO in connection with investigations or prosecutions under this Regulation, Member States should not be considered at fault or negligent for the purposes of recovery procedures within the meaning of Article 122 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (15). |
| (107) | The EPPO should enable the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union and other victims to take appropriate measures. This may include taking precautionary measures, in particular to prevent any continuous wrongdoing or to protect the Union from reputational damage, or to allow them to intervene as a civil party in the proceedings in accordance with national law. The exchange of information should take place in a manner that fully respects the independence of the EPPO, and only to the extent possible, without any prejudice to the proper conduct and confidentiality of investigations. |
| (108) | In so far as necessary for the performance of its tasks, the EPPO should also be able to establish and maintain cooperative relations with the authorities of third countries and international organisations. For the purpose of this Regulation, ‘international organisations’ means international organisations and their subordinate bodies governed by public international law or other bodies which are set up by, or on the basis of, an agreement between two or more countries as well as Interpol. |
| (109) | Where the College identifies an operational need for cooperation with a third country or an international organisation, it should be able to suggest that the Council draw the attention of the Commission to the need for an adequacy decision or for a recommendation on the opening of negotiations on an international agreement. Pending the conclusion of new international agreements by the Union or the accession by the Union to multilateral agreements already concluded by the Member States, on legal assistance in criminal matters, the Member States should facilitate the exercise by the EPPO of its functions pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU. If permitted under a relevant multilateral agreement and subject to the third country’s acceptance, the Member States should recognise and, where applicable, notify the EPPO as a competent authority for the purpose of the implementation of those multilateral agreements. This may entail, in certain cases, an amendment to those agreements but the renegotiation of such agreements should not be regarded as a mandatory step, since it may not always be possible. The Member States may also notify the EPPO as a competent authority for the purpose of the implementation of other international agreements on legal assistance in criminal matters concluded by them, including by way of an amendment to those agreements. Where the notification of the EPPO as a competent authority for the purposes of multilateral agreements already concluded by the Member States with third countries is not possible or is not accepted by the third countries and pending the Union accession to such international agreements, European Delegated Prosecutors may use their status as national prosecutor toward such third countries, provided that they inform and where appropriate endeavour to obtain consent from the authorities of third countries that the evidence collected from these third countries on the basis of those international agreements, will be used in investigations and prosecutions carried out by the EPPO. The EPPO should also be able to rely on reciprocity or international comity vis à-vis the authorities of third countries. This should however be carried out on a case-by-case basis, within the limits of the material competence of the EPPO and subject to possible conditions set by the authorities of the third countries. |
| (110) | Member States of the European Union which do not participate in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO are not bound by this Regulation. The Commission should, if appropriate, submit proposals in order to ensure effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the EPPO and Member States of the European Union which do not participate in enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the EPPO. This should in particular concern the rules relating to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and surrender, fully respecting the Union acquis in this field as well as the duty of sincere cooperation in accordance with Article 4(3) TEU. |
| (111) | To guarantee the full autonomy and independence of the EPPO, it should be granted an autonomous budget, with revenue coming essentially from a contribution from the budget of the Union. The financial, budgetary and staff regime of the EPPO should follow the relevant Union standards applicable to bodies referred to in Article 208 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (16), with due regard, however, to the fact that the competence of the EPPO to carry out criminal investigations and prosecutions at Union level is unique. |
| (112) | The costs of investigation measures undertaken by the EPPO should in principle be covered by the national authorities carrying them out. Exceptionally high costs for investigation measures such as complex experts’ opinions, extensive police operations or surveillance activities over a long period of time could partly be reimbursed by the EPPO, including, where possible, by reallocating resources from other budget lines of the EPPO, or by amending the budget in accordance with this Regulation and the applicable financial rules. When preparing the proposal for the provisional draft estimate of the revenue and expenditure the Administrative Director should take into account the need of the EPPO to partly reimburse exceptionally costly investigation measures accepted by the Permanent Chamber. |
| (113) | Operational expenditures of the EPPO should be covered from the budget of the EPPO. These should include the cost of operational communication between the European Delegated Prosecutor and the central level of the EPPO, such as mail delivery costs, travel expenses, translations necessary for the internal functioning of the EPPO, and other costs not previously incurred by Member States during an investigation which are caused only due to the EPPO having assumed responsibilities for investigation and prosecution. However, the costs of the European Delegated Prosecutors’ office and secretarial support should be covered by the Member States. In accordance with Article 332 TFEU, expenditure resulting from the implementation of the EPPO will be borne by the Member States. That expenditure does not include the administrative costs entailed for the institutions within the meaning of Article 13(1) TEU. |
| (114) | The College should in principle always delegate its powers conferred on the appointing authority by the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (17) (‘the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment’) to conclude contracts of employment, to the Administrative Director, unless specific circumstances call for it to exercise that power. |
| (115) | The Administrative Director, as authorising officer, is responsible for the implementation of the budget of the EPPO. When consulting with the Permanent Chamber regarding exceptionally costly investigation measures, the Administrative Director is responsible for deciding on the amount of the grant to be awarded, based on the available financial resources and in accordance with the criteria set out in the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO. |
| (116) | The remuneration of the European Delegated Prosecutors as special advisers, which will be set through a direct agreement, should be based on a specific decision to be taken by the College. This decision should, inter alia, ensure that the European Delegated Prosecutors, in the specific case that they also exercise functions as national prosecutors in accordance with Article 13(3), will in principle continue to be paid in their capacity as national prosecutors and that the remuneration as special adviser will only relate to the equivalent of the work on behalf of the EPPO in the capacity as a European Delegated Prosecutor. Each Member State retains the power to determine in its legislation, in compliance with Union law, the conditions for granting benefits under their social security scheme. |
| (117) | In order for the EPPO to be fully operational on the date to be determined, it will need staff with experience within the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union. With a view to meeting that need, the recruitment by the EPPO of temporary and contract agents already working in the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union should be facilitated by guaranteeing those staff members continuity of their contractual rights if they are recruited by the EPPO in its set-up phase until 1 year after the EPPO becomes operational in accordance with the decision in Article 120(2). |
| (118) | The EPPO’s proceedings should be transparent in accordance with Article 15(3) TFEU and specific provisions on how the right of public access to documents is ensured, would need to be adopted by the College. Nothing in this Regulation is intended to restrict the right of public access to documents in so far as it is guaranteed in the Union and in the Member States, in particular under Article 42 of the Charter and other relevant provisions. |
| (119) | The general rules on transparency that apply to Union agencies should also apply to the EPPO but only with regard to documents other than case files, including electronic images of such files, so as not to jeopardise in any manner the requirement of confidentiality in its operational work. In the same manner, administrative inquiries conducted by the European Ombudsman should respect the requirement of confidentiality of the EPPO. In view of ensuring the integrity of the investigations and prosecutions of the EPPO, documents relating to the operational activity should not be covered by the rules of transparency. |
| (120) | The European Data Protection Supervisory has been consulted and, on 10 March 2014, delivered an opinion. |
| (121) | The Representatives of the Member States, meeting at Head of State or Government level in Brussels on 13 December 2003, have determined the seat of the EPPO in accordance with the provisions of the Decision of 8 April 1965 (18), |